


JPRS-NEA-89-081
28 DECEMBER 1989



**FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE**

JPRS Report

Near East & South Asia

Near East & South Asia

JPRS-NEA-89-081

CONTENTS

28 DECEMBER 1989

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

- Debts to West Blamed for Increase in Poverty [Kuwait AL-SIYASAH 24 Oct] 1
- Egypt's Liberal Party Meets New Hungarian Liberals [Cairo AL-AHRAR 27 Nov] 2

ISLAMIC AFFAIRS

- Article Analyzes Obstacles to 'Progress With Islam' [Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI 12 Dec] ... 3

NEAR EAST

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

- World Demand for Oil Forecast for Year 2000 [Kuwait AL-SIYASAH 23 Oct] 5
- Preparations for Arab-European Dialogue Underway
[Manama AKHBAR AL-KHALIJ 2 Sep] 8
- Arab-European Trade Relations Discussed [Manama AL-BAHRAYN 25 Oct] 9
- Power Grid Integration With Europe Discussed [Doha AL-'ARAB 17 Oct] 10
- Article Discusses Benefits of Arab Economic Integration [Kuwait AL-SIYASAH 24 Oct] 11
- Natural Gas Use in Arab Industries Increasing [Manama AL-BAHRAYN 25 Oct] 12
- Writer Records Impressions of Libya, 'Manmade River' [Cairo AL-SHA'B 28 Nov] 13

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

- Nusaybah Calls for Provisional Government Now
[Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST 17 Nov] 14
- Namibian Model for Palestinian State Analyzed [Tel Aviv MA'ARIV 3 Nov] 15
- Recent Hamas Activity in Gaza Detailed [Tel Aviv MA'ARIV 17 Nov] 17

EGYPT

- Mubarak's Mawlid al-Nabi Speech Discussed [LIWA' AL-ISLAM 1 Nov] 19
- Security Forces Arrest 'More Than 200' in al-Daqahliyah [AL-WAFD 13 Dec] 20
- Union's al-Khawajah Praises Syria, Calls Lebanon Nonentity [London AL-DUSTUR 13 Nov] 20
- SLP Youth Secretary on Party Goals, Domestic Issues [Paris AL-YAWM AL-SABI' 27 Nov] 21
- Writer Defends Future, History of Communism [AL-AHALI 18 Oct] 23

ISRAEL

- Israelis Reportedly Support Shamir's Immobility [YEDI'OT AHARONOT 30 Oct] 24
- Opposition to Shamir Discussed [DAVAR 27 Oct] 25
- Meridor Called Shamir's 'Heir Apparent' [HADASHOT 13 Oct] 26
- 'Dirty Politics' Reported Among Likud Leadership [AL HAMISHMAR 6 Oct] 27
- Likud Personalities, Factions Examined [HADASHOT 13 Oct] 28
- Peres Reportedly Losing Ground in Party [HADASHOT 6 Oct] 31
- Peres Accused of Preventing Negev Settlement [HADASHOT 13 Oct] 33
- UNRWA Activities in Gaza Described [HA'ARETZ 20 Dec] 33
- UNRWA Accused of Exceeding Its Mandate [YEDI'OT AHARONOT 30 Oct] 33
- Controversy Reported in IDF Decisionmaking [HA'ARETZ 2 Nov] 34
- No Grounds Perceived for Lebanon Withdrawal [HA'ARETZ 25 Oct] 35
- Shortcomings Reported in Military Intelligence [AL HAMISHMAR 8 Oct] 36
- IDF Planning Branch Chief Examines Budget Cuts [BAMAHAANE 22 Nov] 37
- Reservists Protest Unclear Orders [HA'ARETZ 2 Nov] 38
- Jerusalem Police Request Freedom To Shoot [AL-HAMISHMAR 26 Oct] 38

Role of Shin Bet in Territories Described	[AL HAMISHMAR 7 Dec]	39
Palestinian the Islamic Jihad Activities Described	[MA'ARIV 20 Oct]	40
Social Impact of Intifadah Denied	[HA'ARETZ 24 Oct]	43
Crime Level Influenced by General Situation	[HA'ARETZ 23 Oct]	44
New Road To Skirt Gaza Camps, Villages	[HADASHOT 22 Oct]	45
New Settlement in Etzion Bloc Established	[MA'ARIV 12 Dec]	45
New Organization Established in Nabulus	[YEDI'OT AHARONOT 19 Dec]	45
Religious Parties' Positions Examined	[HA'ARETZ 22 Oct]	45
Changes Expected In RAKAH Leadership	[AL HAMISHMAR 10 Oct]	46
Statistics Indicate Economic Stabilization	[YEDI'OT AHARONOT 12 Oct]	47
Official Denies Crisis in Higher Education	[HA'ARETZ 23 Oct]	47
Immigration Statistics for 1989 Given	[DAVAR 8 Dec]	47
New Power Plant in Hadera	[DAVAR 30 Oct]	48
New Bill Expected To Reduce Pollution	[HA'ARETZ 22 Oct]	48
Arab Housing Problems Reportedly Spreading	[AL-HAMISHMAR 25 Oct]	48
Arab Christians Form 'Union of Churches'	[Tel Aviv DAVAR 13 Dec]	49
Commentator Rules Out Mideast War	[HA'ARETZ 23 Oct]	50

JORDAN

Disturbances in Refugee Camps Reported	[Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ 11 Dec]	51
--	----------------------------	----

OMAN

New Tax Law Imposed on Industry, Commerce	[UMAN 21 Oct]	51
Resolutions Dealing With Irrigation Suggested	[UMAN 20 Oct]	51

QATAR

State's Security Apparatus Described	[AL-'ARAB 17 Oct]	52
Industrial Coordination With GCC Discussed	[AL-RAYAH 8 Oct]	53

SUDAN

Eritrean Refugees Add to Economic Burdens	[London AL-MAJALLAH 31 Oct]	55
---	-----------------------------	----

TUNISIA

Lack of Innovation on Part of RCD Criticized	[LE MAGHREB 3 Nov]	56
--	--------------------	----

SOUTH ASIA

INDIA

Reportage on 'Hindu' Coverage of Bofors Case		60
Associate Editor Ram's Statement	[THE HINDU 13 Oct]	60
Kasturi's Reply	[THE HINDU 13 Oct]	62

IRAN

IRI, Turkey Reach Extradition Agreement on Fugitives	[KEYHAN 21 Nov]	62
Iran Stressing Normalization With GCC	[Doha AL-'ARAB 1 Oct]	63
Importance of Fighting Foreign Influences Stressed		63
Resisting Societal Vice	[RESALAT 22 Nov]	63
Opposing Cultural Conspiracies	[RESALAT 22 Nov]	64
Excess Liquid Gas To Be Exported	[KEYHAN 21 Nov]	66
Thousands of Telephone Numbers Assigned in Tehran	[KEYHAN 21 Nov]	66
Heavy Industries Ministry on Distribution Suggestions	[KEYHAN 21 Nov]	67

PAKISTAN

Seraiki Leaders Demand Division of Punjab [DAWN 14 Oct]	69
Status of Northern Areas Discussed [DAWN 18 Oct]	69
Technology Transfer: Article Questions Standard Views [DAWN 3 Nov]	71
Steel Expansion Program Launched [THE MUSLIM 12 Nov]	73
Press Views on Sindh Situation Reported [DAWN 13 Oct]	74

Debts to West Blamed for Increase in Poverty

90OL0091B Kuwait AL-SIYASAH
in Arabic 24 Oct 89 p 10

[Article: "On the Occasion of the Silver Jubilee of the Kuwaiti Union Movement: Dr al-Najjar Lectures on Debts to West and Their Role in Poverty Industry"]

[Text] The committee to celebrate the silver jubilee of the Kuwaiti union movement held a seminar the day before yesterday on "developing nations indebtedness to the West and its role in creating poverty." The seminar, which featured Dr Ghanim al-Najjar, was held at the Hawli Square headquarters of the General Association for Kuwaiti Labor.

Dr al-Najjar said in his lecture, "It probably is no exaggeration to say that the crisis of indebtedness creates a poverty industry. Keeping nations in the throes of poverty, or even rendering them poor if necessary, is a deliberate and calculated course orchestrated by curricula that have existed for a while and permeated existing Western institutions of lending to the Third World.

"The activities of these institutions, be they states, international lending organizations, or private banks, can no longer be classified as assistance, since they have clearly become indications of a crisis in the international monetary system, especially in the West.

"International indebtedness is at \$1.3 trillion in 1989, and primarily involves parties that are international in nature and character, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), or commercial, such as commercial banks or other national lending organizations.

"Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, India, Chile, and the Philippines share an aggregate debt of \$15 billion to the IMF alone. This is a small portion of the total indebtedness of those countries since the IMF is the lender of last resort and intervenes only when there is a problem. The fund does not enjoy a good reputation among the peoples of the Third World because its intervention is invariably followed by disturbances. This phenomenon has occurred with such regularity that it could be a scene in an international theatrical play directed by the fund. Perhaps the two most recent examples are incidents last April in Jordan and in February in Venezuela where 297 victims were killed and the army had to take control of the streets.

"What are these debts in reality? In other words, is there a debt crisis? The definition of a debt crisis is the inability of the borrower to repay. In truth, this is merely an indication and symptom of a much deeper problem rooted in the proceedings and covenants that govern and propel the international monetary system.

"Imbalances have actually afflicted the international balance of payments since the end of the seventies. The deficit has grown annually at an estimated \$100 billion

through the early eighties. In other words, it amounted to 10 percent of the total value of aggregate international trade. It was not easy, but the situation has created a feverish atmosphere in international money flows, producing what might be called hot money, or vagabond money, ready at all times to hop from one country to another in quest of warmer receptions and higher interest rates. It was therefore no surprise that world currency exchange markets handle as much as \$150 billion in daily funds.

"The international balance of payments deficit worsened with the emergence of a new organized class of international crooks specialized in breaking laws, violating rules, and jumping borders to exploit this volume of homeless vagabond money. They manage their operations and activities out of certain international banking institutions.

"The debt crisis began in the summer of 1982 when it was revealed that certain Third World countries were unable to service their debt. The development received intense media attention. (It is odd coincidence that the peak of al-Manakh crisis [Kuwait's Suk al-Manakh stock exchange crisis] coincided perfectly with the emergence of the international debt crisis).

"That emergence indicates the extent of the crisis deep within the international banking system and is proof of the risks and instability that characterize it. It was also evidence of malfeasance and misconduct by the system and its participants (international banks) and an indication of the following:

"A group of banks with international activity began aiding and abetting the smuggling of private funds from politically and socially unstable countries subjected to various pressures. The banks then loaned these fleeing and smuggled funds for specific periods of time to countries and governments with shortages of foreign reserves. Some bankers were fully aware of this suicidal game in which they became involved. Everybody colluded and not one banking institution dared buck the trend and challenge those gold-digging adventurers.

"We wonder whether it is fair and just to demand repayment of those debts in the first place. The peoples of the Third World are already suffering low standards of living, devastated ambitions, and violations of human rights. Should they be burdened further because funds were systematically passed out of their countries by their political and economic leaders in cooperation and coordination with international banks? For instance, funds valued at \$19 billion were smuggled out of the Sudan in the 1978-1985 period. Some \$39 billion in funds were also smuggled out of Mexico in a single year—that of 1982. The role played by illegitimate debts originated with a crisis rooted in the capitalist economic system that obstructs the potential of Third World countries to achieve progress. The specter of cooperation and attempts at resolution by means of IMF-proposed reforms would so fetter Third World countries that they

would be totally inundated. They would strike a final blow to all efforts that spark in those a ray of hope in independence and autonomous self-development.

"It is sad that although they contributed a lot in support of international lending institutions and even of United Nations specialized agencies, the Arab countries did not receive much benefit and could not gain enough voting power to be able to serve the Third World in general and Arab development causes in particular. Some of those institutions undercut the interests of numerous Arab countries, and their objectives were by necessity nothing but subjugation and domination. We have been unable to play a role in organizations that are primarily finance-driven. We need to move with more awareness and with better and more forceful coordination in order to profit by situations where we find ourselves without benefit.

"Corrective attempts sought by international lending institutions to alleviate the debt crisis are nothing more than a new form of exploitation and plundering adapted to new conditions created by the past crises. That unfair equation will continue to exist as long as certain populations suffer from over-eating while others starve.

"Belt-tightening is perhaps the main factor thwarting the interests of the poor, because it cuts down on general social outlays of primary benefit to the poor, such as subsidies to consumer goods and free education and health services.

"The [IMF-recommended] program frequently seeks to boost revenues by raising the prices of public sector products and by hiking the rates of such public utilities as electricity, water, and mass transport. In addition to the program's inflationary effects, contraction also impacts the poor by reducing job opportunities and increasing unemployment. Inflation, according to Dr al-'Issawi, redistributes income from the poor to the rich, diminishes wages in real terms, and lowers the living standards of those with fixed or limited incomes.

"Studies of fund programs emphasize that complications from fund policies primarily afflict the poorer classes. For instance, the implementation of a stabilization program in Argentina drove prices up by 64 percent in 1972, by 335 percent in 1975, and by 348 percent in 1976.

Chile, in addition to price escalations and a collapse in real wages, suffered a jump in unemployment from 3 percent in 1972 (prior to the program) to 5 percent in 1973 and to 15 percent in 1975. The unemployment rate dropped to 10 percent in 1980 (which is still considerable and is more than thrice the rate prevailing before the stabilization program) but rebounded again to 20 percent in 1983.

"The study also revealed that Morocco reduced some 19,000 government jobs in 1983 in order to comply with fund recommendations.

"Similar effects were observed in other countries that implemented fund programs. A study of Latin America and the Caribbean said that while the rate of unemployment soared, the unemployed were denied assistance. The same study added that all indicators pointed out that living conditions of the poor have deteriorated and need urgent handling as tremendous price escalations accompanied currency devaluations and other measures for uniform exchange rates. Wages dropped precipitously in real terms. Infant mortality rates rose in some countries, like Brazil, after long periods of decline. Nutrition also deteriorated in countries like Mexico, especially among the lower and lower-middle classes. School capacity ratios dropped in countries like Chile because of truancy by poor pupils in order to make up for the declines in family income. Rising cases of malnutrition among children and deteriorating public health services were also observed, in the Dominican Republic for instance.

"In Egypt, conditions of the poor have deteriorated, the gap widened between them and the rich, the rate of inflation escalated, and persistent price hikes outraced the monetary wages of those with fixed or limited incomes among the poor and middle classes."

Egypt's Liberal Party Meets New Hungarian Liberals

45000041 Cairo AL-AHRAR in Arabic 27 Nov 89 p 2

[Text] Mustafa Kamil Murad, head of the Liberal Party, received a delegation from the new Hungarian liberal party [as published], led by Mr Jnush [as published], which is currently visiting Egypt.

Article Analyzes Obstacles to 'Progress With Islam'

900A0183A Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI
in Arabic 12 Dec 89 p 7

[Article by Fahmi Huwaydi: "On Progress With Islam"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] The elections Jordan held last month were a unique occasion. Even though they were not meant to be a referendum on Islam, the fact that the Islamists won 40 percent of the Jordanian Parliament's seats has its extreme significance in the context of what we are about to discuss.

There have been numerous analyses and interpretations of the outcome of Jordan's elections. Numerous reasons have been cited for this remarkable victory but none of them mention the fact that people rally behind the Islamic banner wherever it is flown and that this circle is expanding in the various parts of the Arab world from Jordan to Tunisia and Algeria.

Under the canopy of this logic, we have to deal with the "rising" Islamic path, and there is no alternative to the endeavor to extract the best elements and capabilities of this path and to employ them in the service of progress, of renaissance, and of a better future.

This is why the slogan of "progress with Islam" gains utmost importance in this phase. It embodies to a large degree the aspirations and hopes of the nation with its various religious and political denominations.

What I mean is that this slogan creates a common ground that eliminates the "progressives'" apprehension of Islam and that puts the Islamists face to face with their true responsibilities.

Obstacles on Path

If it occurs to us to move seriously in this direction, and this is what we have been urging for years through what we have called "summoning Islam to the progress battle," then we will find that the path is not paved and not strewn with roses, but that there are obstacles to be overcome and criteria to be defined and clarified first. Let us begin with useful words on the subject.

The first obstacle is embodied in the need for consensus on the principle of progress with Islam. Consensus is required here from the elite representing the nation's intellect and awareness, regardless of whether this elite a ruling political authority or a guiding cultural authority. [passage omitted]

Intellectual petrification represents a second obstacle. We have constantly denounced intellectual petrification in the Islamic side and we have nothing more to say on this point. [passage omitted]

The third obstacle is embodied in this mistaking Muslims for Islam or of principle for history. Islam's message, and the message of every intellectual or political

ideology, is addressed to people who include the good and the bad, the benevolent and the evil, the pure and the corrupt. What these or those do to build or to destroy with the teachings of the message falls on their own shoulders and they are accountable for it ultimately. Consequently, when evaluation and treatment are considered, the issue moves from the intellectual and ideological level to the social level.

If, for example, we have a broad heritage abounding with a mixture of great ideas and sickly interpretation, and if at one time or another a group of people build on what is sickly and turn away from what is beneficial and important, wouldn't logic dictate in this case that we discuss the social circumstances that motivate such a group of people to stray in this direction and not in others? Is it any good to heap curses on the heritage and to call for dropping the heritage from both conscience and memory, as some in the Arab Maghreb have advocated?

The faulty reading of history and of the reality represents a fourth obstacle.

As example of the faulty reading of history is the generalized condemnation of the Islamic reformist movement because of a limited number, three or four, acts of violence which were committed more than 30 years ago, which have been considered a mistake, and which have been condemned. We make a big mistake if we fail to realize that views develop and mature through experience and over the years. It is in the interest of the present and the future for all to cooperate in turning over the pages of the past, especially those which have already been surpassed.

If a party proceeds to correct its position and if it calls for turning over a new leaf, then why should there be insistence on freezing history at a certain moment which passed 30 years ago?

An example of the faulty reading of the reality is to turn all the lights and to focus all the attention on the brotherhood movement—the parent group—and on a number of new groups, especially those groups, which are no more than five in number, that engage in intellectual or material violence.

The mistake is embodied here in disregarding a broad segment of elements of the reformist school—the advocate of renaissance and progress—who have surpassed the brotherhood experience and who have not agreed with any of the new Islamic groups' lines of thought. It is difficult to classify these elements within a particular group. However, their presence is felt in the various intellectual and interpretive fields.

These elements represent an influential and important bridge in the call advocating progress with Islam. To disregard their presence and role is to presume that the Islamic tendency has become futile. This is untrue, not to mention that it obstructs one of the lines of progress toward the goal for which we aspire.

The effort for progress with Islam does not, of course, begin in void. It has its ample munition in the laws. Fair specialists are aware how rich this nation's heritage is with treasures that form an inexhaustible asset for the renaissance plan. All that is needed is to remove the piles of dirt and layers of rust that have accumulated atop these treasures, thus making the precious and the worthless—both lumped together in the same basket and under the same heading—in this heritage equal.

We will not talk about the position of the law or about the bright side of the heritage. Numerous predecessors have dwelt on these issues in detail and have done them justice. But what we wish to draw attention to is that there are contemporary jurisprudential interpretations that represent, to a large degree, advanced steps that have surpassed not only the vociferous Islamic groups but also the conventional jurisprudential position in the various aspects of life. For one reason or another, these interpretations, as extremely significant as they are, have not gained the popularity and proliferation they merit.

There isn't enough space here to review all these tendencies. But I will cite some examples in the political area only.

The jurisprudential position inherited since the days of the Abbasid era believes that the "caliphate" is the system of government approved by Islam. Some people have even come to consider this view a "religion that must be followed." The new interpretive position sees the caliphate as a nonbinding historical system and adds that Islam has not stipulated a certain system of government, but is concerned with dictating certain values and requires that they be observed, regardless of the system of government to which the people agree. Consultation, justice, freedom, and equality top these values.

The conventional position states that there are no parties in Islam and that political plurality is a path to a division prohibited by the shari'a [Islamic code of law]. The new interpretive position believes that difference between people is one of God's laws to the universe, that plurality is required to expand the sphere of consultation, and that the proscribed difference is the difference that separates

and divides the nation. As for the difference of political viewpoints, it is desired that competition serve the public good.

The conventional position considers consultation a desirable thing and believes that the ruler does not have to adhere to it, whereas the new interpretive position believes that consultation is mandatory to begin with and binding in the end, that the ruler may not abandon consulting the nation, and that upon learning the nation's opinion, the ruler may not swerve from it.

It is a constant in the conventional jurisprudential position that the relationship between the state and its non-Muslim citizens is governed by what is known historically as the covenant of protection.

The new interpretive position stresses that the citizens, regardless of their religion, are equal in rights and duties, except for those of a purely religious nature in which the followers of each religion shall observe the dictates of their religion. The covenant of protection ended with the disappearance of its parties and justifications, followed by the head tax on free non-Muslims which was used as a substitute for the nonparticipation of non-Muslims in the jihad with Muslims.

Finally, the conventional jurisprudential position spells out the responsibilities of and the areas in which women may work, expressing the belief that women belong in the home and that their role is to raise children. The new interpretive position considers women the same as men in public work, be it political or nonpolitical, and believes that there is no conflict between a woman's performance of her public role and her performance of her other duties. Should a conflict develop, then it should be settled individually and case by case. Setting rules that prevent women from engaging in public work is not the way to solve this conflict.

These are specific examples in just one area. There are numerous other interpretations at the same level in the other criminal, economic, and educational areas. These are encouraging that call for optimism over the possibility of narrowing the gap and transforming the dream into a reality.

All you have to do is decide and settle the matter and you will find that the soldiers of this message are countless and that their ultimate goal is to be martyred for this message.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

World Demand for Oil Forecast for Year 2000

90OL0098A Kuwait AL-SIYASAH
in Arabic 23 Oct 89 p 8

[Article: "Five Gulf Development Trends for the Nineties; World Grows More Dependent on Gulf Oil; OPEC To Produce 30 Million Barrels by Year 2000; New Stock Exchanges To Be Founded; Volume To Increase on Existing Ones"]

[Text] The drive for economic diversification in Gulf countries will gain momentum over the next decade, according to the September issue of Gulf International Bank's bulletin of Gulf economy and finance.

The bulletin said that development in the nineties will be driven by five trends: restructuring Gulf economies, changing demographics, restating the importance of oil, developing financial markets, and accomplishing regional integration.

On economic restructuring, the bulletin forecast that specialization will be among the most prominent economic trends of the next decade. It pointed out in a discussion of changing demographics that population growth rates will most probably continue to be lower than in the sixties and seventies but still higher than the world average, and that youth unemployment will probably emerge as the region's guest work force increases from 7.6 million in 1985 to 11.6 million at the beginning of next century. On the importance of oil, the bulletin said that OPEC will account for some 30 million barrels per day by the year 2000, and that Gulf production will consequently rise, since it accounts for about 75 percent of all world reserves.

The bulletin, in its discussion of financial market development, forecasts that the nineties will witness the creation of stock markets in Gulf countries that currently have none, and that existing markets will experience growth in their volumes of trade. Domestic and world conditions, the bulletin concluded, mandate the creation of an integrated Gulf market.

The study said: By trends we mean concepts that originate in the past and extend to the future. The five trends we cite below may not be new or comprehensive but are selected because we believe that they will play a vital role in shaping the future of Gulf economies over the next decade. The discussion below will be limited to brief reviews that future issues of this bulletin will study in more detail.

Restructuring Gulf Economies

Even though the oil sector contribution as a percentage of gross domestic product is declining in all the Gulf countries, those countries will continue to depend on oil export revenues to finance future economic development. It is anticipated that they will diligently seek some

restructuring in order to reduce the impact of oil price fluctuations on the course of their economies and to sustain their domestic growth momentum. One of the most important steps in that direction is to speed up economic diversification and boost efforts to steer the economy towards individual initiative with emphasis for development on the private, rather than the public, sector. Perhaps the most outstanding feature of this strategy is the privatization of certain public sector corporations and the mobilization of [private] sector resources in order to reduce the burden on state treasuries.

The Gulf market still presents many profitable investment opportunities that need to be developed, including a variety of services and consumer goods that could be domestically produced for export and for import substitution. They would be commercially viable, without need for long-term subsidies or protection. The region, as a productivity base, has the advantage of cheap energy and feedstock gleaned from natural gas and petrochemical facilities. It also enjoys existence of modern infrastructure; various incentives, support, and funding; domestic stability; and the free movement of capital.

Good opportunities exist in the services sector which accounts for about one-third of the gross domestic product in countries of the region. Because the six Gulf Cooperation Council states use the services of foreign institutions, imported services account for about one-fifth of aggregate consumption.

Operations and maintenance, estimated at \$10 billion annually in the nineties, are among major investment opportunities. Others include health services, telecommunications, computer programming, data processing, transfer of technology, development of human resources, consulting, marketing, research and development, entertainment, information management, and other services.

Specialization is expected to lead major economic trends of the coming decade. Heavy industry, such as refineries, petrochemical plants, and aluminum and iron facilities will remain under public sector control because of the long time it takes them to provide a return on investment and because the private sector is unable at present to handle the marketing operations they require. The first to be privatized will be successful public sector companies whose shares and assets can be evaluated such as telecommunication firms, airlines, railroads, banks, etc.

It is possible in the future that investors may have to raise their stake in the capital of industrial and services projects to 50 percent from the currently common 25 percent. That could help decrease reliance on soft loans from the state and reduce the size of commercial bank loans, therefore freeing the resources of those institutions and allowing them to study of feasibility of financing a wider range of projects.

This change would also force major investors to be more committed to their projects and would prepare businessmen in the region to accept more risk-taking, therefore helping to change the mercantile mentality of a large number of Gulf businessmen who insist on quick profits. They would then become more amenable to investment in industry and services which take longer to become profitable.

Changing Demographics

The economic development of Gulf countries in the nineties will depend to a great extent on the changing demographics of the region.

Population growth rates, quite high in the sixties and seventies at between 2.8 percent and 4 percent, will quite possibly decline but will remain higher than world averages in the nineties.

The World Bank estimates that the number of citizens will increase from 8.7 million in 1985 to 16 million in the year 2000. Birth and pregnancy rates are considered very high in all countries of the region. In the second half of the eighties, the ratio of children to women of conception age varied from 4.6 in Bahrain, 5.4 in Kuwait, 6 in the UAE [United Arab Emirates], to 7.2 in both Oman and Saudi Arabia. Pregnancy rates are expected to decline steadily throughout the coming decade to reflect the decline in infant mortality, improved health services, and increased female participation in the work force.

The region's guest work force is expected to increase from 7.6 million in 1985 to 11.6 million at the beginning of the next century. This is attributed not to higher inflows of guest workers into Cooperation Council states but rather to an increase in the number of families arriving to join foreign workers in the region and to the natural growth of the indigenous population.

The number of foreign births in the region will surpass their rate in the seventies and eighties. Population stabilization operations and the growing numbers of arriving foreign dependents (wives and sons) will be more pronounced in the coming decade, and will no doubt change the composition of foreign communities which have in the past consisted mainly of males between the ages of 20 and 40 years. This group will then be better balanced as to age and sex. The numbers of those younger than 15 years of age will decline from 43 percent at present to 39 percent by the year 2000 when the ratio of females to the total population will increase to 46 percent from the present 40 percent.

The economic slowdown of the past few years has made the authorities more sympathetic to allowing foreign workers to summon their families to live with them for as long as they work in the area. This will increase demand for apartments and houses and for services in general, thereby impacting their markets positively.

Moreover, that trend would reduce the amounts remitted abroad by guest workers. That would be a

positive development, since those remittances amount to 20 percent of the region's annual oil revenues. By the same token, this trend will cause labor-exporting countries to lose one of their major sources of income on top of the exodus of their skilled workers, almost constantly.

We consequently believe that pessimism was exaggerated in the last few years over the region's future employment opportunities for guest workers. It is true that the completion of infrastructure has eliminated the need in construction and services for large numbers of unskilled and semi-skilled workers, and that a considerable segment of that force was sent back as the period came to a close. Demand is increasing, however, for professionals and skilled workers in the sectors of services, operations, and maintenance. The rate of this demand is anticipated to exceed the rate of locally available supply for a few years to come. Guest workers are therefore expected to continue to play an important role in the region during the coming decade, even though their required skills will differ from those sought in the seventies and early eighties.

The growth rate of the indigenous Gulf population has resulted in prominence for the youth category. Those under 15 years of age accounted for nearly 50 percent of the total indigenous population in 1985, which means that increasing numbers of native sons will be entering the labor market in the nineties and will be different in educational makeup from previous generations. Their expectations will have been born during the period of revival and prosperity that permeated the region in the seventies and early eighties.

Gulf Oil Significance for the Nineties

The world oil situation in the nineties will be a function of policies adopted by OPEC countries in recent years. Observers can already discern fundamental changes in the demand for oil and in the output rates of non-OPEC producers since the collapse of oil prices in 1986. Conspicuous among those changes are an increase in the demand for oil over previous norms, a rise in the rates of economic growth, a slowdown in the push to rationalize oil consumption and search for alternative sources of energy, and a decline in supply rates by non-OPEC producers.

The organization may need to keep its prices for the next few years close to their current level of \$18 per barrel because low oil prices take a long time to produce their desired effect on the configuration of the oil market.

Soft oil prices carry within them the seeds of future strength and they are expected to firm-up as soon as structural changes are in effect. Although not likely to exceed \$18 per barrel in the next two years, they are expected to exceed \$24 per barrel in 1995 and to reach \$30 at the beginning of next century.

OPEC's share of world oil markets is also expected to increase in the early nineties as output rates in non-OPEC countries begin to decline. OPEC, meanwhile,

will be increasingly pressured over the next few years to maintain production and prices at current levels.

The world oil supply on world markets will continue to exceed demand through the middle of the next decade, when demand for OPEC oil will have risen enough to allow all member countries to produce at rates sufficient to meet their monetary needs.

The rising demand for oil, accompanied by a decline in non-OPEC output, will have the net result of boosting OPEC's market share to 21 million barrels per day [bpd] in 1990, 25 million bpd in 1995, and 30 million bpd in the year 2000. It is certain that the output of Gulf countries will increase, since almost 80 percent of world surplus energy and 75 percent of known world reserves are in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Iran, and the UAE (Table No.1). OPEC output is expected to exceed 50 percent of total world production by the beginning of the century to match the levels it maintained in the seventies.

We have attempted in Table No. 2 to estimate the current export capacity of oil producers and until the year 2000.

The figures are not forecasts of probable export rates but they do indicate the potential of non-OPEC producers to compete with countries of the region for oil markets as the current century draws to a close.

The table profiles a few major oil producers, including Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Iran in the Gulf. All of them have current production levels of more than 2 million barrels per day and are capable of increasing that by about a million barrels per day within a relatively short period of time. This group of major producers also includes the Soviet Union, the United States, China, and Britain which have high outputs but limited export capacity. Moreover, their productivity rates will steadily decrease in the nineties. The United States, meanwhile, is presently considered a net importer of oil.

The table also profiles a large number of small producers. Almost all are developing nations with outputs of less than 500,000 barrels per day. Outputs will decline in a considerable number of them while others are expected to maintain or slightly increase their current levels of production.

The table also profiles net oil importers and a third group of 9 medium-size producers with outputs ranging from 1 to 2 million barrels per day. The UAE, Kuwait, and Venezuela could have been listed among major producers in view of their capabilities and available resources. Those three countries, and also Libya to a lesser degree, have the capacity to become major producers as they were in the seventies. Among the remaining nations, only Mexico and Norway will be able to consolidate their position but not enough to become major world exporters. Nigeria, Indonesia, and Canada will probably decline in ranking as the United States turns into a major oil importer.

The world, as we enter the 9th decade, will become more dependent on Gulf oil. That dependence will be further

reinforced by other recent structural changes in world markets, especially moves by major producers to own refineries and distribution outlets for refined products in oil-consuming countries, mainly to secure marketing outlets for petroleum products, especially when supply exceeds demand. When crude oil prices drop, producers that own refineries can hope to realize some profit from the sale of refined products. They are in a position similar to that of major international oil companies. It is in the best interests of all that good economic conditions are maintained in consuming countries. The accelerating trend towards vertical integration of oil production, refining, and marketing will eventually lead to classifying oil producers not by whether they are members of OPEC but by whether they—like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, and Venezuela—own refineries and distribution outlets for refined products in consuming countries.

Capital Market Development

Many obstacles still impede the creation of developed stock and bond markets in the Gulf region. Forecasts for the nineties are optimistic.

Declines in the region's monetary surpluses and the trend to finance budget deficits by issuing public debt instruments rather than by drawing on assets abroad—all are without doubt factors that contribute to the entrenchment of capital markets in the Gulf. Furthermore, efforts to develop the industrial base, boost private sector participation, and mobilize local resources all underline the need for effectual capital markets.

It must be pointed out that the experiment of borrowing by issuing public debt instruments has been so successful that markets for trading in these instruments are expected to be developed in the next few years. The nineties are therefore expected to witness an increase in the volume of circulating government issues, coordination of their flow into the main and secondary markets, and pricing practices based on market conditions. It is possible that the development of capital markets in the region would encourage banks and other institutions to issue their own private debt instruments which would be priced relative to government bonds.

Stock markets in the region, except for Kuwait and more recently Bahrain and Oman, are currently small in size and lack the necessary volume, mainly because of the small number of stocks traded and the absence of an official market. Specialist operations over the next few years, coupled with the need to mobilize private sector resources, will actively contribute to bolstering domestic stock markets.

Perhaps the most common form of specialization, at least in the beginning, has been action by governments to issue stock in order to sell their equity in public and private sector companies. This will create additional opportunities for investment in stocks, the supply of which currently trails demand. Governments in the region are expected to gradually implement such specialized operations over several years in order to avoid depressing prices by making large stock offerings.

The nineties are expected to bring accelerated volumes to existing stock markets and the founding of new ones in other countries of the region.

The major objective would be to create competing centers for trading in financial instruments. They would complement each other and be electronically linked to a regional

capital market that deals in other stocks and bonds of jointly-owned Gulf companies. The Gulf Cooperation Council has resolved to implement joint ventures and to permit citizens of member countries to trade in the stocks of other members. This will no doubt lead to the creation of a Gulf capital market, provide more investment opportunities, and mobilize the region's financial resources.

Petroleum Production Capacity of Selected States (million barrels per day)

	Maximum Output Capacity Since 1978	1989 Output Capacity	Anticipated Capacity in the Nineties	Reserves (billion barrels)	Reserve as a Percentage of World Reserves
Saudi Arabia	10.5	6.5	8.0	255.0	25.7
Iran	4.1	3.5	5.0	92.9	9.3
Iraq	3.7	4.0	7.0	100.0	10.1
Kuwait	2.6	2.0	3.0	94.5	9.5
UAE	1.9	2.0	2.5	98.1	9.9
Oman	0.6	0.6	0.65	4.1	0.4
Bahrain	0.05	0.04	0.02	0.13	—
Qatar	0.5	0.5	0.4	3.2	0.3
Total	23.95	19.14	26.57	647.9	65.4
All OPEC Countries	35.07	27.0	34.5	759.2	76.6

Petroleum Production Capacity in the Nineties and Output in the First Half of 1989 (million barrels per day)

Production Capacity by the Year 2000 Compared with 1989	Major Oil Producers (with 1989 output of more than 2 million barrels per day)	Medium Producers (with 1989 output between 1 and 2 million barrels per day)	Minor Producers (with 1989 output of less than a million barrels per day)
Countries With Large Reserves (more than a million barrels per day)	Saudi Arabia (4.8 million barrels per day), Iraq (2.7 million barrels per day), Iran (2.9 million barrels per day)	The United Arab Emirates (1.5 million barrels per day), Kuwait (1.5 million barrels per day), Venezuela (1.7 million barrels per day)	—
Countries to Realize a Major Rise in Output (from 0.50 to 1 million barrels per day)	Mexico (2.9 million barrels per day)	Libya (1.1 million barrels per day), Norway (1.2 million barrels per day)	—
Countries to Realize a Modest Rise in Output (up to ½ barrel per day)	—	—	Oman, Qatar, Ecuador, Gabon, Syria, Malaysia, Angola, Brunei, Colombia, Trinidad, North Yemen
Countries to see a Limited Decline in Output	Soviet Union (12.5 million barrels per day. Net exports do not exceed 1.7 million barrels per day), China (2.7 million barrels per day)	Nigeria (1.4 million barrels per day), Indonesia (1.2 million barrels per day), Canada (1.9 million barrels per day)	Algeria, Canada, Egypt, Australia, Bahrain
Countries to Suffer a Major Decline in Output	United States (9.8 million barrels per day), Britain (2.35 million barrels per day)	—	Tunisia, Yemen PDR, other East European countries

Preparations for Arab-European Dialogue Underway
90OL0111C Manama AKHBAR AL-KHALIJ
in Arabic 2 Sep 89 pp 1, 10

[Article by Usamah Mahran: "Gulf-European Dialogue Issues: Focus on Foodstuffs Import and Manufacture, Technical Training, Technology Transfer"]

[Text] AKHBAR AL-KHALIJ has obtained the particulars of the issues that the Gulf Cooperation Council

[GCC] will raise with EEC in the expanded conference to be held next February in Granada, Spain. Preparations for this conference were recently concluded in Bahrain. It also obtained a list of topics the EEC plans to put forth for discussion at the same conference.

Issues to be raised include seven topics [as published]: mining, which includes oil and gas; energy-based industries that include aluminum, iron, steel, cement and copper; capital industries that include machinery, equipment and spare parts; pharmaceutical, food and

agricultural industries; and service-related industries that include shipping and insurance, financial and banking services.

This framework will be used to discuss the manufacture of foodstuffs, technical training, and technology transfer.

AKHBAR AL-KHALIJ has learned that, based on an EEC proposal, the total number of participants will be 300 persons. In light of that, the GCC general secretariat has proposed that GCC chambers of commerce and industry nominate 10 to 15 persons from each GCC country in addition to those nominated by the secretariat, and that conference costs, set at 420,000 European monetary units, be shared. GCC countries will hold discussions with the European countries in the Brussels meeting scheduled for next 8 September.

The rules of the dialogue between the two groups, according to the point of view of the GCC General Secretariat has drafted, include the requirement that each side prepare a working paper on the key elements of each of the seven topics which will be used to raise the main issues at the conference.

This will be done in order to focus discussion around the issues while taking care of matters related to research and development, patent rights, training and maintenance in each of these industries, provided that the particulars relevant to these industries be discussed by working groups comprised of specialists from both sides.

The papers prepared by GCC industrialists will include the matter of preferential price treatment followed by EEC countries. For should there be a desire to discuss other industries not included in the program, it would be possible to form independent working groups from both sides to take up the debates without overlap.

AKHBAR AL-KHALIJ has also learned that, besides Mr Yusuf Ahmad al-Shirawi, eight other prominent gulf personalities representing the petrochemical and other industries will speak at the conference. Dr 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Jarbu' and 'Abdallah al-Naydi will present a paper on this subject; Muhammad al-Taki will talk about the energy-based industries; Walid al-Jafali about the capital industries; Dr 'Abdallah 'Abd-al-Qadir about the pharmaceutical industries; and 'Abd-al-Latif al-Muqarran and Dr Mansur Aba-Husayn about the food and agricultural industries. This is in addition to representatives from an Arab maritime company, national insurance companies, freight and insurance services, Dr 'Abdallah al-Mulla for the Gulf International Bank, who will talk about financial and banking services, and a representative from the Gulf Investment Corporation.

Also to be discussed are means of cooperation in the field of basic foodstuff imports and procurement and cooperation with the EEC to advance and develop the food industries, including the training of technicians and university graduates, transfer of modern technology, and investment in GCC modern and new industries.

Proposals on mining issues that encompass the oil and gas sectors included marketing policies related to front and end industries for the purpose of focusing debate on exploration, production, refining, and potential cooperation between these two groups, instead of going into the plans and policies governments follow as part of their regional and international commitments, as EEC countries had proposed for this dialogue.

With regard to energy-based industries such as aluminum, iron and steel, and cement and copper, the GCC secretariat's memorandum underscores the relative importance of these and the petrochemical industries. This is in view of their contribution to the GCC industrial development march, and as a direct consequence of developments taking place in world markets with respect to supply and demand for the purpose of identifying potential mutual cooperation between the two sides, for the sake of these industries' stability and economic growth.

The memorandum also underscored the importance of capital industries, which encompass machinery, equipment, and spare parts, to the future of industrial growth and technology transfer in GCC countries, in fields where such imports are a key and recurring factor in the region's market needs and established industries, and to GCC endeavors to build and develop the technical base and to create sophisticated industries to encompass this base.

The EEC had proposed to GCC countries the discussion of five basic issues, namely the oil and gas industry, the pharmaceutical, the food and the agricultural industries, and financial and banking services.

The GCC countries, however, diverted the direction of the dialogue in favor of the GCC's higher interest in terms of these industries' strategies and by raising additional issues relevant to these industries or to new ones of relative advantage to GCC economies.

Arab-European Trade Relations Discussed

90OL0102C Manama AL-BAHRAIN
in Arabic 25 Oct 89 p 13

[Article: "Meeting to Discuss Arab-European Trade Relations"]

[Text] Economic sources in Cairo disclosed that a decision has been made to hold a large-scale meeting in Paris next February, between the Federation of Arab and Gulf Chambers of Commerce and representatives of the European Common Market Chambers of Commerce, for the purpose of exploring the future of mutual relations between Arab and European markets. This decision follows the announcement of the establishment of a unified Europe by 1992. These sources say that this meeting, which is now jointly being arranged with senior officials of the French Chamber of Commerce, will discuss a number of working papers to be presented by the Arab and European countries. They will concentrate

on the future of mutual trade relations between nations of the Arab and European groups, in light of custom barriers and restrictions. These obstacles are expected to be one of the basic problems in the development of mutual trade, and the flow of Arab exports of raw and manufactured materials to European markets after 1992, especially with regard to petrochemicals, energy, gas, phosphates, and certain agricultural commodities that the Arab Maghreb nations export to Europe. Moreover, the working papers will also include discussion of the future of Arab investments in Europe, as well as banking cooperation, insurance, double taxation, land and air transportation services, customs, and other new fiscal and economic laws that the ECC nations may impose. These laws have begun to raise certain fears about the possibilities of reduced trade movement between Arab and European markets in the future.

Economic circles in Cairo believe that to the same extent that the nations of the Arab bloc will attempt to discuss the possibility of cooperation in the future with the ECC nations during the period after 1992, so too will the European states try to reach a mutual formula for strategic cooperation between the European nations and the Arab bloc. This is especially true since the Arab markets account for more than 60 percent of the volume of European foreign exports. Furthermore, Arab investments and capital prefer to go to the stable European markets and into a number of joint investment ventures.

Egyptian economic sources note that a Paris meeting between the Arab and European Chambers of Commerce Federations comes within the framework of an Arab-European dialogue that will be renewed during the next few months, on the governmental level. The purpose of this dialogue is to reach a common formula for cooperation between the two blocs, in preparation for the stage following the announcement of a unified Europe in 1992.

Power Grid Integration With Europe Discussed

900L0111A Doha AL-ARAB in Arabic 17 Oct 89 p 7

[Article: "Egyptian Minister of Electricity: Arab Countries Linked to Europe's Unified Power Grid"]

[Text] A new agreement with certain Middle Eastern countries promises to illuminate new horizons for the construction of a unified electric power network linked to the European network in an effort to improve electric power services in the region.

The protocol signed last September by Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Iraq, and Turkey is the first step in broadening mutual cooperation between these countries and Europe in the field of energy.

Egyptian Minister of Electricity Mahir Abazah, in a special interview with Reuters, said that this agreement was the first serious attempt to offer better energy services and the new basis for mutual cooperation between Middle Eastern countries and Europe.

Abazah went on to say that Turkey is currently linked to the unified European network and linking the Arab countries to Turkey is the first step toward broadening mutual cooperation.

The minister of electricity said that the Kuwaiti Arab Economic Development Fund offered a \$400,000 grant and the Islamic Bank a \$250,000 grant to finance the project's feasibility study. Abazah said that some gulf countries are undertaking studies on linking Iraq and Kuwait, on one side, and Kuwait with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates [UAE], on the other side, to join the Arab network and Turkey.

He added that with the completion of this link, most Arab countries will be connected to the unified European grid, something that heralds better energy services for all these countries.

Abazah also said that this agreement was brought before a meeting of 46 Islamic energy ministers held in Istanbul at the end of last September and was ratified as an Islamic national project, in view of the fact that all the participants are Islamic countries.

The minister of electricity said that the most important benefit of this linkage is the exchange of energy among the member countries participating at peak hours which differ from one country to another.

Abazah said that the link linking Egypt to Jordan, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey starts at the city of Bani Suwayf south of Cairo and passes through the lower part of the Suez Canal and via an aerial cable to 'Uyun Musa and across Taba on the Gulf of 'Aqabah to Jordan via the 'Aqabah plant and then to Oman and from there to Baghdad.

He added that Syria, Jordan, Iraq and Turkey will be linked by aerial cables.

Abazah also said that this linkage will supply each country with about 5 percent of its current energy consumption, thus making it possible to direct investments to other needs.

He went on to say that Egypt currently produces 56 billion kilowatt hours compared with 18 billion kilowatt hours in 1981.

Abazah said that this great increase was the result of the interest Egyptian President Husni Mubarak, who assumed power in 1981 following the al-Sadat assassination, showed in improving the infrastructure, the base needed to attract international investments.

Abazah also said that the industrial sector consumes 55 percent of the electric power output, while the agricultural sector consumes 5 percent and housing and other sectors 25 percent. The remaining 15 percent is put in reserve every year.

He added that there has been great public response to the government's request to rationalize consumption which has dropped 10 percent since the campaign got underway in 1988.

Abazah said that because of the 1986 Chernobyl explosion, Egypt is not thinking of setting up nuclear power plants.

He added that this incident prompted Egypt to put off any consideration to set up nuclear plants until studies on the hazards of such plants are completed.

Abazah said that Egypt is now building five alternate thermal power plants and that an easy-term loan for 120 million sterling has been obtained from the Soviet Union for the construction of a 1200 megawatt-per-hour thermal plant in 'Uyun Musa and another one in al-Karimat on the Nile, located 7 kms south of Cairo.

A third plant will be built in al-Za'faranah at the Suez Canal. This plant will be operated on coal and natural gas, have a 1200-megawatt output capacity and will be implemented in the 1992-1997 third 5-year plan.

Abazah said that the United States has offered a \$136 million grant to renovate the High Dam plant where some of the turbines were out of order and others were cracked. The Soviet Union, that built the High Dam, had refused to supply the necessary spare parts when political relations between the two countries began to deteriorate from 1972 up until the al-Sadat assassination.

Eight turbines have been refurbished and the other four will be ready in two years.

Abazah denied that the American turbines were cracked.

Abazah said that the new turbines are operating at high efficiency and that the current drop in the Nile water level does not affect the electric power output.

The present water level is 169.8 meters and is expected to drop 4 or 5 meters by next July. This is a good sign that energy production in Egypt will not be disturbed.

Abazah said that West Germany this year offered Egypt a 50-year 220 million DM loan at 0.75 percent interest to finance the renovation of all old plants whose life expectancy has expired.

Abazah also said that the Qattarah Depression project in the Western Desert, conceived in the sixties, is still under study, for its costs are estimated at between \$4 and \$5 billion and its output capacity at about 300 megawatt hours. Therefore, it is considered uneconomical.

Abazah stressed that electric power rates which, at the request of the IMF, have been raised by 30 percent this year, are still subsidized by the government.

He added, "We are not contemplating new rate increases."

Article Discusses Benefits of Arab Economic Integration

90OL0091A Kuwait AL-SIYASAH
in Arabic 24 Oct 89 p 8

[Article: "Bil'id at Opening of Seventh Arab Conference on Industrial Development: There Is Need for an Arab Economic Combination With a Distinguished World Position"]

[Text] The 7th Arab Conference on Industrial Development convened on the ministerial level in Tunis yesterday. It was attended by all member states of the Arab Organization for Industrial Development as well as by experts from world economic organizations.

Conference chairman al-Munsif Bil'id, Tunisian minister of national economy, said in his remarks that the occasion represented a new opportunity for consultations on intensifying the potential and opportunities for industrial cooperation among Arab countries within the framework of an Arab industrial plan mandated by Arab and world economic conditions.

He added that while the world economic climate is characterized by the emergence of regional economic blocks, economic cooperation between the industrialized and developing nations generally remains below expectations.

He said that observers of world economy believe that the disparity of development levels between the advanced and the developing nations has improved little in favor of developing countries. Rather, it deepened in most instances, giving rise to acute economic crises in several developing nations that are struggling to this day in the throes of complex problems originating mostly with protectionism, disincentives to foreign trade, deterioration of exchange factors, contraction of financial aid to development, and aggravation of foreign debt.

The Tunisian minister called upon Arab countries to coordinate efforts and intensify cooperation in order to accomplish progress through the ideal utilization of natural, human, and material resources without forsaking cooperation and constructive dialogue with industrialized nations.

He underscored the need to accord joint Arab projects the importance they deserve and to build them on solid foundations by identifying sources of financing, giving their output priority, and shielding them from protectionist policies, since they have the potential for supplying the quantitative and qualitative demands of Arab markets.

Bil'id said in his remarks that the industrial resolutions of the three Arab combinations; the focus on coordination, integration, and merger among existing institutions; and the identification of certain projects to be implemented by members of those combinations—all

are indications and proof of diligence and optimism that would positively impact the course of national industrial integration.

Antoine Jubran, Syrian minister of industry and chairman of the follow-up committee created by the sixth conference, said in his remarks that the most distinguishing feature of world economy in the second half of this century has been the creation of major regional economic blocs and combinations that clearly impact world economic relations and the international distribution of labor.

He called for the creation of an Arab economic combination that would have a distinguished position in the international arena and would carry weight among major economic blocs as a strong competitive productive partner.

He added that joint Arab industrial projects have been accorded the utmost importance as a tool of Arab economic integration and a means for bolstering plans for joint Arab development plans.

He said that those projects met with varying degrees of success and failure and that some were fettered with numerous restrictions while others enjoyed many guarantees, privileges, and facilities.

He pointed out that by opting to deposit their capital funds with foreign banks instead of participating in joint productive [capital] projects, joint Arab companies are creating a precedence that contradicts their reason for being and impedes joint Arab efforts.

He called for giving extraordinary importance to issues of transportation and communications networks because of their major role in facilitating trade between Arab states and the outside world and because they, being the object of many investments, have been developed in all the Arab countries but are still incapable of meeting the evergrowing Arab commercial needs.

Dr Hatim 'Abd al-Rashid, director-general of the Arab Organization for Industrial Development, made remarks in which he welcomed Egyptian membership in the organization and participation in the conference in the person of Egyptian Minister of Industry Mahmud Muhammad 'Abd-al-Wahab.

He underscored the importance of the conference in view of extremely difficult and critical international economic and political climates that intensify the internal and external challenges confronting the Arab nation on the road to social and economic development.

He said, "The seventies and eighties period of this century has witnessed profound changes in world economic conditions characterized with a large measure of instability caused by a series of major economic developments, such as vacillating oil prices and exchange rates of major currencies, in addition to variations in basic

commodity prices and interest rates, worsening external debt crises, and increasing protectionism for the exports of developed nations."

Dr 'Abd al-Rashid called for industrial coordination as a developing multistage operation, for balance among the national, regional, and international frameworks, and for allowing opportunities for bolstering the integration efforts of the three Arab economic combinations, while keeping in mind the need for continuity and for keeping the concerned agencies from slackening.

The ministers, during their two-day session, will review an expert report and recommendations for items on the agenda. The experts, who concluded their meetings the day before yesterday, recommended in their final resolution, obtained by the Kuwaiti News Agency, that industrially developed nations be called upon to relinquish restrictive economic policies that undermine the interests of developing nations, including the Arab countries.

The experts, in resolutions to be studied and acted upon by the ministers, also expressed support for proposals by certain Arab countries to convene an international conference to devise acceptable solutions to the external debt problem.

Natural Gas Use in Arab Industries Increasing

90OL0102B Manama AL-BAHRAIN
in Arabic 25 Oct 89 p 12

[Article: "Increase in Use of Natural Gas in Arab Industries"]

[Text] The consumption of energy in most of the Arab states since the early eighties has been marked by an increase in the use of natural gas to generate energy, as well as by an increase in its consumption in industry, that is, in sectors of the economy that use the most energy. This increase in gas consumption has been at the expense of oil. This trend is partially reflected in the drop in growth of oil product consumption in the period 1985-88, as compared with 1980-84. This was accompanied by a rise in the average use of natural gas. However, in the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC] states, the ratio of oil to total energy consumption of these countries only dropped slightly between 1980 and 1988. The reason for that was the increase in demand for oil by the refining sector, as well as the continued and constantly increasing transportation requirements by residents of these countries, which compensated for the dwindling oil role in other economic sectors.

As regards the Arab Cooperation Council nations, oil has somewhat maintained its share of the energy needs of these countries, as its share is about 80 percent. However, natural gas' share of total energy consumption has improved considerably, increasing from 9 percent in 1980 to 15 percent in 1988. This increase in average natural gas consumption was achieved at the expense of hydroelectric energy, which has decreased in Egypt, for

example, because of the decline in the flow of Nile waters as a result of dissipation. However, the bulk of the decline in oil's share of energy demands has occurred in the Arab Maghreb Union [UMA] countries, as oil's share has dwindled by 11 percent from 1980 to 1988. A part of this drop is evident in the improvement in natural gas' share in certain countries. In Morocco, where gas consumption is not worth mentioning, coal has to a considerable extent made up for the lack of increase in oil consumption, because coal's share in fact rose from 8 percent in 1980 to 15 percent in 1988.

The rate of generating electrical energy in countries of the GCC and the UMA rapidly increased in the two periods of 1980-84 and 1985-88. Its increase in the latter period was somewhat unexpected, in view of the fact that the level of economic activity declined in the GCC states and slowed its pace in the UMA. However, one can explain this increase in light of the reduced prices prevailing in the countries of those two groups, which encouraged consumption, and also in light of the improvements that were recently introduced in structural capacity to generate electricity. However, deficiencies in exploiting the capacity to generate electrical energy were the principal obstacles standing in the way of industrial growth in a country such as Egypt. Moreover, the financial subsidies that the government offers to finance costs was the other factor confirming this deficiency. However, the main factor behind the slow growth in producing energy in Egypt was the loss of hydroelectric energy from the Aswan High Dam (for reasons referred to above). One should note that the Aswan Dam's share of the total electricity generated in 1982 was 45 percent, while this percentage dropped in 1988 to 20 percent.

Writer Records Impressions of Libya, 'Manmade River'

900A0156A Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 28 Nov 89 p 4

[Article by Tal'at Rumayh: "AL-SHA'B Visits Project Which Enemies Exploited To Sow Discord Between Egypt and Libya; When Will We Separate Political Disagreements From Estrangement Which Is Akin to Pre-Islamic Tribal Wars"]

[Excerpts] When I was told that I would be part of the press delegation heading for a visit to the "great man-made river," my emotions flared and I recalled that miserable period of deteriorating Egyptian-Libyan relations which reached the point of the use of arms. [passage omitted]

The trip from Tripoli to Benghazi took one hour during which absentmindedness and aimless thoughts settled in.

One does not realize the value of the Nile and of the [Aswan] dam until one leaves for a country where no river exists.

Two days before the trip, Egyptian artists and critics arrived at the hotel to attend an Arab creativity symposium. One cannot forget the sight of Producer 'Ali Badrkhan (the dean of the session wherever he happened to be) carrying his water cooler wherever he went, so that his colleagues may have a drink because no potable water was available due to the delay in the delivery of mineral water bottles from the southernmost part of Libya. As for the problem of tea made with saline water, nobody could find a solution for it. The "dean" offered the legal opinion that the solution lies in permitting a weight gain in order that one may protect his palate from the taste of salted tea.

This is how life is without a river. One cannot appreciate the Nile's value until one leaves the valley.

My eyes fell on my watch and I was surprised. I whispered to the Libyan escort, "What time is it?" He confirmed that my watch was correct. I couldn't believe it!

The driver had been driving us to the airport at a speed of km 180 an hour. But had the plane taken off ahead of schedule?

The escort responded, "Here, once a plane flying a domestic route gets full, it takes off to save time! Your watch is correct."

I told myself: This idea of "microbus" plane is a good idea. So why do some people say that Arab relations had been severed!

The car again moves at insane speed, driving in a way that is not much better than the way people drive in Upper Egypt. Because of the long distance, I could do nothing but give up. After traveling 1,080 km by plane, we still had to drive 230 km to get to the plant that produces the piping used in "building the river!" [passage omitted]

With the car flying through the air, I get a glimpse of an enormous picture on the roadside. It will, of course, be a picture of al-Qadhdhafi, I told myself. What draws the attention of whoever tours Libya's streets is that no commercial signs, whether advertising Libyan products, airlines, or anything else, are seen in these streets.

On the other hand, the only picture seen in these streets is the picture of Chairman al-Qadhdhafi. The chairman's pictures and revolutionary slogans are found in abundance in all hotels and government agencies, even in coffee shops.

This is not confined to the streets. Papers are not published without a picture of Leader al-Qadhdhafi. If the ministers'—i.e. the Peoples' Committees' secretaries—or the prime minister's—i.e. secretary of the People's Committees Secretariat—are published, then mention is made only of the position of the individual whose picture is published. Names are rarely mentioned. So I tell myself: It is another al-Qadhdhafi picture. But then I discover that it is a picture of 'Umar al-Mukhtar. I asked

our escort about it and he said, "It is a few meters from here, the Sulug area, that the Italians hung Libyan Revolutionary 'Umar al-Mukhtar, and here lies his pure body. As for his famous glasses, they are the captive of an Italian museum."

The visit to the work areas began with the visit to the plant that produces the piping used in implementing the project. We were escorted by the Libyan director of the plant where Koreans do the work. The plant uses Korean equipment and everything in it is Korean.

It has a production capacity of 88 pipe segments daily. The project cost \$150 million and is located geographically in the center of the project's initial and fundamental stage. I asked our Libyan escort, "When does Libyan labor enter the phase of production work at the plant?" He responded, "We are present and nothing is produced without first reporting to us." I said, "I don't mean reporting. I mean contribution to production, so that Libya may graduate from the project citizens who form its executive industrial cadres."

The escort responded, "Libyan labor will get involved in the production process in the final, or eighth, year of the project!"

The plant is built over a large area. Korean labor there is not great in number. We were not given a figure.

From the plant, we moved to the "reservoir," the second and final station on our trip. The enormous reservoir is a visiting site for the Libyans as well now, not just for foreigners.

Atop the reservoir, cars move over an enormous and awesome structure surrounded by sands, may God fight them, on every side. The reservoir's total capacity is 4 million cubic meters.

Atop the reservoir, the Libyan engineer supervising the project said to us, "The waterline from al-Sarir has been tested and has delivered water to the reservoir." I asked him about the reservoir's surface area and about its effect on blood [as published]. He answered that according to the studies, the evaporation will not exceed 1.5 percent.

He added, "It took 24 months to build the reservoir which has cost \$150 million. As happy as I was to see the sisterly Libya take this mighty step, I felt equally miserable throughout the return trip. The happiness comes from seeing Libya take this gigantic step."

I asked the engineer, whom I found to be reasonably familiar with the project, "How many years will the water store last?"

He said, "According to the studies, 50 years."

I asked, "And what happens then, considering that you seek to develop agriculture, which means investing vast sums of money to reclaim and cultivate the land?"

He answered, "There is no cause for fear. According to the studies, the problem will be no more than a problem of drilling new wells at a distance of 50 kilometers from the initial wells. The water store is enormous."

With my question, I wanted to know the geographic scope within which the project gets its water and to find out if this scope stretches to the Egyptian borders or not. The answer is no, no. The question and the answer are intended for those who have tried to sow discord between the Arab Egyptian and Libyan peoples by alleging that Libya is drawing the water from the Egyptian underground reservoir.

As happy as I was to see the sisterly Arab Libya take this mighty step in defeating the desert and in changing the geographical structure of its population distribution by creating new population concentrations that live on the river water, I felt equally sad throughout the return trip to see Koreans everywhere and to see their companies siphoning our Arab money in profits.

I told myself loudly: Egypt has gigantic contracting companies. Why aren't they the companies implementing this enormous project? I whispered to my Libyan escort, "Is the work so complex that we cannot handle it?" "Not at all," he said, adding nothing more.

I could do nothing but beseech God, saying: O God, unite the Arabs. What we have missed is enough. God, make us a truly united nation.

While writing this dispatch, and now that the night bats have surfaced to undermine the relations of the Egyptian and Iraqi peoples and of the Egyptian and Algerian peoples, I have changed my imploration and it now says: God, protect us from the weak of spirit among us. They are the ones who are determined to ruin every step for Arab rapprochement.

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

Nusaybah Calls for Provisional Government Now

44000073 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST
in English 17 Nov 89 p 16

[Article by Joel Greenberg]

[Text] Bir Zayt University Professor Sari Nusaybah has proposed that Palestinians form a provisional government, with ministers from the PLO executive committee and a grassroots administration manned by thousands of Palestinians in the territories.

Nusaybah first made the proposal in Washington in an address before a conference of Arab-American university graduates. He discussed it this week with THE JERUSALEM POST.

Nusaybah proposes that Palestinians announce the formation of a provisional government, whose administration would function in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Ministers would be members of the PLO executive committee abroad, but department heads would be drawn from the territories.

The bureaucracy of the administration, according to Nusaybah, would be made up of thousands of workers in health, education, and social services in the territories, who would be declared employees of the newly-established "National Authority."

"In the past 2 years, Palestinians have been building an infrastructure through popular committees and other institutions," Nusaybah said. "These are the walls for which a roof can be built by declaring a provisional government; it can give cohesion and organization, and exercise authority over the multiplicity of committees and institutions that have been created."

Israel could react by arresting Palestinian department heads, but these could be replaced, Nusaybah said. Arrests of thousands of employees, such as teachers and health professionals, for merely doing their work would make the authorities look "ridiculous." Alternatively, Nusaybah said, Israel could accept the new situation and arrive at *modus vivendi* with the Palestinian administration.

Nusaybah conceded that the security authorities would move to block a unilateral attempt to set up such a Palestinian governing bureaucracy, but he argued that the effort would be a step forward in the process of "state-creation" in progress during the *infadah*.

This process should be the proper focus of Palestinian activity in the uprising, rather than escalation of violence, Nusaybah said.

Namibian Model for Palestinian State Analyzed

90OL0132A Tel Aviv MA'ARIV
in Hebrew 3 Nov 89 pp 34-36

[Article by Oded Granot: "'Arafat's African Dream'"]

[Text] The last African colony will soon shed "foreign occupation," and Yasir 'Arafat is casting despairing eyes in its direction. Next Tuesday there will be elections for a legislative assembly in Namibia, which will draw up the new state's constitution, and 'Arafat already agrees that the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] should withdraw from the occupied territories—gradually, by the time of elections—exactly as the South Africans pulled out of Namibia, provided a detailed timetable is hammered out for Palestinian independence, "as in Namibia."

From the window of the low-flying airplane preparing to land at the airport of the capital city Windhoek, one fails to perceive any external similarity between Namibia and Judaea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip. Namibia has about 1,500,000 inhabitants, like the territories; however, Israel could fit 40 times inside this country, which is mostly desert.

Namibia, previously called South-West Africa, is a rare mixture of wild landscape, European culture, and heavy South African accents. Windhoek bakes under a hot African sun, but house windows on the main street, Kaiser Strasse, sport geraniums. Houses in old German style are mixed together with modern, glass and concrete buildings. Women of the Herero tribe, one of 11 ethnic minorities (including whites), wear colorful dresses under pointed Victorian hats dating back to the German rulers of the country.

The clock has stood still in Swakopmund, a small resort town on the Atlantic founded by German settlers in 1892. At the antique store one can purchase, albeit under the counter, copies of "Mein Kampf," much to the mayor's displeasure. Other Nazi mementoes, like swastikas, are displayed in full view. On Hitler's birthday town burghers fly the black Nazi flag on their roofs, but my escort, appointed by the office of Namibia's South African governor, passionately claims that those are only a handful of nostalgic people, noted only by sensation-seeking foreign journalists.

The Germans occupied Namibia in 1884. South Africa replaced them in World War I. Since then, the German inhabitants lost their majority among the white population to South African settlers, who came from the south with government encouragement and aid. The white settlers struck roots mainly in Windhoek and several other urban centers. Some of them built industrial plants, others joined the civil service. A few settled on farms. Today, some two-thirds of Windhoek's population is African, less than one-third speak German, and a minority speaks English.

Despite 74 years of occupation, the South Africans never viewed Namibia as an integral part of their country, except for one pocket, Walvis Bay, which has Namibia's only deep water port. This area of vital strategic and economic importance was annexed to South Africa a few years after the occupation. Nevertheless, South Africa did not hasten to fulfill the UN request to transfer Namibia—which was declared a mandate after World War II—to international patronage. After all, Namibia had rich uranium deposits, diamonds, gold, zinc, etc.

South Africa's refusal to return Namibia's mandate gave rise to a lengthy conflict with the United Nations, which escalated after the introduction of apartheid in Namibia. That policy undoubtedly contributed greatly to the emergence of SWAPO (South-West African People's Organization), the underground movement for Namibia's liberation.

Not for nothing does 'Arafat view SWAPO as his own ideal, and not for nothing does he envy Sam Nujoma, SWAPO's bearded leader who, after 23 years of armed struggle, has now replaced his uniform with a presidential suit.

SWAPO emerged toward the end of the 1950's, like the Palestinian terrorist organization. While the first Fatah members were getting organized in Kuwait, the first

SWAPO nucleus was getting together in Cape Town as a protest movement against the exploitation of Namibian blacks as cheap labor for South Africa.

The Ovambo tribe, which, with about 500,000 members, is the largest ethnic minority, was SWAPO's power base in Namibia. The tribe members, who came to Namibia in the middle of the 16th century from the Great Lakes area, are known as a proud people. Both PLO and SWAPO members were weaned on Che Guevara's and Mao's revolutionary theories. Together they underwent terrorist training in joint camps in Algeria, Lebanon, and East Europe. However, in the 1960's, SWAPO was succeeding where the PLO was failing, namely in blending among the population like "fish in water," according to Mao's famous dictum. SWAPO established centers inside Ovamboland, preached its philosophy to the population, and recruited them into its service. While Israel was implacably suppressing any PLO political activity in the territories, the South Africans allowed SWAPO to maintain a political arm, even after Sam Nujoma decided to declare a guerilla war from the outside.

Since 1966, for the next 23 years, SWAPO staged terrorist attacks and sabotage against the South African Government in Namibia from bases in Angola, just as the PLO worked from Jordan and later, from Lebanon. However, in contrast to the territories population, which did not spring to the aid of terrorists, the Ovambo helped SWAPO fighters to lay mines and explosives, and to escape back to Angola. The South Africans were supported by other tribes and they established a special police force to deal with demonstrations, which became notorious for its cruelty.

The armed struggle forced South Africa to steadily increase its forces in Namibia, which finally totalled 40,000 troops. The armed struggle culminated toward the end of the 1970's, when SWAPO began to attack Windhoek suburbs, too. Not unlike Israeli patterns of reaction to terrorist attacks (it has been said that South Africa had Israeli instructors), South Africa began to retaliate against SWAPO bases in Angola with deep air raids. There were dog fights with Angolan warplanes. Along the Namibian-Angolan border South Africa established a short of security zone patrolled by special units.

Nujoma's and 'Arafat's endeavors in the international arena brought them political gains. In 1973 SWAPO was granted observer status at the United Nations. At about the same time that the PLO was recognized as "the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people," SWAPO won recognition as the "exclusive representative of the Namibian people." That was a somewhat distorted version of reality, insofar as SWAPO had many opponents among black minorities in Namibia, not to mention the white minority. Many fear SWAPO's intention to turn Namibia into a Marxist one-party state in which all private business would be nationalized.

As the deadline for independence approaches, this fear is already chasing out whites from Namibia. In his spacious

home in Windhoek, Judge Levy, the only Jewish judge in Namibia, told us that 70 out of the 100 Jewish families of Namibia have already left.

The PLO wants to believe that SWAPO'S guerrilla war against South Africa (which, according to Pretoria, cost SWAPO more than 10,000 dead, as opposed to 500 dead on South Africa's side), was responsible for the change in South Africa's stand and finally persuaded it to cede Namibia to Namibia's people.

Similarly, the Security Council formula that South Africa accepted—"to end the occupation"—is exactly what the PLO is praying for in the West Bank and Gaza. Other decisions on Namibia included a cease-fire monitored by the big powers, the return of thousands of SWAPO activists and exiles to Namibia under UN aegis, gradual withdrawal of South African troops, and deployment of 5,000 UN military troops and police to supervise "free and democratic" elections. In those elections, scheduled for November 7th, 650,000 voters will elect a legislative assembly who will give the new state a constitution and will establish the final date of independence, which will probably be some time at the beginning of next year.

The armed struggle against SWAPO indeed caused victims among South Africans, forced them to maintain troops along the border with Angola, and eroded the national treasury. Still, Pretoria did not exactly come away a loser from the independence agreement; in return, it won complete withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, improved its image in the West, and ensured the new country's economic dependence on it.

In order to be able to dictate the nature of the new government, SWAPO must win no less than two-thirds of the 72 seats of the legislative assembly. The consensus is that SWAPO, led by Nujoma—who returned to Namibia last month after 30 years of exile—will win half the seats. Two-thirds, however, is another matter. Unlike the PLO in the West Bank and Gaza, SWAPO has its opposition. At least 10 parties are preparing to challenge it in the elections, one of which, the Democratic Alliance, is a serious contender. The latter is a moderate front of whites and blacks which, in contrast to SWAPO, was a partner in Namibia's transitional government in the last years. Most of the 80,000 Namibian whites will vote for it, as will members of other tribes who fear Ovambo rule.

Mishake Muyongo is the vice chairman of the Democratic Youth Alliance. At a dinner on the 11th floor of the hotel Kalahari Sands in Windhoek, the black leader warned that if Nujoma comes to power he will be as cruel and pitiless as Uganda's Idi Amin. Muyongo should know. For 11 years he was Nujoma's deputy in exile and he knows him. His decision to leave the movement was caused, according to him, by his realization that SWAPO was not prepared to condone different views. After his defection there were attempts to "show him the error of his ways." A meeting was set up

somewhere outside Namibia. Muyongo was a few minutes late. The delay saved his life, because a bomb reduced the place to ruins.

Muyongo describes Nujoma as a gray, uninspired, and boring leader. "He left here with nothing and came back with nothing. All he learned is how to stay in power." Even Nujoma supporters admit that he has no charisma. Nujoma, however, like 'Arafat, has already become a symbol of the struggle for independence. His popularity can be explained by two factors: One is that South Africa declared him an enemy, thus securing Namibia's support for him. The other factor was the United Nations, which decided that SWAPO was the representative of Namibians. The United Nations, whose troops are now supervising the elections in Namibia, in the meantime retracted this recognition of SWAPO. It may, however, be too late to eradicate residual resentment of the blue berets.

"It is only natural that most whites should feel threatened by the independence process and by our presence," said a UN member. "Many still remember our support for SWAPO. In the meantime, however, things changed, and even SWAPO members now accuse us of partiality." Both sides accuse each other of attempting to intimidate and bribe voters. The tension mounted in the past weeks after the assassination of Anton Lubowsky, one of SWAPO's white activists. The killer was not apprehended.

A tour of Ovamboland reveals the changes that occurred in the area since the cease-fire. The "security strip" along the border with Angola, once a bloody battlefield, is steeped in bucolic peace. Near the spot where the Kunene river spills into the Ruacana waterfalls, bare-breasted women cross the border into Angola. The last South African troops are departing the area. Bases and strongholds have been dismantled, including the main military base at Oshakati, which used to be known as the "white city." Dozens of houses stand empty. The buildings of the South African military headquarters are now occupied by UN officers. The heavy vehicles used by the much-hated South African secret police were painted in UN colors. SWAPO flags rise above roofs and gas stations along the road and even on top of a water tower, where a machine gun used to stand until a few months ago.

Next week there will be elections in Namibia. The white minority will anxiously wait for the results. A coalition between SWAPO and the Democratic Alliance may secure relative peace. However, a sweeping SWAPO victory will make it the sole ruler and many will leave the country, despite Sam Nujoma's reassurances.

Whatever the case, 'Arafat no longer cares what happens in Namibia. Fascinated by SWAPO's victory, he is willing to adopt Namibia's independence process. Or, as his aide Yasir 'Abd-al-Rabu pointed out, "We are in complete agreement with the Namibian model. For us it is a good example."

Recent Hamas Activity in Gaza Detailed

90OL0131A Tel Aviv MA'ARIV
in Hebrew 17 Nov 89 p 3B

[Article by Mazal Mu'alem: "Shaykh Yasin's Murderous Organization"]

[Text] One day in December 1987, Shaykh Ahmad Yasin invited the six senior religious leaders of Gaza to his house. He told them that he intended to establish a new movement to unite the two organizations that he had established and was chairing: Al-Majhad, an intelligence apparatus, and the military Palestinian Mujahadeen Organization. The purpose, he told them, was to create one powerful organization against the "Israeli occupation."

At that meeting the Hamas [Islamic Resistance Movement] organization was born and its line of action was decided. This is the organization responsible for the murders of Avi Sasportas and Ilan Sa'adon, and for a series of amazingly cruel killings of collaborators. The security forces also attribute to it the ambush and killing of reservists Ze'ev Traub and Yisra'el Trachtenbroit earlier this week in Gaza.

At the same meeting Shaykh Yasin also laid down the objectives of Hamas. Alongside religious targets, such as liberating the land of Palestine and restoring it to Islam in holy war against the Zionists and adopting Islam as a way of life, topical militant targets were listed, beginning with integration in the uprising and use of firearms.

The Shaykh also came up with the idea of establishing strike committees in charge of closing down stores on strike days, throwing stones, erecting barricades, and causing disruptions of the peace. The aging, lame Shaykh Yasin revealed himself not only as a religious ideologue, but also as actively responsible for attacks.

This week, following the killing of the two soldiers, the commanding officer of the Southern Command, Matan Vilna'i, stated: "We knew this would happen. The IDF [Israel Defense Forces] was not surprised at the incident, having had warnings that Hamas was pushing for such actions and that it was only a matter of time before its members took up firearms."

About 6 months ago, in a wide-ranging action, the security forces managed to arrest some 200 major Hamas activists, including Shaykh Ahmad Yasin. That was a heavy blow for Hamas, the heaviest perhaps since the outbreak of the uprising. It did not, however, put a stop to its activities. Jailed Hamas leaders Shaykh Yasin and his deputy Isma'il Abu-Shanab continued to issue instructions from prison. Leaflets continued to be circulated, collaborators were murdered, and the armed struggle stage began.

About 10 days ago approximately 200 indictments against Hamas activists arrested and still in detention were filed with the Military Court in Gaza. The detainees are accused of a wide range of crimes: murder,

attempted murder, manslaughter, laying explosives, kidnapping, beating up and threatening people suspected of collaboration, possession of large stocks of weapons, harboring wanted men, and the murder of Sasportas and Sa'adon.

Hamas rallied to its ranks hundreds of members who engage in hostile activities. Most of its actions are run from mosques, which enjoy relative immunity.

The indictment writ states that at the same historic meeting in the Shaykh's home in December 1987 it was decided that the new organization will actively participate in the intifadah as a means of attracting large masses to its service.

The Gaza Strip was divided into six areas and the six religious leaders attending the meeting were directly put in charge of them: Attorney Frayj al-'Awwal was made responsible for al-Shati'; Salamah Safadi for the Gaza area; 'Aruni Abu-Sayf for the Khan Yunus area; Ibrahim Abu-Nur for Rafi'ah; Hasan Madyan for the central refugee camps, and Isma'il Ashqar for the Jabaliya refugee camp. Without delay, the six began to recruit new members for the organization.

Once a month at his house Yasin held staff meetings with the area leaders. He heard detailed reports on events, planned activities for the following month, made decisions, and proposed new ideas.

The movement was divided, according to Yasin's principles and planning, into three arms: a security arm in charge of gathering information about collaborators and IDF movements in the Gaza Strip; an intifadah arm that organizes, plans, and carries out demonstrations and disruption of the peace, and a military arm, Hamas' highest achievement, whose members train with firearms, devise improvised weaponry, and stage attacks on security forces.

Within this framework, for example, Nizar 'Awdallah, one of the movement leaders, established four military teams that laid and threw explosives. It was one of these teams that kidnapped and murdered Avi Sasportas and Ilan Sa'adon.

At Yasin's initiative, a well run administrative apparatus was established, which collected money for current activities and distributed funds to area leaders. Families of intifadah victims were not forgotten: they were the recipients of part of the funds. Shaykh Yasin was not short on finances. At the beginning of the intifadah he had received from Amman \$500,000. Even Cat Stevens, the singer who converted to Islam, contributed \$2,000.

Shaykh Yasin was directly responsible for the leaflets circulated by Hamas, which were remarkably aggressive. He decided strike dates and barricade sites. Hamas fliers became inflammatory slogans and were painted on building walls in Gaza.

The method by which fliers were circulated was also sophisticated. The Shaykh passed his leaflets on to

Khalid al-Hanri, who sent them to a printing shop in Israel. Each flier was printed in about 7,000 copies, which were distributed in mosques to area leaders. Some of the leaflets even made their way by fax machine to the Muslim Brothers in Jordan. Later, the method was further refined: Shaykh Yasin purchased printing equipment and did the job himself.

The mosques served as a base for Hamas activities. That is where new activists were recruited, the idea being that mosques enjoy relative immunity from the security forces. At Yasin's instruction, collection boxes in mosques served as mail drops. Messages and reports were put in them for activists and new members. Activists emptied them at regular intervals to ensure that users of the boxes were not spotted. For greater safety, Shaykh Yasin assigned special codes to activists, which served as a means of identification.

Military training was intensive and was also carefully supervised by Shaykh Yasin. Members of the military arm learned to use various weapons: rifles, handguns, machine guns, and hand grenades. They were also taught how to make improvised bombs. The military arm had considerable arms stockpiles. The arms were hidden in mosques and in abandoned houses in Gaza, and were distributed by Yasin to members on special missions. After the mission, the arms were returned. In one such cache, security forces found three M-16 rifles, one Glilon, one Karl Gustaf submachine gun, three Uzis, five handguns, and knives.

Yasin instructed his movement members to use every opportunity and means against the army. After each action he received detailed written reports on the mission and the results attained.

Shaykh Yasin did not neglect contacts with outside factors. In January 1988 he met with Jamal Hammami, leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in the West Bank, and suggested establishing a Hamas branch there. The shaykh and his activists met several times with Hamas leaders in the West Bank; together they planned new actions. Yasin also ensured ongoing contacts with the Muslim Brothers in Amman and briefed them on his activities through fax machines and envoys.

Hamas staged particularly cruel attacks on collaborators, pimps, prostitutes, and distributors of pornographic material. Yasin decided to purify the Gaza Strip from such elements. With the help of the intelligence arm, incriminating material was collected against such people. At his suggestion, each suspect was interrogated, and if they confessed, execution immediately followed. The enforcers of this plan were equipped with a "fatwa," a religious verdict according to which anyone who admits to collaboration or prostitution is to be executed "according to Islam."

Shocking murder cases ensued. In one case, Hamas intelligence men armed with a "fatwa" kidnapped Rasmi Salim, who, according to information, was suspected of collaborating with the authorities and of prostitution.

Salim was taken to an abandoned grove in Khan Yunus, where he was questioned without pity for about 3 days. He was beaten all over his body and humiliated until he confessed. His confession was taped and put in writing. Rasmi was commanded to sign it. After that, his arms and legs tied and his eyes covered, he was buried alive in a hole specifically dug for that purpose. The hole was covered with dirt and Rasmi died of asphyxiation.

In another case, 'Adnan 'Asfur was kidnapped, also by intelligence men equipped with a "fatwa." 'Asfur was suspected of collaborating with the authorities and of circulating pornographic movies. He was questioned for 2 days, beaten, and cruelly tortured until he broke down and admitted collaborating and having contacts with "prostitution." After the confession, sedated with sleeping pills, 'Asfur was driven to the Shaykh Agalon area, where he was strangled and thrown into a hole. Once the deed was done, faithful to regulations, the men reported success to Yasin and, as customary in such cases, were given a cash reward.

In September 1989 the six Hamas area leaders and other activists were arrested. Shaykh Yasin had no fear that his movement may disintegrate. He immediately recruited replacements. And when he himself was arrested, he ordered Isma'il Abu-Shanab to take his place and to continue the work according to instructions he had no trouble passing on from prison.

Yasin's trial will soon open at the Gaza Military Court. Yasin will be accused of murder, manslaughter, premeditated killing, forming illegal associations, holding office in an illegal organization, incitement, and a long string of other offences. The military prosecutor will probably ask for the death sentence for Shaykh Yasin.

EGYPT

Mubarak's Mawlid al-Nabi Speech Discussed

900A0124A Cairo LIWA' AL-ISLAM
in Arabic 1 Nov 89 p 4-5

[Article: "Only Way To Escape Concerns"]

[Text] The speech delivered by the president of the republic, on the occasion of the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad this year, called for following the Prophet's path and emulating his guidance as the one true way to escape from crises and achieve progress and growth. President Mubarak concentrated on several important points, designed to capture the attention of the masses. At the same time, a number of issues and questions were raised that are undoubtedly worth discussion and an exchange of views. This is because they aroused the broad hopes of all people, for they see the content of President Mubarak's speech as an application, implementation, and obligation in all areas, in all quarters, and on all levels.

The people have certainly clamored and are clamoring to escape and get out of God's law as revealed by God's

Prophet Muhammad, and be free of the teachings, the guideposts and the precepts, which guarantee for the country and mankind righteousness and prosperity, which take the people to preeminence and leadership, and which make them torches of good and light. The escapes and attempts to get out of God's laws have reached a high degree on many levels and by many quarters and levels, both official and private. All of us feel the effects and results of that, concerns that weigh heavily, upset our souls, and break our hearts. President Mubarak's speech stresses that, and he declares, "Emulating the way of the Prophet in his life, based on purity, righteousness, truthfulness, and faith, must be our model in rearing generations of our children. Education along this line is the obligation of the family, the school, media, and cultural organizations, etc. The Prophet's way in his fulfillment of his message is the highest ideal with regard to obligation, struggle, fulfillment of duties, steadfastness, and sacrifice. Moreover, the Prophet's way is the highest point in terms of tolerance, compassion, and humility, and should not be mistaken for arrogance. There was nothing cruel or harsh about him, and there was no hatred or rancor in his heart. On the contrary, he confronted the duplicity of his adversaries with forgiveness." If the president's speech contained this, the people ask what there is to prevent implementation and application, obligation and emulation, verification and evaluation, and censure and accountability of libertine elements, led by official quarters and levels? This is particularly the case, as complaints mount up regarding many official quarters that devote themselves to neglecting work, indolence and sluggishness in fulfilling obligations, and use cruelty and harshness in their dealings, after abandoning all ways of compassion and human love.

Peace and Security

All men who strive to live in peace and stability have a sense of equality and evenhanded justice, and want no unforeseen event to disturb their peace, no battering on their door. They are unafraid to give advice on behalf of God, His Prophet, and all Muslims, and are unafraid to enrich a dialogue to achieve benefit for all. However, people today are in a state of distress that destroys their peace, and disorder that deprives them of security and tranquillity. They see and hear about arrests of thinkers and prosecution of religious followers, laws that give the authorities a free hand without any controls, that prevent broad segments of the people from pursuing legitimate rights or fulfilling desired roles. Or rather, they make use of practises that defy the meaning of brotherhood and citizenship, and contradict the meaning of compassion and tolerance. In the president of the republic's speech on the anniversary of the Prophet's birthday, he said: "The Prophet brought forth the people's right to freedom and equality, evenhanded justice, and democracy of consultation. People are born free and equal; they are protected by one law, which governs the ruler and the ruled. Their ruler is chosen by their will, and guides their affairs by the consultative process." However, the people

ask why it is that this system and those quarters betray the people with regard to their freedoms, stripping them away? They restrict the views of individuals and groups, prevent expression and views. Moreover, they prevent speaking of right or advice; they confine it to the people's breasts. When the feeling of security is lost, the guideposts of consultative democracy are weakened, and the feeling of equality is crushed. Thoughts are pent up in people's hearts. No one can claim that we are planting the seeds of love in souls by these means, or weeding out the roots of enmity from our hearts. Accordingly, the people's questions continue: For whose benefit do those quarters continue to attack security and consultation, and freedom of speech and thought? What is preventing the commitment of those quarters or their obligation to fulfill their duties correctly and perform their roles as desired and hoped for, in safeguarding the citizens' security, and protecting their right to express thoughts and pursue their role in consultative democracy? It is known with certainty and conviction that the citizens' sanctity in religion, dignity, property, security, and thought is more important to God than the sanctity of the Kaabah, around which they circle and pray by the millions!

Problems of Life

People under the pressure of life's problems moan and suffer. No doubt they long for a day in which they will be delivered from the concerns of high prices and housing, water and sewage, sickness and illiteracy. However, it only increases their concerns when they see and sense luxury, splendor, and extravagance within certain groups and also within a number of official quarters. They hear the president of the republic say in his speech on the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad: "Among our problems is the economic concern, because of expenditures to rebuild what the wars destroyed; expenditures to reconstruct the infrastructure, which has deteriorated from long use, and expenditures to provide the masses with their basic needs. These expenditures must be countered with earnest work and production, and economy in standards of living and expenses. We must refrain from exploitation, differentiate between the state's and any other funds, and have respect for time and appreciation for labor."

When the people hear that, they ask: What prevents many responsible quarters from fulfilling their obligations in production and labor, setting an example with regard to time and fulfillment of duties, and economy in expenditures? What prevents serious investigation of all groups living in luxury, without any regard for the feelings of the deprived, the needy, and those who have been crushed down? Why aren't limits being put to luxury and extravagance, in order to protect the sensibilities of others? What prevents concentration of security efforts, so that its true role can be fulfilled in the pursuit and prosecution of those who are corrupt and steal and plunder public money and the masses' funds? President Mubarak's speech, on this year's anniversary of the Prophet's birthday, raised a number of concerns,

and concentrated on several factors. He said that Islam, as brought forth by the Prophet, was a program and a system, a religion and a state, here on earth and above. The community in its long history has had its highs and its lows. It was high to the extent it adhered to the way of Islam, and sank and diminished to the extent it distanced itself from Islam. There is no salvation except to return to that program and system in education, fiscal affairs and the economy, in the media and culture, in law and legislation, and consultation and freedoms. That is the way to escape from crises and perils.

The people demand and wait in longing for the speech to turn into facts of reality and implementation, for the obligating of all executive and responsible quarters to commit themselves to Islam in their planning, policies, and work. Furthermore, these quarters must make room for the call to Islam in their areas of interest, while pursuing their roles and espousing their message, so that all efforts can join together on the true path to the true goals and sublime objectives.

Security Forces Arrest 'More Than 200' in al-Daqahliyah

45000043 Cairo AL-WAFD in Arabic 13 Dec 89 p 2

[Text] At dawn yesterday, the central security forces and the security detachment in al-Daqahliyah launched a punitive campaign against the people of the village of Mit Timamah, the markaz [administrative center] of Minyat al-Nasr. The security detachment, which comprised 100 vehicles carrying security forces, arrested more than 200 people and transported them to the Minyat al-Nasr police station. The detachment destroyed all the cafes and stores, and the officers and enlisted men attacked women and children.

Union's al-Khawajah Praises Syria, Calls Lebanon Nonentity

900A0145A London AL-DUSTUR
in Arabic 13 Nov 89 pp 17-18

[Excerpt] The Arab lawyers circles were surprised by Ahmad al-Khawajah, doyen of Egyptian lawyers and chairman of the Arab Lawyers Union, suddenly appearing on the Syrian television screen making an extemporaneous speech before the lawyers congress in Syria which was held on 30 October. It appears that none of the official quarters in the Egyptian Lawyers Syndicate or the Arab Lawyers Union was aware of his arrival, except for the fact that al-Khawajah came to Damascus, without being aware of the occasion.

Speaking of how he arrived in Damascus, doyen al-Khawajah said that he was attending a conference in Khartoum when he received a message—the source of which he did not disclose—requesting him to come to Damascus. He did not take the trouble to find out the reason for this request, but thought to himself that perhaps the Syrian lawyers are celebrating one of the two October or both. Which, of course, meant the October

war and the anniversary of President al-Asad assuming power in Syria. Accordingly, he came.

We do not intend here to question al-Khawajah on this matter, for this concerns the [union's] official quarters that have the right to question unilateral decisions and behaviors by their members which directly reflect on their position and national policy.

But we believe that what Ahmad al-Khawajah said in his speech, which contained serious matters and strange attitudes that undermine the position of the Egyptian Lawyers Syndicate and the Arab Lawyers Union and are contrary to their policies and the methods they pursue in dealing with issues of national and Arab character, does concern us.

The doyen opened his speech by showering praise on Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad, describing him as the greatest Arab leader and "the only one among the Arab leaders who did not change his course, did not weaken, and did not succumb to foreign pressures." He is also "the man of honorable national stands" and "the author of October corrective movement that brought about the October liberation and removed the 1967 set back"—and flattery ad infinitum.

These claims represent an astonishing ignorance of a history of terrible actions committed by the Syrian government against the Arab people in Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Iraq, and of al-Asad's disgraceful attitude toward the Iranian aggression against Iraq, and his numerous massacres against the Palestinian revolution.

The most serious thing about al-Khawajah's speech was his participation with the Syrian president's personal representative at the conference in attacking Iraq and its leadership, using the same terminology used by the Syrian regime. He described the 8-year war on the eastern approaches as "a crazy war right from the beginning," saying that it has led to no positive results either in favor of Iraq or Iran; it was only a river of blood. It is obvious that this is a deliberate misrepresentation, the purpose of which is to confuse Iraq's stand with that of Iran and to ignore the clear victory Iraq won and the defeat of shu'ubism which is represented by the Khomeyni sectarian movement which is hostile to Arabism and Islam. We believe that it is our duty to remind al-Khawajah of the statement he made in front of President Saddam Husayn during the Arab Lawyers Union delegation's visit to Baghdad to express congratulations on the Iraqi victory. Al-Khawajah had then spoken profusely about the positive effects this victory will have on the course of the Arab nation now and in the future.

The doyen did not stop at this. He declared his blessing for the Syrian attitude toward the Lebanese crisis, describing General Michel 'Awn as an agent and considering Iraq's support for the Lebanese government as "as wrong...Iraq must be enlightened and confronted with this wrong."

It is simply astonishing that al-Khawajah has forgotten that he was speaking from the capital of the Syrian

government which so far spent 13 years indulging in corruption, destruction, and ruination inside the torn Lebanese body.

This dissonant symphony did not stop at this. Indeed, al-Khawajah went on to say: "We know and everybody knows that there was nothing called Lebanon...but we do not wish to elaborate on the subject now." This sentence travelled at great speed, drawing applause from the Syrian regime leaders who were astonished, since they did not expect the doyen of Egyptian lawyers to go that far at a time when those leaders are experiencing a suffocating isolation in all the Arab and international meetings.

Al-Khawajah concluded his series of surprises by talking about the Palestinian revolution and the PLO and recounting some of what went on during a meeting he had with President Hafiz al-Asad some time earlier. "I have felt," he said, "that President al-Asad cares for the PLO more than some of its leaders." [passage omitted]

SLP Youth Secretary on Party Goals, Domestic Issues

900A0163A Paris AL-YAWM AL-SABI'
in Arabic 27 Nov 89 p 20

[Interview With Dr Ibrahim al-Ja'fari, SLP Youth Secretary; "How Does Second Generation in Arab Political Life Think; Ibrahim al-Ja'fari, SLP Youth Secretary, Egypt: We Represent Forces That Believe That Islam Is Solution; We Are Preparing for Phase of Raising Slogan of Attaining Power"; first paragraph is AL-YAWM AL-SABI' introduction; date, place not given"]

[Text] Cairo AL-YAWM AL-SABI'—SLP [Socialist Labor Party] Youth Secretary Dr Ibrahim al-Ja'fari is the youngest youth secretary in the Egyptian parties. He is an extremely dark youth who comprehends the question and answers it promptly and accurately. He got his Ph.D. recently and has been appointed instructor at the Education College of al-Zaqaziq University. He is in his early thirties. We met with him at the SLP headquarters in the popular al-Sayyidah Zaynab Quarter, in the heart of Cairo. He asked us to embark on the subject immediately so that he may join the meeting that was being then convened by the Higher Executive Committee under Ibrahim Shukri, the party chairman.

[AL-YAWM AL-SABI'] What, in your opinion, are the social forces represented by the SLP?

[Ja'fari] The SLP stands with the forces and parties that are aligned with the poor and the powerless who seek social justice. This is insofar as the economic aspect is concerned. Ideologically, the party represents the Islamic, not secular, forces. So we represent all the social forces that accept Islam as a solution to all our problems.

[AL-YAWM AL-SABI'] What, in your opinion, are the slogans that embody the demands of the forces represented by your party?

[Ja'fari] It is a single and comprehensive slogan, namely: "Islam Is the Solution." The party raised this slogan in the 1987 election. Regrettably, we were subjected to misguided battles and campaigns. It was said that the SLP alleges that it is the only party representing Islam. But we say that we do not adhere to the Islamic tendency solely. We are simultaneously aligned with the poor and the powerless. Generally, we include all the Islamic forces, both rich and poor. We also believe that not every rich person is an evil person who must be fought. Briefly, we present in our slogans a simultaneously economic and ideological course, contrary to the Grouping Party, for example, which presents a purely economic course without paying attention to the ideological side.

[AL-YAWM AL-SABI'] To your mind, what is the most significant movement made by the SLP in the past 5 years?

[Ja'fari] In the area of foreign relations, the SLP has made numerous significant moves. The party aligned itself with and supported the Libyan people during the latest U.S. attack on Libya. We also highlighted to public opinion the issue of trooper Sulayman Khatir who killed a number of Jews in the Sinai. Our most important political moves have been embodied in our participation in all of the international organizations, such as the Human Rights Organization, the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, the World Peace Committee, and so forth. I will also add that the SLP offered during the 1987 election a political formula which stirred the entire Egyptian political scene because it divided the parties to the struggle into two groups: The Islamic forces and the non-Islamic forces. The party's proclamation of its Islamic identity was a decisive factor in defining the two groups to the struggle.

[AL-YAWM AL-SABI'] What is your concept of your party's attainment of power?

[Ja'fari] I will not hide from you the secret that we are in the phase of preparing for raising the slogan of attaining power. We reject what some opposition parties condone, namely to stay in opposition all their lives. We also believe that we are entitled to rule. Our means to accomplish this objective is to march on the legitimate democratic path, meaning that we are opposed to sudden shocks and changes. We believe that we can accomplish our objective through greater unity with the people and with the other national forces in order to entrench democracy.

[AL-YAWM AL-SABI'] As youth secretary, what is your opinion of the current election law and system?

[Ja'fari] It is my opinion that election guarantees are more important than amending the current election law. We want to focus on the essence of the election process, beginning with registration in the voter lists and ending with the vote count. Here, we focus on the need for the judiciary, not the Ministry of Interior, to supervise the course of all the election processes. If election guarantees

are achieved, then we favor the the relative list that is tied to no specific percentage as an election system.

[AL-YAWM AL-SABI'] In case you attain power, what decisions will you make in the areas of democracy, economy, and foreign policy?

[Ja'fari] In the area of democracy, we will work to amend the election law in order to fill the gaps it contains. We will work to abolish the emergency law and all the ill-reputed laws which restrict the liberties, such as the suspicion law, the state security courts law, the socialist public prosecutor law, and so forth. Economically, we believe in an independent economy and in the need for self-reliance, meaning that we will reduce borrowing from the outside world. We will also present the Islamic economic formula whose most important feature is the "nonusurious" economy and the achievement of this economy gradually. We will maintain the subsidy for essential commodities. In foreign policy, we believe in pan-Arabism, meaning that we are "Islamic pan-Arabists." This is why we will work to strengthen Arab-Islamic relations. Conversely, the SLP's attainment of power would mean that Egyptian-Israeli relations will reach their bottom level. As you know, we are opposed to all the forms of normalization and cooperation with Israel.

[AL-YAWM AL-SABI'] To what degree did the SLP youth take part in the decision on alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood?

[Ja'fari] When the alliance was established, all the popular bases approved it. The SLP Higher Committee, which represents the party congress in the periods between its convocation, met and made the decision of alliance with the brotherhood. As for the objections raised afterward against the alliance, they represent a normal phenomenon because any political alliance will inevitably evoke organizational reactions within the parties and political forces forming the alliance. I tell you that some have broken away from the SLP not because of its alliance with the brotherhood but because of a mainly personal reason. I had wished that the dissidents would accept the alliance and would continue to perform their role in creating masses supporting the party.

[AL-YAWM AL-SABI'] Now that a period of time has passed since the alliance with the brotherhood was established, what, in your opinion, are the positives and the negatives?

[Ja'fari] The negatives pertain to the organizational difficulties, meaning that there has not been full understanding of the formula of "coordination," not alliance, with the brotherhood in some governorates and districts. The positives are in the fact that the experiment has projected the formula of the "Islamic solution" in the arena strongly, and that a public opinion supporting this formula has now developed.

[AL-YAWM AL-SABI'] Some youth leaderships have been elevated to the party's Higher Committee. Was this done by election or by appointment?

[Ja'fari] I am a member of the Higher Committee, the party's top authority. I have attained this position through free direct election, not by appointment. The names of other youth who have risen to the Executive Committee include: Majdi Ahmad Husayn, Majdi Qarqar, and Salah 'Abdallah. The youth represent one-sixth of the Executive Committee members and they have all attained their positions through election.

[AL-YAWM AL-SABI'] What decision has the party made in which the youth leaderships played the main role?

[Ja'fari] It is definitely the decision reaffirming and determining the party's identity and raising the slogan "Islam Is the Solution." The youth played a major role in putting pressure to present the Islamic formula as the party's course. You have perhaps read some papers which characterize these youth as the "green militias" or "green shirts." They applied effective pressure to reaffirm the party's Islamic identity.

[AL-YAWM AL-SABI'] To your mind, what is the common issue that dictates coordination between the opposition parties and which party, in your opinion, is the closest to the SLP?

[Ja'fari] There is no doubt that the pivotal issue between all the opposition parties is the issue of democracy, freedom, and of establishing the guarantees that insure sound democratic action. The party closest to the SLP is the Nasirist Party, which is still in the phase of formation, if it plays its role within the Islamic framework and circle. We consider the 23 July revolution an extension of the Young Egypt movement. We are also "Julyists," meaning that we appreciate the July revolution's pioneer accomplishments at the Egyptian, Arab, and international levels.

[AL-YAWM AL-SABI'] Are you satisfied with the current level of coordination among the opposition parties?

[Ja'fari] I wish, of course, the coordination was better, meaning that I wish it was not confined to coordination among party chairmen. On our part, we, as opposition parties' youth secretaries, try to bolster this coordination among ourselves by holding semiperiodic meetings.

[AL-YAWM AL-SABI'] Why, do you think, coordination between the opposition parties often fails?

[Ja'fari] Most often, the reason is a difference of ideologies. It is difficult, for example, for the opposition parties to coordinate in the areas of economy or of foreign policy because our programs differ sharply in these areas. Generally, we coordinate on what is close in our parties' programs, namely bolstering the cause of democracy.

[AL-YAWM AL-SABI'] Is there a decision which the party has made and with which you are not pleased?

[Ja'fari] Yes, the decision to agree to the appointment of a number of party members to the People's Assembly in 1984. I hung a sign on my chest saying: "No to Appointment."

[AL-YAWM AL-SABI'] Is there a decision which the party did not make and which you wish it had made?

[Ja'fari] Yes, the party's decision on waging the local elections. Regrettably, the party refused to wage those elections. It was my viewpoint that waging the local elections would give the party the opportunity to establish direct contact with the masses and to gain excellent election propaganda, something which we needed.

[AL-YAWM AL-SABI'] Finally, what, in your opinion, are the SLP's negatives?

[Ja'fari] There is no doubt that we have negatives insofar as organizational action and forming the party cadres are concerned. We also are experiencing difficulties in responding and making decisions promptly. All these negatives are connected with the general condition of all the opposition parties.

[AL-YAWM AL-SABI'] What have you read most recently?

[Ja'fari] "The Islamic Movement in Turkey," a book written by Dr Ibrahim Shat. I am especially interested in Islamic books. As for the other sources of culture, I do not keep up with the movies generally. The latest play I have seen is the "Joker," an old play presented in the late 1970's.

[AL-YAWM AL-SABI'] Who is your favorite writer?

[Ja'fari] Fahmi Huwaydi, an Islamic writer, and 'Adil Husayn, an economic writer whom Dr Ibrahim [Shat] considers one of the most important intellectuals to influence his political and intellectual tendency.

[AL-YAWM AL-SABI'] Do you read Marxist authors?

[Ja'fari] I keep up with Dr Amir Iskandar, even though I have my reservations on his writing style and on the content which he promotes, namely the Marxist philosophy.

Writer Defends Future, History of Communism

90OA0123B Cairo AL-AHALI in Arabic 18 Oct 89 p 5

[Article by Faridah al-Naqqash: "Workers of the World Have United...United"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted]

Difficulties, Yes

At the outset, no one can deny that the socialist experiment is facing enormous difficulties with regard to its democratic development, growth rates, labor productivity, and nationalities. "Perestroika" was established in the Soviet Union to meet these problems in the

leading socialist country of the world, especially the absence of political democracy, and with regard to the socialist apparatus itself, with the criticism of erroneous practises in the past and the correction of the course of the present, in order to reach a better future—not for the Socialist camp alone—but also for the entire world. This is the essence of the new political thinking.

There is no need to say that the process of that comprehensive renewal will not be accomplished without cost. Moreover, this is not the first time in which socialism has reconsidered and criticized its destiny. [passage omitted]

As for socialism's age, it is not more than 70 years old, and in 70 years without colonies or looting, the Soviet Union—the foremost socialist nation—has become the second superpower, our star power capable of entering the nuclear arms race, which capitalism began. [passage omitted]

What is happening now in the Soviet Union, on both the theoretical and practical levels, will be based fundamentally on Leninist ideas, because the revival of "Soviets," that is, committees of workers, peasants and soldiers, and the releasing of their freedoms from the hands of the bureaucracy, to practise true authority, is a fulfillment of socialism on its democratic side, which has been absent for a very long time. Socialism has bared its genuine humanistic face, in order to master the enormous possibilities for progress that the scientific and technological revolution is providing. This is because the essence of the new political thinking is to insure human resources against being squandered in the nuclear race, in order to provide prosperity and security for all. [passage omitted]

It was the national liberation movements' good fortune that socialism became a superpower and that capitalism is now incapable of defeating it militarily.

Let us imagine the cost to Nasserist Egypt, which proceeded to vindicate its national revolution by nationalizing the Suez Canal in order to finance the High Dam project that the West refused to finance, if it were not for the Soviet Union as a world deterrent power capable of warning off those who attacked Egypt.

Let us also imagine the cost after the 1967 disaster, without the full assistance of the Soviet Union, whether in rearming the army, eliminating military debts, or supporting development plans, as well as steadfastly standing by us in international forums. Moreover, let us think about our condition in the October War, without the assistance of the Soviet Union. [passage omitted]

The Soviet Union was capable, by its support to us and others, of fulfilling its international duty. The Soviet Union could have spent those huge sums on its people's luxuries, and not be in the condition that it is in now.

Another reason for this crisis, which is reflected basically in the lack of consumer goods, is represented by the fact that the enormous progress in Soviet industry has been

concentrated in the military industries. This has been not only to protect socialism from imperialist follies, with the latter financing its wars from the plundering of other peoples, but also to fulfill the arms requests of the national liberation movements, because of the decisive battles that were fought in our era in Algeria, Vietnam and Egypt, in Angola and Mozambique, in Syria and Palestine, etc. The Soviet Union was the constant support for these peoples. In this regard, let us not forget the price the Soviet Union paid in World War II, which was begun by capitalism, the price in terms of human and property losses. This was the war from which America emerged from as the wealthiest nation in the world, because it opened the age of nuclear bombs without losing anything. [passage omitted]

Communists are nationalists at the highest stage of nationalism, because it is a nationalism of workers, peasants, and all who work for wages. They are nationalists with the eyes, feelings, and hearts of the working classes. Therefore, they are also internationalists, that is, they are against exploitation and subjugation in any form. [passage omitted]

All attempts at independent capitalist development in Third World countries have failed, because no colonies have been or will be provided for that purpose, and no slaves. The only solution is to progress down the socialist path to solve their problems. This is the lesson that 'Abd-al-Nasser learned during the experiment and the mistake, and he understood it well, before his death.

ISRAEL

Israelis Reportedly Support Shamir's Immobility

44230046C Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT
in Hebrew 30 Oct 89 p 19

[Article by Hanan Porat: "The Real Test"]

[Text] Sometimes one doesn't see the forest for the trees. Similarly, the overall picture gets lost in the mixture of 4 points, 5 points, and 10 points. It was precisely the representatives of the PLO position in Knesset, Yosi Sarid, Me'ir Wilner, and their associates Muhammad Mi'ari and 'Abd-al-Wahhab Darawishah who revealed the reality in all its seriousness.

Those who are in favor of responding to a political initiative in its Egyptian and American interpretation, lead with the slogan "peace in exchange for territories" on the way to a Palestinian state under PLO leadership, while the wild wind of the intifadah is blasting at their backs.

Recent studies show that less than 10 percent of the Jewish population support the establishment of a Palestinian state. This, in fact, is the real reason for the unclear pronouncements emanating from Alignment and from U.S. Government leaders. All those definitions and splitting of hairs are nothing but spider webs, bound to

break sooner or later. One of these days we will have to face the moment of truth and to answer honestly whether we are willing to come to an agreement that involves withdrawal from Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza and establishment of a Palestinian state under the PLO, or whether we want to gird our loins and stick to the only small home we have in the world between the Jordan and the sea, overcome the intifadah, and continue the pioneer work of settling throughout the country.

What we must do is not "adjust to reality," according to the wishes of the world nations that are impatiently prodding us to withdraw, but conquer reality in the ways of Zionism, which has an ideal and fights to attain it. Only by faithfully holding on to all the parts of Greater Israel in our possession and defeating terrorism in all its forms, will we be in a position to offer Arabs in Judaea and Samaria, who want to live in peace with us, municipal and social autonomy under Israeli sovereignty. Those who will not be content with less than an Arab state, Arab flag, and Arab anthem will be free to find a place in the big wide Arab world around us.

In the complex current situation we demand that the prime minister put his political initiative to a simple test that will also provide an answer to President Mubarak's brilliant question: How can we identify Palestinians and decide who among them belongs to the PLO? To that we offer a very simple answer: Even those who are not unquestionably PLO representatives, who in any event will not be in on the dialogue, will be required to declare a priori that they are against the Palestinian Charter which calls for the destruction of the State of Israel and to disown terrorism in all its forms, including the violent aspects of the intifadah. The prime minister must adopt this condition not only as a tactic and not only as a compromise with Alignment, but as a basic moral condition that he should present at his meeting with President Bush.

I expect that the PLO will threaten to murder every Arab who dares sign such a declaration. Consequently, it is to be assumed that in the meantime no Arab representatives will be found who will dare satisfy this condition. However, this fact serves to reveal the truth and to prove that, in order to arrive at real negotiations, terrorism and the intifadah must first be eliminated. We can attain peace only if we remain undaunted, as has been said: God will give courage to His people and will bless them with peace.

Opposition to Shamir Discussed

44230048A Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 27 Oct 89 p 13

[Article by Dani'el Ben-Simon: "Shamir Against the Whole World"]

[Text] In the past few weeks Prime Minister Yitzhaq Shamir has been looking tired, worried, ill-tempered, cross, impatient, and haunted. He doesn't smile much and he's clearly not happy. All of a sudden it has become obvious that he is nearing the second half of his 70's. The political events of the past months have left fresh scars on

him. Since the government's political solution was forced on him he has become a different man. Although the initiative bears his name, he is no longer happy with it. The political restlessness visiting the area has thrown Shamir into a tizzy. If he could, he would undoubtedly tell the Americans and the Egyptians: Stop a moment, I didn't mean to run as fast as this. However, from the moment he glimpsed the political arena, he was desperately wounded. He just cannot manage to turn back the clock.

In a way, this is a sad story. This is the same Yitzhaq Shamir whose meteoric rise to power occurred precisely because of his political inactivity. At the time al-Sadat visited Israel, Shamir was Knesset speaker, and he was known as distant and uninvolved. When required to take a stand on the Camp David accords, he voted against without wasting too many words on it. He was on his way to retirement from political life when Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan's resignation preempted him. Menahem Begin summoned Shamir and promoted him. He made a quiet, passive foreign minister, who preferred quiet action to extroverted diplomacy. During the Lebanon war he kept a frozen expression on his face. Although he was a member of Begin's small club, Shamir chose to let Sharon do as he pleased. The investigative commission that studied the war strongly emphasized his passive reaction to the Sabra and Shatila massacre. When asked why he didn't do anything when he learned that something was going on in the camps, Shamir replied: "Because."

As foreign minister, Shamir did not reveal great interest in being active within his party. He did not gather a court around him and did not endeavor to establish his own camp. Vulnerable Sharon dressed his wounds, and David Levy planned the conquest of the prize he coveted: Begin's seat. Begin's surprising resignation found Shamir totally unprepared. His political ambitions were never too high, but the hard core of the party, which included the old timers, felt that the time was not ripe to pass the baton to the new generation. And thus, without much effort on his part, Shamir found himself crowned prime minister. His political inactivity continued to characterize him without detracting from his leadership capability.

In the first 2 years of the rotation, Shamir's presence at the head of the government was not felt. One might well have thought that the earth had swallowed him. Shim'on Peres monopolized the limelight and claimed spectacular achievements for himself. Shamir waited quietly for the end of the rotation and as quietly returned to the premier's office. His "eternal" serenity was for the first time troubled when the intifadah broke out. He hoped that it would be suppressed and die down within a few weeks. But the determination of the Palestinian uprising proved to be no less strong than his own. When he realized that both sides of the Green Line were on fire, he decided to do something. In close cooperation with Defense Minister Yitzhaq Rabin he hammered out a political plan that centered on elections in the territories, which meant autonomy for the inhabitants to elect their own leaders and to govern their own lives.

Shamir has always evinced revulsion and abhorrence whenever the PLO was mentioned as a possible partner to an agreement with Israel. He was incapable of halting the political upsurge and legitimacy that the organization won throughout the world, but he was firmly determined to thwart any attempt by the two big powers to bring the PLO in on political negotiations with Israel. Shamir believed, and still believes, that we can arrive at a common language with the inhabitants of the territories on some form of autonomy. Consequently, he based his plan on erecting a wall between the inhabitants and their leaders outside the territories. Shamir wants to hold on to Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip, including their Arab populations. To him, the PLO represents a Palestinian state in those territories, and to that he will never agree. He does not believe that there is room for two states in Greater Israel, because it would lead to bloody, endless fighting between the two nations.

Shamir's great misfortune that doesn't allow him respite, is that the consensus concerning PLO participation in a political agreement is becoming shakier day by day. He is apprehensively following the growing coordination between Labor, the U.S. administration, and the Egyptian Government on accepting the PLO as a tacit partner in talks on a political solution. Although the former refrains from calling a spade a spade, Shamir is well aware that the three's request to include Palestinians from outside the territories in the Palestinian delegation means letting the PLO in through the back door. That, in fact, is the root of the controversy that has emerged in recent weeks around the "Baker document." The Egyptians have now said loud and clear that it is preposterous that Israel should decide which Palestinians will sit down to talks. Shamir has not found a sympathetic ear in Rabin, either. The latter informed him more than once that no initiative can succeed without the participation of outside Palestinians. What this means to Shamir is PLO participation, and what that means is a request for a Palestinian state in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza.

There is something else that Shamir wants, namely that the meeting, when it is convened, discuss only one topic: the procedure for elections in the territories. Were it up to him, he would finalize the procedures with the Egyptians alone, without even asking a Palestinian delegation. However, both the Egyptians and the Americans are firmly against that. Those who claim that the issue concerns the Palestinians and their fate and that they cannot be ignored, also request that the Palestinians be permitted to bring up other issues that don't concern the elections. "What are you afraid of?" President Mubarak asked Rabin in Cairo and Arens in Washington; "Let them talk as much as they want. They ask for the right of return. Let them ask. Tell them no! They want to have an army. Tell them no! They want damages, tell them no! But you shouldn't shut them up. Let them talk...."

Shamir, as we said, also wants to deprive the Palestinian delegation of the right to make requests and ask questions.

It is still unclear how he will overcome those obstacles. One thing, though, is becoming clearer every day. The circle around Shamir is growing tighter and tighter. The Egyptians are angrily awaiting Israel's response. Secretary of State James Baker is losing patience, and Shim'on Peres and Yitzhaq Rabin are watching from the side seemingly unconcerned.

The prime minister's aides are doing their best to dispel stubborn rumors about the feeling of siege under which Shamir has recently been laboring. Shamir expressed something along this line 2 weeks ago at a meeting with Likud faction members. He took refuge in Jewish mythology and talked about the struggle between Jews and Gentiles, who are once again trying to subdue them as in the past. Shamir used uncommonly sharp language toward the U.S. administration, and even caused a diplomatic incident with his talk of tension and conflict between the two nations. Shamir never had too much love for the countries of the world and was at the most prepared to trust the one and only nation that helped Israel throughout its existence, in his view. Now even this trust is dwindling. If he could, he would cancel his forthcoming meetings with President Bush and Secretary of State Baker, and content himself with meeting with Jewish organizations and communities, among whom he feels at home.

Meridor Called Shamir's 'Heir Apparent'

90OL01221 Tel Aviv HADASHOT (Weekend Supplement) in Hebrew 13 Oct 89 p 2

[Article by Eyalan Kfir and Hanan Crystal]

[Text] Prime Minister Yitzhaq Shamir has a plan in the drawer according to which he intends to run once more for elections to the 13th Knesset as the Likud's candidate for prime minister, whether in early elections or in elections held as scheduled in November 1992.

Shamir, unlike his predecessor Menahem Begin, aspires to determine his successor while still prime minister. He has no intention of his successor being one of the three ministers: Sharon, Levy, and Moda'i.

Shamir's first preference is to crown current Finance Minister Dan Meridor as his successor. The timing, in the middle, or toward the end, of the 13th Knesset's tenure, i.e., in the mid-1990s, Shamir intends to initiate an orderly transfer of power to Dan Meridor.

Meridor is to Shamir as was the late Yisrael Galili to Golda, may her memory be for a blessing and peace. This close connection seems to be too close for some Likud ministers, including Foreign Minister Moshe Arens. For example, Arens had no advance knowledge of Meridor's meeting in Washington with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker. Defense Minister Yitzhaq Rabin knows that Meridor, who is not a cabinet member, shares in all state secrets and proceedings, sometimes even before him. Recently, Rabin complained that Meridor sees cables before he does.

On the eve of his trip to Cairo, Meridor stated to Rabin: I see that you are travelling to Egypt.

Rabin: I do not know.

Meridor: It was written in the cables.

Shamir's plan is likely to encounter the opposition of Arens, who would seem to be the real heir given his membership in the government's leadership quartet by virtue of his position as foreign minister and his chairmanship of the Herut movement secretariat. Opposition is also likely to come from Qatzav and Deputy Minister Netanyahu, who view themselves as candidates for the premiership, and from Roni Milo', who is designating Knesset Member Beni Begin for the position. Meridor will gain the support of Minister Ehud Olmert.

The second part of Shamir's plan: distancing the trio of constraints ministers [Sharon, Levy, and Moda'i] from the centers of political power. This is doubtlessly a main reason why Shamir prefers a unity government with the Labor Alignment over a narrow government, and why he prefers Rabin and Peres as members of the ruling quartet and holders of the treasury and defense portfolios over the participation of Sharon and Levy.

The three constraints ministers are aware of the general lines of the secret plan. This is what binds them together, not the future of the land of Israel. Therefore, all of Shamir's attempts to separate the three and to bring one of them, David Levy, closer, have failed.

The three ministers aim to push out Shamir, or as an alternative, to deny Shamir's intended heir, be it Arens or Meridor, his inheritance. The means to achieve this aim: Ariq Sharon and Yitzhaq Moda'i made a verbal commitment to David Levi that he is their candidate for the premiership.

The trio set spring 1990 as the deadline for completing the process of gaining control of the Likud. Internal rumors in the Likud, according to which Shamir is likely to resign next year when he becomes 75, are quickening their deployment.

The strategy of the three: opposition to every political process—without reference to content—by presenting themselves as the protectors of the land of Israel, and presenting their rivals as consciously or unconsciously aiding the establishment of a Palestinian state headed by the PLO. It is understood that the meeting which they held this week is another step in the application of this strategy.

'Dirty Politics' Reported Among Likud Leadership
90OL0122B Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR
in Hebrew 6 Oct 89 p 8

[Article by Pe'er-li Shahar]

[Text] On the eve of the contest between Shamir and Sharon in 1984, members of the Herut movement center

received a booklet on whose binding was recorded "Do You Know Ari'el Sharon?" In 19 pages of good-quality paper, the booklet's publishers sought to convince members of the center not to support Ari'el Sharon for the premiership: "Has anyone contributed more to Begin's departure from politics than Ari'el Sharon?" bears a caption under a picture showing the likenesses of Sharon and Begin.

After detailing events from Sharon's past, including his suggestion to Yosi Sarid that he run together with him in Shlomtzion, and reference to the Lebanon War, members of the center were asked: "You will soon find yourself alone at the ballot box to elect the leadership of your party. Will you elect one who discards his friends? Will you elect one who exchanges his political allies from the left and right in the absence of ideological distinctions to derive personal benefit, who has also lost Begin's trust, who permits himself to present false data even regarding the number of IDF [Israel Defense Force] casualties, who has no inhibitions, and whose wildness is unbridled. Ask yourself! Is Ari'el Sharon capable of leading us to a better future...?"

Currently, as then, attempts are being made to influence the positions of members of the center by means of anonymous letters. This time, the goal is to harm the position of the "princes [Dan Meridor, Ehud Olmert, and Roni Milo']."

Two letters recently reached the post boxes of members of the Likud center. The letters were signed HMBG—Members of the Center Favoring Expulsion. The first letter states: "The Labor Alignment defense minister favors expulsion, and the Likud justice minister opposes expulsion. Member of the center, is this the man whom you elected to be your representative in the government?! Join us in the call to Dan Meridor to immediately expel any Arab who throws a rock and/or incites, and/or disrupts order throughout the entire land of Israel."

The second page, sent on 10 September, states: "Dan Meridor, justice minister, our Jewish brothers, who are being killed and injured daily, cry out to you to expel, and immediately! Member of the center, how much Jewish blood must be spilled in the state of Israel before the justice minister emerges from his leftist indifference and legislates an expulsion law?!" Signed HMBG.

The campaign in the Likud movement is not against Dan Meridor alone. The camps of Sharon and Levy decided to highlight the conceptual-ideological issue in all appearances at branches by focussing on the so-called "they and we." "They" include ministers close to Shamir, doves, and leftists, whereas "we" comprise the people of the land of Israel. "They" are willing to compromise on the land of Israel and the participation of deportees in a Palestinian delegation, and to bring closer the horror of the establishment of a Palestinian state. "We" are the guardians of the walls.

The message is supposed to have a double meaning. If Shamir is vulnerable to the leftist propaganda of his

confidants, it should also be assumed that he has been stricken by the concessions syndrome....

Aside from this activity, whose initiators have been identified, the "princes" are facing a campaign of rumors which are filling the corridors at Metzudat Ze'ev [Fortress of Ze'ev] and the branches, where news of internal conflicts among the "princes" is being circulated by word of mouth. Shamir's confidants may be close to Shamir, but they are not close to each other. It is related at the fortress that Meridor and Olmert—impatient on the road to power—are attempting to generate a conflict between Arens and Shamir. Drop by drop, the media is being leaked "reliable news items" to the effect that Meridor has information directly from the office of the foreign minister—because Salay Meridor, the justice minister's brother, is Arens' advisor. There is also talk of a rift among Shamir's people, and the separate activity of Roni Milo' versus Moshe Qatzav, versus Olmert and Meridor, and versus Binyamin Netanyahu's activity.

There is no clear source of all these rumors and whispers. This week too, with the publication of reports of a rift between Shamir and Olmert, some argued that Mikha'el Degel's confidants are responsible for the spread of the news. Others stated that Milo's confidants are behind the publication, for which there is even a logical explanation: Milo' is angry with Olmert because Olmert agreed to head the committee to attach the Liberals to the Likud center, and did not act so that Milo' would head it.

Feelings ran strong in the prime minister's building this week. Elements close to the situation stated suspiciously: "It is very strange that these slurs relate only to Meridor, Olmert, and Milo'. These slurs obviously contain, as it were, internal information from forums in which the participants are counted among those defined as "our friends." For example, they attempted "to incriminate" Olmert for holding dovish views based on internal information which arrived in cables regarding private discussions which he held abroad for which there are no protocols. The natural destination of these cables, which arrived as it were, would be the foreign ministry and perhaps the prime minister's office, too.

Someone has concluded from this that "the war is now at home." Another adds: "It is correct that the 'princes' shall have their inheritance when the time comes; however, there are very many princes!"

Likud Personalities, Factions Examined

90OL0122J Tel Aviv HADASHOT (Weekend Supplement) in Hebrew 13 Oct 89 pp 2-3

[Article by Tzvi Gilat?]

[Text] On the eve of the New Year, as a gesture of good will, Mubarak telephoned Yitzhaq Shamir from Washington. In the absence of a common topic, the Egyptian president took an interest in the customs of the holiday. It became clear to him that despite his recommendation

to eat beans, the Israelis prefer, on this day, to eat apples with honey. If he had called on the eve of Yom Kippur, perhaps Shamir would have wished him a good obstruction [a play on words between 'obstruction' (hasima) and 'sealing' (hatima); the latter is said on Yom Kippur in wishing others a 'good sealing' in the book of life].

Shamir is currently at the height of obstructing. Apparently he is reaping gains with this tactic. However, he cannot continue this game for long. His rivals know this. They too have adopted the bunker tactic. The ball is now in the Israeli court, as the U.S. secretary of state says, i.e., in the Likud's court. Let them bleed, states the administration cruelly and unsympathetically. Rabin also says: "I am not becoming involved in this; let the Likud solve the problem."

Shamir cannot play the bunker game when no one is actually interested in attacking. True, it proves that he holds the keys, but what does one do now? Movement is required. Meanwhile, they play. Arens reports to Shamir, Shamir reports to Olmert, Olmert reports to Meridor, Meridor to Shamir. How long can 30 play in our penalty area. Someone will ultimately have to kick. It is humorous.

The Americans Are Staring Goldstein Down

The Likud—both Likud A (comprising Shamir and his people) and Likud B (the constraints Likud)—is in distress. On Wednesday of this week, the Likud center was convened for an unofficial convention on the initiative of Levi, Sharon, and Moda'i. This is a repeat event. With each such meeting, those who initiate them become more bewildered. Both Levy's ministry and Sharon's ministry sent invitations. They were under pressure. Shamir's camp demonstrated tranquility. Unlike the past, Shamir's earthworks contractors, Roni Milo' and Mikha'el Degel, did not hustle 1,000 members of the center within a week into Shamir's office. Bibi [Binyamin] Netanyahu travelled on the eve of the meeting to cheer Maccabi Tel Aviv in Miami. Previous obligations. There were a total of only 500 people at the Gane Hata'arukha [exhibit gardens] Hall, including Papo Hanitzhi and Hulda Gorvitz, who, this time, did not organize public singing. Sharon's camp was fully mobilized—more Liberal faces—but spaces still remained between the seats, and, most importantly, the Likud's joy of living and hunger for battle were missing. They were not rejoicing there. Some fool at the door initially insisted on identifying those entering by their documents. "Why documents," rightly asked Ka'tvi of the Liberals. "Let people enter." The only thing lacking was to find out how many true members of the center were in the audience.

"Former Minister" Yig'al Hurvitz, and even "former Minister" Mordekhay Ben-Porat (incidentally, he is careful to emphasize that he is the head of the "Unity" movement, a strange name for a one-man movement). Sharir sent greetings from abroad, Tzahi Hanegbi is on a mission abroad, Sha'ul 'Amor, contrary to published

reports, did not show up. In order to aggrandize the weak showing, each frustrated Knesset member was allowed to vent the bitterness of his heart. Yig'al Hurvitz blamed the inability to cope with the intifadah on Moshe Shlonski from the television network. Mikha'el Kleiner longed for Begin, and Pinhas Goldstein revealed the truth—the Americans are staring us down.

Senior ministers then complained. Moda'i complained that he is not being allowed to see documents. Sharon wearied the members of the center with his repeated correspondence with the prime minister regarding a meeting of the center to discuss unemployment and the development towns.

"I requested and I wrote," stated Sharon. "Nu, so what happened? I did not receive a response." Five times he repeated "Nu, so what happened," but, nothing truly happened. Not even everyone remained to hear David Levy complain. Levy was the first speaker at the previous constraints meeting, and his speech went on and on until "Mabat" came on. Now he spoke last, and again, apparently he took into account Hanan 'Azran. But what remained for him to say after Sharon and Moda'i? They took the words from him, only the intonation remained.

Frustration was prominent among the constraints ministers. "Are we splitting?" asked Sharon. "Who is splitting? Minister David Levy, traces of whose welcomed activity are seen throughout the country?" Levy beamed with pleasure. Here is Sharon making him known. However, Sharon is not a child. When he rhetorically asked the audience if it would be the successful Levy who would split, or perhaps the successful economist Moda'i, or perhaps "you concerned members of the center," someone from the audience, as expected, responded "or perhaps you?" Then Sharon gave the piece about the wars, the fording [in the 1973 war], the concern for security, and collected the proceeds. Levy had already stopped smiling.

Out of frustration, they spoke of the "the soil," "the land of choice," and the "people of Israel." We will abandon this. Frustration perhaps characterizes the entire Likud at present.

The Likud is currently in a situation in which it must ultimately be strong. The matter does not pulsate as they saw in their vision. Can one currently say that we will not compromise on anything after 22 years of occupation, in which Israeli law has not been applied to Judea and Samaria, a transfer was not carried out, an alternative leadership did not develop in the West Bank, and in which the village associations failed? It is impossible, and people in the Likud increasingly understand this.

Power Is Theirs, So Are the Problems

The breaking point was perhaps the peace agreement with Egypt. Begin, who conceded Sinai, understood, or should have understood, that he laid the foundations for a concession regarding the West Bank. He secluded himself for this reason according to those close to him,

not because of the Lebanon war. Later, Shamir decided to discard the agreements with the religious parties, preferring a unity government with the hated MAPAI [Israeli Workers Party]. He did not do so out of love for Peres, but for lack of an alternative. Likud members, many of whom are still motivated by hatred of the rule of MAPAI, are beginning to understand—and it has taken them 10 years to do so—that they have the power, which means that they also have the problems. It is therefore no wonder that Sharon, Levy, and Moda'i have repeatedly stated that negotiations must be held in Jerusalem, not on Egyptian soil. Where did Mr Mubarak come from, asked Knesset Member Pinhas Goldstein, wanting to forget that Begin brought him.

Somehow, the Herut center has a militant, hard-line image, and every politician knows that the determining body in Israeli politics is the Herut center, such that anyone having more moderate views, i.e., who believes that some compromise must be reached, still expresses these views quietly. This week, I spoke with very many members from the Herut center, both young and old. I heard this reconciliatory tone in the statements of some of them. However, anyone still needing the center, whether to be elected to the Knesset, or to be chosen for a ministerial position, made me swear not to indicate this, lest the center hear. However, how long can one exist under the balance of terror of Sharon and Levi, without disputing whether this terror is so great.

On the eve of the constraints meeting, Shamir demanded the dismissal of Beilin, and released to the press a headline to the effect that Israel would not agree to hold discussions with Palestinians who even identified with the PLO, thereby taking the wind out of the sails of the constraints ministers. What reason currently exists to attack Shamir, or to not broadly back these demands? However, parallel to the tranquilizer given to the center's ego, an additional process is beginning to develop. Roni Milo' had a confrontation with David Levy on the eve of the New Year. "Do not be a foolish leader," he told him, and this week Olmert was heard saying that "during the past 2 months, I have lived with the sense that the constraints ministers are talking about ideology and thinking about the leadership of the movement. From this standpoint, they and Peres are portrayed as actual partners in a process aimed at undermining Shamir's leadership." Shamir's young people are beginning to call the boy by his name and are lining up on the firing line.

It Would Be Interesting To Know What the Princes Have To Sell

A currently recurring question is what are they doing there, in the office of "Shamir's confidants." Are Olmert, Meridor, and Milo' really pulling Shamir toward moderation, or is this perhaps wishful thinking on the part of frustrated leftists. According to the current political results, it is difficult to see moderation in Shamir's positions or the moderating influence of those close to him. Is this because they are not as moderate as they seem? Everything is relative. The princes are not as

moderate as they seem, or as they wish to think. They want neither to surrender the territories, nor talk with the PLO, but some of them must think about a solution. They also know well, that if Shamir fails, they would become prey. Meridor, Olmert, and Milo' need to begin to repay the leadership and expectations note. The public needs decisionmakers, not advisers. They have already extracted the dividend of "young Knesset members" and "young ministers." The time has now come to hear what they have to sell, and to discover whether they are capable of graduating from ideology to political pragmatism. They call them princes and political novices, forgetting that Milo' and Olmert have been active in politics for 20 years.

Meanwhile, they are attempting to unify the ranks. "Misha" called to Shamir emotionally from the podium at the Palace of Culture, "you are our flesh." Arens, Meridor, Milo', Olmert, and Netanyahu are really of one flesh, or at least they wish to be seen as such. For veteran Jabotinskians and young Herut members faithful to ideology, Sharon, Moda'i, and Levy do not belong to the family. Sharon is a Mapainik and Levy is a socialist from Beit She'an. It is a fact that other pure Sephardis, who made names for themselves in Herut, such as Shitrit, Qatzav, and Magen to mention several prominent names, are in a process of moving to the Shamir-Arens Camp. And Moda'i? He is the same platoon sergeant who arrested members of the National Military Organization [Irgun] in Netanya after the Altana operation. They are not "of our own flesh" as is Misha, and Shamir now needs the rest of the flesh around him.

Beni Begin Needs To Decide

As a party head and head of state, Shamir wears two hats, each with its own objective inscribed on it. As head of state, he must maintain power and move policy forward. As the party head, he must maintain the party and transfer power in an orderly fashion to whomever suits him. He needs support, and this circle of support must help him obtain these two objectives, profiting personally itself. The princes must help him obtain a political compromise with which he can live, and they are also the ones who must obtain the inheritance. It is said that Shamir's candidate is Arens. The name of Arens is raised, because the princes are not yet mature enough to do battle against Ariq's bulldozers and Levy's judgments. However, Arens would be an interim candidate, if a candidate at all. He would sit on the fence until it would be possible to skip over to the next generation. The problem is that this generation must begin to demonstrate courage.

It is clear that there are cracks. It is not certain that the views of Netanyahu, who dreams of the development of an alternative leadership in the territories, are acceptable to Meridor. Nor is it certain that the attempt to describe Olmert as being in disgrace with Shamir did not originate in the same internal circle of princedom. However, the hour of decision between them is still distant. Shamir still takes a cold shower every morning and is careful to

rest between 2:00 and 4:00. Who says that he will retire at 75? Aside from this, until then, other names could blossom. We have not yet heard Beni Begin speak, and Begin has already shown that he is fashioned from leadership material. There is a difference between "leaders" and "advisors." The younger Begin appears charismatic. He is now successfully managing Histadrut election headquarters, and, unlike others, he does not fear confrontation, perhaps because he has yet to finally decide if politics is vocation. In any case, it is to his credit that he opposed Ari'el Sharon in elections for the chairmanship of the center, despite losing. None of the other princes have yet dared to engage in such an open contest. Perhaps, when the young Begin understands that his vocation is politics, the court will rally behind him.

In Sum, Shamir Is Isolated

Moshe 'Amirav, a former activist in the Jerusalem branch, knows this group well. They grew up together. He has already made his political transition. On this exact day, he is going to Frankfurt for a joint appearance with the PLO's Labib Tarzi, within the bounds of the law of course. He still feels betrayed by Meridor, Olmert, and Milo', inasmuch as when Shamir refused to act on his suggestion to meet with Faysal al-Husayni, they retreated even though they were involved in deliberations in this matter. They are currently not in contact, but the process, in his opinion, is going in the right direction, i.e., in his direction. According to 'Amirav, Shamir had an opportunity to speak with Faysal al-Husayni about autonomy before the intifadah. Shamir is still unwilling to speak with al-Husayni. But with whom would Shamir speak, and about what? He must talk. When the Palestinians proposed municipal elections in January 1988 in the 14-point document, Murphy and Shamir threw the paper in their faces. What is there to speak about now if not elections? And where is the road leading? Yes, 'Amirav also thinks that they must demonstrate courage. How much longer can they only advise? One can understand from 'Amirav that Olmert and Meridor, like Shamir, will ultimately have to stick their necks out.

In the meantime, they are closing ranks and preparing an offensive. Regarding Sharon, they will recall that his contribution to the peace process was not only crossing the canal, but also levelling Yamit. Regarding Levy, they will recall his position favoring the IDF's [Israel Defense Forces] evacuation of Lebanon. They will demonstrate boldness, but they will prepare for what is coming.

In sum, Shamir is finding himself alone in the field, which is very sad from his standpoint. It suddenly emerges that Mubarak, the intermediary, must be paid a brokerage fee. The Americans, despite what was virtually concluded with them, continue to write off their support of Israel, and one would have to be naive and stupid to think that we have reached the last station with them on the road to concessions. Rabin, the "glue" of the government, suddenly surprises Shamir with a willingness to talk with certain people who could be considered PLO,

and Rabin is not making an issue of whether or not such people are deportees. In short, no one is willing to do Shamir's mental labor. Let him bleed. And he will truly bleed profusely to convince members of the center that, now, as he is speaking with them, he is establishing a limit on concessions, because he alone does not determine the limit, and Ariq Sharon will put him to the test. Already this week, Sharon threatened that, if it proves impossible to coordinate with the prime minister regarding a meeting of the center, they will convene it without coordination. It is likely that they will convene it before 15 November, when Shamir is to depart for Washington. The Labor Alignment says that they should give him 3 to 5 weeks, meaning: "Only for us to get through Histadrut elections." In the Likud, they also are saying give us time, time is needed. However, Sharon is already pressing the stopwatch. He too has no time. Shamir is consolidating his forces, knowing that he is only at the starting line in this hurdles race.

Sharon is correct in determining this week that the terms "the Israeli peace initiative," "the Mubarak initiative," and "the Baker plan" are a smoke screen. Not to be seen in any of these initiatives is an Arab personality with whom Shamir would be willing to speak. Such a person must not be of the PLO, nor must he identify with the PLO or be from East Jerusalem. Rather he must be one who publicly states that he has read Shamir's plan and will not speak of anything but it. It would only be necessary to add "and who was born to a Jewish mother." Shamir will need to prove, not just state, that he supports his own peace initiative, which was disputed by THE NEW YORK TIMES this week. The smoke screen will have to be discarded. Shamir's advisors, if they are truly advisors, will need to help him pass through this difficult maturation phase. They are not being heard, perhaps because maturation is too difficult for them. They too have grown up with "not one handful" and "the Jordan has two banks," and they still lack the political power to declare and implement a concession. But Sharon is also right in determining that we have entered into the corral, in which cattle are driven for slaughter. Let them bleed, but they no longer can ask: "How did we get here."

Peres Reportedly Losing Ground in Party

900L0122A Tel Aviv HADASHOT
in Hebrew 6 Oct 89 pp 4-5

[Article by Ya'el Gvirtz; box by Hanan Crystal]

[Excerpts] On Tuesday evening, the television network announced, on behalf of Peres, that a dramatic development was expected before the cabinet meeting that occurred yesterday. It ultimately emerged that this was a misunderstanding with the Americans. Incidentally, what is the Finance Minister presently doing, when the political process, so it seems, is gaining momentum? Ministers, party members, and Knesset members who were asked, state: He is simply not relevant. [passage omitted]

His Line Is Winning, But He Is Losing

Peres returned to Israel on the eve of the holiday and buried himself in the Finance Ministry, as boring as he finds this. There is nothing in which Shim'on Peres is more interested than advancing the peace process and heading the Labor Party. His priorities depend on who is speaking. "It is always easier to appear abroad than to receive massive support in Israel," states Professor Ze'ev Sternhal. "There, one can appear with a peace plan whose only deficiency is that it is not implementable. Peres does not have public support, nor does he control his party. Currently, Peres can do nothing without Rabin, and it is doubtful whether he can do anything without Shamir. All of the comparisons made recently in the press between Rabin and De Gaulle and Churchill are foolishness. For Rabin to enter history through the front door, he needs to be able to play for the entire jackpot, which is on the order of a miracle. Therefore, it will not happen. Rabin will continue to be defense minister, and Peres will continue to head the party. Both know this, and therefore, neither will take any step leading to early elections or to a narrow government. Peres still controls the different groups comprising the machinery. These elements in the party benefit from the fact that he is finance minister, because they know that they cannot subsist on peace plans. Therefore, they have not transferred their support to Rabin. The doves will also tire when they discover that Rabin's plan is not being actualized."

On the eve of the holiday, a survey published by the Dahaf Institute showed that 52 percent of the public supports a meeting between an Israeli delegation and a Palestinian delegation in Cairo, which is inversely proportional to Peres' popularity index. In the past 5 years, Peres, very sadly, contributed, more than any other leading politician to the penetration of a moderate line of thinking to the electorate. He alone has born the burden of this issue since 1984, and here is Rabin reaping the harvest.

In Peres' office, they argue that Rabin was selected to lead the development based on technical and tactical considerations. Peres, they say, became immersed in the treasury after elections, and it seemed that Rabin was more suited to lead the development because he has responsibility for the territories as defense minister, and because of electoral considerations. In other words, the public is willing to buy Peres' goods provided someone else sells them. True, his aides say, Peres is experiencing a certain political depression at present, but it should be remembered how popular he was as prime minister. The high marks gained by every defense minister, especially Rabin in Shamir's government, enables Rabin to move the peace initiative forward. Peres is willing to massage everyone's ego so long as the peace process does not sour. His aids estimate that the next 2 weeks will provide him with tactical flexibility to advance the subject, and, in his view, any price would be suitable for exhausting the process. According to this explanation, Peres is determined not to allow the Likud to shift the subject from the

peace process axis to the party axis. A problem will develop on account of this period elapsing; a rejection front on both sides will be organized, or as an alternative, the initiative will no longer be in the headlines. They quote him—as if his remarks were made in a closed forum—as saying that if Histadrut elections were to disrupt the peace process, he would concede the Histadrut. It is not worthwhile to rely on this. Many are betting that simply nothing will happen until 1992.

The Price of Sugar Has Risen

Among ministers, party members, and Knesset members who were asked about Peres' degree of relevancy to the political process, only Yosi Sarid was willing to express what many said in background conversations: "Running to America, the expressions, are all a pathetic attempt to stay in the picture. Peres is currently unable to lead any political development. He has no option of managing a development of his own, unless he dances to Rabin's tune. His situation is so pathetic as not even to be a matter of the center's support or nonsupport. In order to breathe at present, he must be all right with one man, Yitzhaq Rabin. What we have from Peres are only specific movements intended to prove that he is still alive."

Sarid is convinced that Peres and Rabin will continue becoming attached to each other within the national unity. He is convinced that Rabin would not compete against Peres. Even Peres' confidants believe that Rabin remembers what happened to Yitzhaq Navon in the center, and that Rabin will not attempt to effect a temporary streaming to his camp. In the Labor Party, in which nothing is more liquid than loyalty, 'Ezer Weizmann hastened to cross the fence to Rabin and create the impression that there already exists between them an alliance of the center. 'Uzi Bar'am, Hayim Ramon, Avram Burg, Eli Dayan, Eli Ben-Menahem, and Hagay Merom also hastened to declare their support for Rabin, as if the moment of decision were imminent.

Bar'am's group is not interested in contending at present. Their ideas regarding elections in 1992 in any case envisage neither Rabin nor Peres. However, from their standpoint, Rabin is currently a live bird in hand, while Peres has for a long time been irrelevant. His role as the head of a faction is providing him with a few more moments of grace as a technical leader of political developments. With the help of the thick hide which adapted him to face the eggs and tomatoes, said a member of the faction, he is able to see himself as a leader and conductor of the political initiative. At a faction meeting, he reported to members as if he were at least the foreign minister. Incidentally, the impression in the same meeting was that Rabin and Peres have been coordinating, at least until the cabinet meeting yesterday. They usually meet alone, and each briefs his aides separately. There is no joint staff. There is a common interest. The problem is what to do with a political initiative which lacks a timetable and starter?

Not much, sigh all of those close to Peres and Rabin in disappointment, and those close to Shamir in relief.

They say that there are still no signs that Peres is broadcasting true nervousness in the face of what is being done to him against the background of his initiatives in the Finance Ministry and Rabin's flowering. When he becomes truly angered, it is cautioned, he is capable of striking. Peres has unrivaled access to material and the media. He also has an unmatched ability to arouse guilt feelings in many of us over the fact that he is actually bearing the fate of us all. He is paying the price on our behalf. Some pointed to the article by Yo'el Marcus, "If I Were Shim'on Peres," as the first quiver of possible nervousness.

Meanwhile, between the promise of action on Tuesday and the cabinet meeting on Thursday, Peres' ministry announced an increase in the price of sugar.

[Box, p 5] The Treasurer Supports Rabin

Nothing good has happened to Shim'on Peres since he failed in elections for the fourth consecutive time. Public opinion polls continue to be cruel to him and his party. The economic miracle simply is not occurring and Rabin's popularity is growing.

Peres and Rabin have competed three times, most recently 9 years ago. They could compete again in early 1990, following the dissolution of the national unity government, or in 1992, with the end of the current Knesset term.

The balance of powers is currently as follows: Rabin's camp comprises about 25 percent of the center's members, including most of the United Kibbutz Movement members. Prominent members of Rabin's camp include Minister Ya'aqov Tzur, Knesset Members Shevah Weiss, Ora Namir, Beyga Shohet, Mikha Goldman, 'Edna Solodar, and 'Amir Peretz. They were joined recently by Minister 'Ezer Weizmann.

Peres' camp, in the most recent contest in 1980-81, included about 70 percent of the center's members. Over the years, it has shrivelled to a group of faithful, which includes Ministers Rafi Edri and Avraham Katz-'Oz of the United Kibbutz Movement, Deputy Minister Yosi Beilin, party Secretary General and Knesset Member Mikha Harish, Na'amat [Histadrut women's organization] Secretary General Masha Lobelski, Knesset Member Eli Dayan, and apparently also Tel Aviv district secretary and coordinating Committee member Gid'on Sagi'. Most of the members of this group would apparently prefer to lose the Knesset elections with Peres heading the Labor Alignment rather than winning with Rabin heading the Labor list.

The unaffiliated camp includes a group of former Peres supporters who reached the conclusion that Peres is unable to win in the elections. For different considerations, they have postponed to the last minute a decision

on whom they would support. They remember the breaking/capitulation of Navon to Peres in 1984. Many of the members of this group have signaled to Rabin, directly or indirectly, that they would support him if he runs. They include Ministers Mordekhay Gur, Moshe Shahal, Gad Ya'aqobi, and Yitzhaq Navon; Knesset Members 'Uzi Bar'am, Hayim Ramon, and Hagay Merom; Moshav movement secretary Nisim Zavili; Jerusalem district heads and Knesset Members 'Imanu'el Zisman and Shim'on Shitrit; leaders of the central hawkish current and Knesset Members Shoshana Arbeli-Almozlino, Shlomo Hillel, Miki Bar-Zahar; and party treasurer Moshe Kohen.

Peres Accused of Preventing Negev Settlement

90OL0122H Tel Aviv HADASHOT
in Hebrew 13 Oct 89 p 6

[Article by Ya'ir Nehuray]

[Text] "Praise of the Negev and slander of the settlers in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza by Shim'on Peres deceives the public and is demagogic," stated an announcement by AMANA [Gush Emunim Settlement Organization]. According to members of the Gush Emunim settlement movement, Finance Minister Shim'on Peres refuses to approve funds for the movement to settle in the Negev.

AMANA has had plans to establish settlements in the Negev ready for 3 years. AMANA members maintain that Peres, who is also the chairman of the ministerial committee for Negev affairs, is withholding approval for members of Gush Emunim to establish these settlements for political reasons. Peres, they say, is unwilling "to make the impure kosher." He fears, according to them, that public opinion of Gush Emunim will improve if the latter is given an opportunity to settle in the Negev.

AMANA's proposals to settle in the Negev relate to the establishment of three community villages in the Gush Nitzana area on the Egyptian border; Neveh-Zohar, which is next to the Dead Sea coast; and Mitzpeh Ramon. Members of the movement claim that a nucleus of 30 families is currently willing to settle at Mitzpeh Ramon immediately.

UNRWA Activities in Gaza Described

TA20121758 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 20 Dec 89 p 2

[Text] For the past 6 months, UNRWA [United Nations Relief and Works Agency] has been monitoring IDF [Israel Defense Forces] activity in the Gaza Strip. For this purpose it has increased the number of foreigners it employs from 8 to 24. IDF officers say that this activity exceeds the organization's mandate, which is to provide food, welfare, education, and health services in the refugee camps only. According to IDF sources, UNRWA personnel often drive around in vehicles equipped with two-way radios in various areas of the Gaza Strip, including cities in which they are not supposed to

operate. During the last few months, U.N. observers belonging to the observers' force stationed on the Israel-Syria border have made frequent visits to the Gaza Strip. UNRWA has been trying to widen the scope of its activities into areas it did not deal with before the intifadah. IDF sources do not discount the possibility that UNRWA is helping to transfer funds from elements hostile to Israel to elements in the Gaza Strip. It was against the background of this increase in UNRWA activity that a confrontation developed during the last month between the Civil Administration in the Gaza Strip and UNRWA personnel. According to IDF sources, "it was necessary to put the U.N. people in their places, and to ensure that the rules of the game were enforced."

UNRWA Accused of Exceeding Its Mandate

44230046D Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT
(Supplement) in Hebrew 30 Oct 89 p 29

[Article by Ronny Shaked: "Is UNRWA Collaborating With the PLO?"]

[Text] Last Thursday, a few minutes after Karim al-Da'amsa was shot to death in Bayt Jallah, a passenger car marked with the UN insignia arrived on the spot. In the car were two men and one woman. They questioned locals in the vicinity, then continued to the Jallah hospital, where the dead man had been brought. At the hospital, the UN people received a report from the physician on duty.

Similar activities by UN officials in their white cars with the large UN markings, have recently been taking place in sensitive areas in the territories. Shortly after a curfew has been declared in a village or urban neighborhood, close on the heels of arrests in refugee camps, or other IDF [Israel Defense Forces] special actions, UN officials arrive at the site, attempt to help the injured when there are any, talk with the inhabitants, and ascertain the circumstances of the incident. Then they write reports to the UNRWA [United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East] headquarters and the UN observers staff in Jerusalem.

The telephone number of the special UNRWA staff department in Jerusalem, which was established to monitor events in the territories, is known to the youth in every village, neighborhood, or refugee camp. Young people, usually intifadah activists, hasten to call the UNRWA staff about every unusual incident. After the telephone call come the white cars.

No one has given it a mandate to do so, but it seems that UNRWA has taken upon itself to act as observer. For that purpose, the organization has recruited foreign staff, including former officers who served with the UN observer forces in Lebanon. Several dozen Palestinian youth familiar with the area were also hired to serve as interpreters and do the talking. Palestinians accompanying UN officials wear prominently displayed United Nations markings on their sleeves.

Last week, UNRWA officials rushed to help the inhabitants of Bayt Sahur under curfew. Hundreds of food parcels waiting in the organization's stores in Bethlehem were sent to the village and distributed to its inhabitants by members of People's Committees. Needless to say, the relatively wealthy Christian population of Bayt Sahur is not in the refugee category.

The UN Relief and Works Agency for refugees was established in 1949. Its mandate features aid in the areas of health, education, and food supply. According to the UNRWA definition, a Palestinian refugee is "anyone whose permanent residence was Palestine at least 2 years prior to the 1948 war, and who lost his house and livelihood as a result of that war." The organization is led by a general commissioner appointed by the UN secretary and answerable to him, and its headquarters are in Vienna.

Supplying food to Bayt Sahur is not UNRWA's first irregular action: Last July, it organized a large food distribution campaign to all Gaza inhabitants and to needy families in the West Bank, not only to those on their refugee lists. An announcement by the Vienna headquarters stated that "This one-time distribution of flour—a basic staple in the Palestinian diet—was designed as special aid to Gaza Strip inhabitants in distress."

In August, UNRWA members distributed food to the people of Jaba' in the Janin District, after the village had been under a lengthy curfew.

In recent months, UNRWA has been attempting to help intifadah casualties through its medical network and field infirmaries. In particular, they treat injured people who fear that hospitalization in government hospitals may lead to their arrest. UNRWA has infirmaries in all refugee camps, including teams of Palestinian nurses and physicians.

The defense forces have no illusions about the organization. "The PLO uses UNRWA to ship food and even money to the territories," they say.

Israel has expressed its displeasure on several occasions. Concerning activities in the territories, Shmuel Goren met with UNRWA's commissioner in Vienna and clearly entreated him to ensure that the organization does not serve as a pipeline for conveying money from the PLO to the territories. Foreign Ministry representatives also discussed the problem with UN officials in New York. It seems, however, that all those warnings had no effect on UNRWA. On the contrary, the agency intensified its irregular activities in recent weeks.

"We do have problems with UNRWA," said a civilian administration official in the territories. "The organization is endeavoring to broaden its mandate. We, on the other hand, have real difficulties with food distribution to people in need who are not refugees. It's a humanitarian problem. That's why we do not interfere with them in that matter."

The defense forces believe that UNRWA's interventions are requested by the PLO and fully coordinated with it.

Two weeks ago, in the wake of several intelligence reports on the subject, defense forces raided UNRWA offices in several refugee camps in the West Bank and Gaza. Lists of casualties, reports on field incidents, intifadah leaflets, and other material indicating contacts between UNRWA officials and intifadah activists, were found on the premises.

The defense forces leadership has no other recourse but to once again issue a warning to the organization's leaders. Israel, however, is in a quandary because, if the IDF withholds humanitarian aid from needy Palestinians, even if they're not refugees according to the definition, it would come under harsh criticism from the entire world. Israel cannot and may not halt UNRWA activities. Consequently, all that it can do is protest, despite the suspicion that the PLO is financing food distribution to Bayt Sahur inhabitants.

Controversy Reported in IDF Decisionmaking

44230046G Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 2 Nov 89 p 4

[Article by Ze'ev Schiff: "Ideological-Political Battles"]

[Text] The Defense Ministry spokesman's announcement that the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] did not establish new units made up of residents of the territories and that existing units will continue to serve in keeping with military requirements, does not cancel the possibility that the Central Command commander may still allow those units to serve in the territories to police their Arab neighbors for the duration of the intifadah.

The announcement issued by the Central Command, according to which Lieutenant General Yitzhak Mordekhay had agreed with the defense minister to permit regional defense companies in the territories to serve there on an experimental basis, raises questions concerning the decisionmaking process on issues regarding the struggle against the intifadah. Are such decisions made during field trips without the participation of the chief of staff, and are reports issued, and not by the IDF spokesman, even before a given issue is settled?!

As is known, General Dan Shomron is opposed to having those units serve in the territories. At the most, he is willing to allow soldiers from those regional defense units to serve there individually. This is not the first time that sensitive issues concerning the territories are dealt with directly between the command general and the defense minister when the chief of staff does not agree with them. The subject of the siege on Bayt Sahur received similar treatment. Gen Shomron was not happy with the way the matter was handled there.

Permitting companies of settlers to serve in the territories while the intifadah continues may implicate the IDF

in provocations and serious incidents. Those would be the only IDF units with a common political-ideological background, many of whose soldiers view transfer of inhabitants of the territories as a solution to the conflict and the intifadah. Among those soldiers there are also Kakh [Me'ir Kahana's Party] members who in civilian life were involved in serious acts of provocation. The fine internal balance created in other reserve units by the fact that their members belong to various Israeli parties—members of Peace Now alongside members of Tehiya, etc.—would be lost in settlers' units. The mixed politics of reserve troops makes internal discipline easier.

The former commander of the Central Command, 'Amram Mitzna', did not permit the deployment of those companies in the territories, and he had the chief of staff's support in the matter. Those regional defense units, which were viewed as elite units, served at the most in the Jordan Valley, where there are fewer Arab inhabitants. Mitzna' explained to settlers that, because of the sensitive political situation, conditions in the territories differ from those in which regional defense units serve on the Lebanese border or the Golan Heights. Now settlers say that Gen Mitzna' promised to return to previous procedures and find a way for them to serve in the territories.

No Grounds Perceived for Lebanon Withdrawal

44230044H Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 25 Oct 89 p 9

[Article by Ze'ev Schiff: "Lebanon: A Different Story"]

[Text] Any agreement in Lebanon designed to end the civil war and bring about a withdrawal, even a partial withdrawal, of Syrian troops, will immediately place Israel under pressure. Demands will rise from every quarter to pull the IDF [Israel defense Forces] out of the security zone it has established in Lebanon. Israel will be requested to pay for a Syrian withdrawal, even if it is only out of the Beirut area. The U.S., British, and French ambassadors have already appealed to the Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem to contribute to consolidating the agreement. Syria is at the most willing to talk of a withdrawal spaced out over 2 years, and in any event, it does not intend to leave the eastern areas of the Lebanon Valley along its border. They have already announced that they could not complete their withdrawal unless Israel pulled out from southern Lebanon. Some will undoubtedly tell Israel that Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon depended solely on Israel, as if identical motives had brought the Syrian Army to Beirut and the IDF to the security zone.

There are three major reasons that make it difficult for Israel to pull out of the security zone it established on Lebanese territory along its border. It is safe to assume that until a satisfactory solution is found to those problems, Israel will maintain its opposition to suggestions for withdrawal. The first reason is the presence in

Lebanon of foreign and local forces and groups dedicated to attacking targets inside Israel. That is not empty rhetoric on their part, accompanied as it is by actions and attempts to infiltrate Israeli territory and to inflict injury on its citizens. Alone in the recent past there have been two such attempts in the sector opposite Kibbutz Manara. Syria doesn't have to deal with this kind of problem when debating when and how far to pull out of Lebanon.

We are not now referring to Amal, the large Shi'ite militia whose purpose it is to bring about the IDF's withdrawal from the security zone. Amal usually refrains from attacking targets inside Israel, focusing instead on the security zone and General Lahd's militia, which it wants to eliminate. The trouble is caused by various Palestinian groups and by the extreme Shi'ite organization Hizballah, which is cooperating with several Palestinian groups. Among those Palestinian groups is Ahmad Jibril's organization, which was responsible for the glider that landed near Qiryat Shemona, the Abu-Nidal group, and Abu-Musa's men. All of them receive support and operational advice from the Syrians. PLO's Democratic Front, too, continues to dispatch teams to Israel through the Lebanese border, although one of its representatives is participating in talks with the U.S. ambassador in Tunis. Although for the past 10 months Fatah has refrained from staging actions from Lebanon, in recent years it managed to reestablish a large military concentration in the Sidon area that could be activated in the future.

When speaking of armed foreign groups we cannot ignore the members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards in Lebanon, who are helping Hizballah in its actions against Israel. As long as the Lebanese Government allows those armed groups to remain active, Israel cannot afford to abandon the security zone and the South Lebanon Army [SLA] and to withdraw completely.

The second reason is the absence of a strong Lebanese Government capable of imposing its will on the various factions and groups in the country. The situation is not at all similar to that in Jordan or even Syria. In point of fact, with its two governments and several armies, Lebanon does not even exist anymore as a state.

Some communities have more than one militia, which at times compete among themselves. There is no president and the governments hardly control a few Beirut districts. There isn't even an authority to which one can complain about problems. Consequently, Lebanese governmental assurances that it will assume responsibility for the security situation along its border with Israel have no value.

The third reason concerns the presence of Syrian forces in Lebanon. In contrast to Sharon's period, Israel today does not view the presence of Syrian forces in Lebanon as a pretext for war; on the other hand, it does constitute a deployment of enemy troops that can at any time

become a threat. That is the reason that Israel insists on continuing reconnaissance flights over Lebanon and opposes deployment of Syrian land missiles in Lebanon. Israel will undoubtedly insist on that condition even after the implementation of the Ta'if agreement.

Israel can understand Syria's strategic interest in the Bija' as far as the sector facing Damascus is concerned, but if this deployment spills over into the southern part of the valley, Israel is forced to take steps. The security zone was not designed to block the Syrian Army, but should that Army come close, the IDF will obviously have to change its deployment in the north. The Lebanese, who are discussing the withdrawal from and deployment of Syrian forces in Lebanon, must take that consideration into account.

All that does not mean that Israel intends to remain in the security zone forever. Ideally, it would like to pull its forces out of the security zone and have them replaced by the SLA, leaving at the most "instructors" with SLA Commander General Lahd's troops.

Thus, this situation will continue until all other militias are dismantled in Lebanon and the Palestinian groups endeavoring to attack Israel from its territory are eliminated. The most that Israel may "contribute" to the Ta'if agreement is to thin out its troops in the security zone on an experimental basis. The fact that several Lebanese Congress members signed the Ta'if compromise agreement still doesn't change anything for Israel's security concerns in the north.

As far as Lebanon is concerned, that is encouraging progress, but it is still not sufficient reason to change the situation along our northern border.

Shortcomings Reported in Military Intelligence

90OL0122C Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR
in Hebrew 8 Oct 89 p 11

[Article by Avi Benyahou]

[Excerpts] The nightmare of every intelligence officer is a surprise similar to that of the war 16 years ago. The intelligence branch of the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] did not read the reports and warnings correctly. Have we learned the lesson? Much effort and money has been invested to prevent a repetition of that trauma. Some believe that not enough has been done. [passage omitted]

The main lessons of 1973 led to the establishment of a control department headed by a colonel directly subordinate to the AMAN [Bureau of Military Intelligence] chief, and to a very significant expansion of the intelligence collection disposition. The general staff allocated very large sums to the intelligence branch to develop and procure systems. The control department, an outgrowth of the main lesson, is supposed to control publications, AMAN bodies, and situation assessments. It must be expanded and allotted the best assessment officers.

Control department personnel are talented officers headed by Colonel 'A., an outstanding person in the research disposition. Like others, he has the potential to advance to the rank of brigadier general. The natural danger is that he will be unable to permit himself, as one who is responsible for the weighty task of control, to go against the assessments of his commanders, knowing that such action could damage his chances for advancement.

Some believe that this position of great importance should be filled by a brigadier general subordinate to the AMAN chief. This brigadier general would function to compensate for system errors. Working under him would be talented civilians experienced in intelligence without ambitions to advance. Such civilians would need to work with maximum freedom of thought, without fear of authority.

Another negative process can be discerned in the Arabist area. A lack of knowledge regarding Islam, Arab history, and Arabic troubles the intelligence branch. Some chiefs of branches and arenas in AMAN do not have degrees in oriental studies, and require "the crutch" of the translation services. Entering into the recesses of the psyche of an Arab commander or leader requires an understanding of his language, literature, religion, and customs. AMAN is investing many efforts in this area, but the situation must be improved.

A traditional dispute among intelligence community experts concerns the division of responsibility for providing warning between the Mosad [Central Institute for Intelligence] and AMAN. Some argue that most of the responsibility lies with the government and the Mosad. Others think that this is the duty of the army and AMAN. Despite the argument, the "Institute for Intelligence and Special Tasks" was no doubt a partner in the overall oversight of the Yom Kippur War, which was also reflected in the conclusions and recommendations of the Agranat Commission.

Before Yom Kippur in 1973, the Mosad and AMAN represented two competing research bodies. Mosad researchers used to remain aloof in the face of AMAN's "wisdom" and were accustomed to leaving it the entire stage. In February 1970, a lesson should have been learned. The Mosad presented AMAN officers with certain information. AMAN rejected the information and was surprised. On the eve of the Yom Kippur War, the Mosad presented AMAN with other information, but AMAN preferred, incorrectly, to refute the information, because of previous, incorrect reports of an imminent war. No one learned this lesson.

Currently, the head of AMAN, who is subordinate to the chief of the general staff, also has governmental responsibility for assessing intelligence in the presence of the prime minister, the government, and the entire state. He is the "national appraiser" without being subordinate to the prime minister. Such a situation is unknown in any modern state. Obviously, the head of the Mosad was supposed to have received this position and to have viewed AMAN as a "subcontractor." The Mosad does

not claim for itself the title "national appraiser," due to its inferior research capability, seniority, and rank compared to AMAN. Some see a danger in this situation, because it precludes a clear definition of national responsibility in a critical area. The busy prime minister alone supervises the Mosad and SHABAK [General Security Service]. Some believe that it is vital that he appoint an appropriate deputy minister to handle the affairs of the intelligence community. The main mission of AMAN, as part of the intelligence community, was, and is, to provide the state with adequate warning—in the worse case, in the space of hours—of the outbreak of war to enable reserve forces to mobilize and deploy.

Whether AMAN has derived all the lessons is greatly doubted. However, things were done, amid debate and confrontations, in the face of different understandings on the part of AMAN chiefs and general staff chiefs who have been replaced. In AMAN, they continue, despite the trauma of Yom Kippur, to use the term "low probability." Israel, because of its nature and limited territory, pins much of its hopes on the intelligence community, especially on AMAN, and has invested a great amount of money in it in recent years for one objective: To strengthen deterrence ability and to prevent a surprise. This is the definition of the desired. Everything else is only hopes and prayer.

IDF Planning Branch Chief Examines Budget Cuts

90OL0139A Tel Aviv BAMAHA
in Hebrew 22 Nov 89 p 8

[Interview with Major General Danny Yatom, chief of the IDF Planning Branch, by Danny Raviv; date and place not given; first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] The picture of the 1990 budget year will not become any rosier, Major General Danny Yatom, head of the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] Planning Branch told BAMAHA in an interview. "I don't doubt that, had the defense budget been larger, the IDF could have been better prepared than it is now," Gen Yatom added.

[BAMAHA] What will be the main characteristics of the Planning Branch work in the coming year?

[Yatom] "The same as in some past years, namely a situation in which many new projects are started, but not all are brought to completion. This will be the third year of a multiyear plan, fully representative of it, and in line with the IDF view of building up our military force over a period of several years.

"The IDF will continue to face challenges in four major areas: the uprising in the West Bank and Gaza, which requires considerable investments of manpower and other resources; current security along the borders and in the security zone; training and courses, and finally, reinforcement for the future. Whenever possible we do take calculated risks and invest in development at the expense of current activities.

"I think that the 1990 defense budget picture will not become any rosier. I don't doubt that had the defense budget been larger, the IDF would have been better prepared than it is now. The multiyear budget plan is based on the assumption that all expenditures in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza will be completely financed by the government."

[BAMAHA] How can you be sure that intifadah expenditures will be financed, when in the past the same promise was not kept?

[Yatom] "I didn't say we were sure, I said that was the assumption on which the working plan was hammered out. In both 1988 and 1989 we got back only part of what the uprising cost the IDF. The outcome was that some of our development and equipment plans had to be spread out over more years, and the scope of some other activities had to be curtailed. So far, the effect of that on our development is not significant."

[BAMAHA] You said you did not expect improvements in the budget picture.

[Yatom] "The IDF shrank in recent years and, in my opinion, we cannot reduce any further, because a certain level of troop strength has to be maintained. At the beginning of the budget cut-back process the IDF tried to maintain that level, the purpose being to finance both army size and other activities. When we grasped that we couldn't continue to cut back indefinitely, we considerably reduced the size of the Army. Today both Army size and stockpiles are stable. There was a real need to improve the stockpile situation, and the multiyear plan took that into account.

"It is important to note that if the budget does not permit the Army to discharge all its functions, each one of the areas of development will increasingly suffer. We may not have any other alternative but to reevaluate each of the elements of our strength, although in certain areas we are already almost in the red."

[BAMAHA] Recent staff studies showed that, while at the high end of the military pyramid there was room for competition, the same could not be said for lower ranks, lieutenant-captain-major, and the number of officers in each rank was equal. In your opinion, will it be possible in the near future to create the same competitive gradation among junior officer ranks, too?

[Yatom] "The numerical relationship between two consecutive ranks is only one of the characteristics of the regular officers corps. When you look at the rank pyramid you must take into consideration both service track and length of service in one job, as well as the number of positions in each rank, the nature of the position, training, and military and civilian courses. All those considerations, in addition to the IDF's particular structure, which on land is based mainly on reserve units with a core of regular army and recruits, point to the fact that a large infrastructure of regular officers in fact deals with the reserve system.

"In my opinion, the lieutenant-captain ranks must be viewed as one body, because the differences between the positions that those ranks fill are not significant. Consequently, I am not at all bothered by the fact that some people may think that there is not enough room for appointment to captain. There is great competition among command positions at captain level, as well as great opportunities for promotion. In other areas, promotion opportunities are indeed more limited. At present, together with the Personnel Branch, we are working on improving the service plan and advancing officers. As a result of that the rank pyramid will also be improved, so as to afford better promotion opportunities."

[BAMAHANE] The training sector recently presented a proposal to the Planning Branch on the establishment of a training corps command. What do you think of that?

[Yatom] "The Training Department Command is, among other things, the command of the chief corps commander in charge of training, and is the most senior factor dealing with this topic. As far as I am concerned, without closing the file on staff work in this respect, there is no room for duplication and for additional definition of something that, to the best of my understanding, is already fully defined. Training is not a profession in itself. Every staff commander and officer must be able to do his duty as far as training is concerned. Consequently, I see no reason to have a new corps for this."

[BAMAHANE] To conclude, do you think that in the coming year the IDF will adapt to a "shortened work week" as is the case in some branches of the economy?

[Yatom] "The IDF will continue to serve the State of Israel 7 days a week. We are not talking of shortening the work week, but of activities designed to ensure that those in charge of a shift are duly compensated."

Reservists Protest Unclear Orders

44230046F Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 2 Nov 89 p 2

[Text] "It may be better to refuse to serve in the territories and sit 30 days in prison, than to follow orders and go to jail for 2 years; defense minister, explain to us what is judgment, what is a life threat; are stones not a life threat"—those are some of the slogans yesterday displayed at a protest by some 60 infantry reservists in front of the Defense Ministry at the Qirya in Tel Aviv. The protest followed the trial of one of their company comrades, Ilan 'Erev, who was sentenced to 2 years imprisonment for killing two Arabs in the Bnay Na'im settlement in Hebron.

The protest organizer, Udy Avital, yesterday said that the protest was designed to make it clear to the defense minister that reservists wanted to serve in the territories, but in secure conditions, not in an atmosphere of fear of being brought to court. "Our protest is not about politics;

we want the defense minister to explain to us what we, as fighters, are expected to do during riots," he said.

The company operations sergeant said at the protest that during his last reserve duty in the West Bank, he realized that there were not enough rubber bullets and other ammunition. Soldiers used live ammunition because the senior command had not supplied sufficient other types of ammunition. It was reported that this new testimony by the operations sergeant will be conveyed to Ilan 'Erev's attorney, to be attached to his appeal to the Military Court of Appeals.

A small police force watched over the demonstration, which proceeded quietly, without incident.

Jerusalem Police Request Freedom To Shoot

44230046A Tel Aviv 'AL-HAMISHMAR
in Hebrew 26 Oct 89 p 8

[Article by Uri'el Ben-Ami: "On A Tight Rope"]

[Text] Jerusalem police officers last week appealed to the police commander general to allow them to open fire "as in the territories." The commander general of the police, Commander David Kraus, has so far denied them permission on grounds that as soon as police begin shooting in Jerusalem "as in the territories," the same will happen everywhere else within the Green Line.

The request of the Jerusalem police officers is symptomatic of their state of nerves. Searches are already under way in Jerusalem for those responsible for inflaming the population and for the prevailing deterioration in security. Teddy Kolek accused the Temple Mount Faithful of sparking rioting by Muslim students with their silly ceremony of laying the cornerstone for a new temple.

Kolek was right, but he forgot that it was the police that gave the Temple Mount Faithful permission to break forth with their "holy stone" at Niqvat Ha'Shiloah.

And now it's the police who oppose. At the time, the Temple Mount Faithful appealed to the High Court of Justice requesting that the police allow them to pray there. The Court decided to permit them to pray 5 meters from the Moors' Gate, and the police even set limits on their trips to the area. As previously agreed, the police allowed them to come to the Temple Mount only in groups of five to seven people, in order to deprive them of a quorum for prayer and thus to preclude emotional outbursts. Now the police say: We were implementing court instructions, and Teddy cannot lay the blame on us; everyone in this city is seeking headlines for his own frustrations, and the tension is mounting in the meantime.

Students of the Rashidiya school, who last week rioted near Herod's Gate, claimed that the police hastened to heat up the atmosphere through excessive use of force. The police replied that the whole thing lasted no more than 12 minutes, after which normal activities resumed.

All these mutual accusations create a complicated picture in which everyone is right or everyone is wrong.

The Muslim mufti, Shaykh Sa'id al-Din al-Alami, who urged the students to go to the Temple Mount this week, claimed that he did so in reaction to Gershon Salomon and his group. Salomon, a well known eccentric in Jerusalem, is not a religious man. Every holiday he breaks forth with his equally eccentric group and tries to embody divine revelation in the image of the third Temple that he wants to build.

Thus, Jerusalem is split between eccentric and helpless madmen. Two weeks ago, prevailing nervousness was also reflected in Defense Minister Yitzhaq Rabin's curious decision to cordon off a certain area in East Jerusalem in order to prevent Faysal al-Husayni from holding a press conference. Rabin instructed the commander of the Central Command, Yitzhaq Mordekhay, to sign the order. The police carried it out, after which criticism began pouring in. Kolek immediately got angry, while Police Minister Hayim Bar-Lev took 2 weeks to tell the public that he hadn't even known about the order; in other words, since he didn't know, he was still "OK." He also hinted on the radio to Commander General Kraus that he hoped in the future there will be "more extensive consultations before such steps are taken."

Against the background of the above, at least two cars are set on fire in both East and West Jerusalem every day. More than 150 cars were burned in Jerusalem since the beginning of the year, most of them on nationalistic grounds. Jerusalem police reported holding several important suspects, but so far it was not in a position to release further details.

It is difficult to predict what will happen in Jerusalem in the future. One wrong decision by a junior police officer may send the whole city up in flames. Deputy Commander Arye Bibi, chief of the Jerusalem District, was not permitted to give interviews. Talks with officers and policemen revealed that Bibi is sensitive to excessive use of force, and any violent incident is immediately reported to him, at his request. Deputy Commander Bibi appointed a retired officer to investigate 50 police actions every month. The officer, Chief Superintendent Lichtman (resigned), gets in touch with the civilians involved and reports to Jerusalem's police chief. Following these reports, Bibi invites the civilians and policemen involved to talks and draws his conclusions. He believes that he can thus keep better informed of what is happening in his area of responsibility.

Every Friday Deputy Commander Bibi holds an "open house" for Jerusalem residents, giving them the opportunity to complain to him directly about their experiences with the police. He also promised to look into complaints by residents of the eastern part of the city about being awakened in the middle of the night by border police shooting in the air or unnecessarily activating their sirens.

The great fear in the city is that East Jerusalem inhabitants will turn into enemies because of inopportune use of force. Jerusalem police members claim that Deputy Commander Bibi has no intention of using force and even hopes to preclude collective punishment, although he himself tends to remind people that the legislative branch has allowed him to use force. He also tells his men that he solves problems like a policeman, not a politician.

Nevertheless, when a curfew was declared in Abu-Tor more than 1 month ago, Deputy Commander Bibi agreed to allow tax collectors for television and value added tax to enter debtors' houses under the protection of a security curfew. Kolek criticized the police at the time for their insensitivity, but Bibi still doesn't understand why it was allegedly wrong. "If they owe taxes, then they should pay," he told his policemen.

Jerusalem is now struggling between the laws incumbent upon it—Green Line laws—and pressures brought to bear by its policemen to apply the shooting regulations valid in the territories.

The city is walking a tight rope that threatens to break. Jerusalem police members say that Deputy Commander Bibi knows that they must not have fatal injuries in Jerusalem, because that would lead to an escalation that would be difficult to quell.

In the present situation, in which Mayor Kolek has not yet designated an heir capable of dealing with the challenge of this city as he did, and Police Minister Hayim Bar-Lev doesn't know, according to his own admission, what his policemen are up to, it can only be hoped that reason will win out. And if someone is wondering whether there is an intifadah in Jerusalem, the answer is clear: Every afternoon, the Jerusalem police chief holds an "intifadah meeting" with his officers, general security men, and City Hall officials. Together they examine the events of the day, prepare for the next day's events, and try to predict them before they happen.

Role of Shin Bet in Territories Described

44000134 Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR
in Hebrew 7 Dec 89 p 2

[Text] For the last 2 years, Shin Bet [General Security Services] agents and investigators have been working all over the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and have uncovered 536 terrorist cells. The Shin Bet is today responsible for making a situation assessment in the territories, and it has set up a special research department with dozens of Middle East specialists whose job is to warn about incidents in the territories and among Israeli Arabs. This department was established because the Shin Bet was taken by surprise in December 1977. Contrary to several assessments that the Shin Bet intelligence network in the territories would collapse with the murders of those who cooperate with Israel, this network has not been affected at all, and continues to provide the necessary intelligence information. The army has become a consumer of Shin

Bet information in matters pertaining to wanted people, the arrest of squads, and the struggle against political subversion. Shin Bet believes that its opponent in the territories is highly motivated, and that only the Shin Bet's high level of activity and work methods have thwarted innumerable terrorist attacks in Israel. The arrest of hundreds of Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement) activists in Gaza was an outstanding and important achievement for the Shin Bet. The current head of the Shin Bet took up his position after a period of crisis and has succeeded in breathing new life into the organization.

Palestinian the Islamic Jihad Activities Described

90OL0092A Tel Aviv MA'ARIV
in Hebrew 20 Oct 89 pp 6-8, 10, 12

[Article by Shafi Gabay]

[Text] The recent renewal of attempted terrorist attacks by Palestinian groups against Israeli targets is in the form of underwater activity. The right to be called first in this endeavor is reserved for the the Islamic Jihad, or, to use its Arabic name, al-Jihad al-Islami, which has begun to conduct training for underwater teams. The new frog men are said to be using sea routes to infiltrate weapons and explosives from Egypt into designated areas of Gaza.

Last week in the Gaza military court, an indictment was presented against a group that has engaged in the new sport of sabotage. Most of the details of the indictment are still secret, but its very existence is proof of the sophistication and aspirations that characterize this extremist movement, which in a short time has jumped into first place among those carrying out attacks against Israelis and holds the dubious record for murders against the Palestinian population. It is difficult to believe that until a few years ago, Israel did not work for the elimination of the members of al-Jihad al-Islami. The experts saw them as single-minded fanatics who set up cells that were small but not particularly well prepared. The trail of blood they left behind in a relatively brief period in the territories held by Israel, together with the close connection between them and murderous brotherhood movements in the Arab world, forced Israel to change this view through and through.

The religious fanatics obtained their first major headlines following a fatal attack only in October 1986. A terrorist band driving by threw three hand grenades at new members of the Giv'ati Brigade and their families at the Dung Gate in Jerusalem at the conclusion of the swearing-in ceremony at the Western Wall. Sixty-two soldiers and family members were wounded in the attack. Dov Navon, the father of one of the inductees, lost his life. Immediately after the attack, al-Jihad al-Islami released its first announcement in Jordan's capital. The announcement declared that a band from its movement was responsible for the attack.

That was the beginning of terrorist activity that has continued ever since. The murderers from the Islamic

Jihad have made their objective the killing of as many Jews as possible, not just soldiers but civilians as well. Their preferred weapons are knives. In recent years, security forces have uncovered a number of underground cells of these Palestinian extremists. But security sources admit that, beneath each cell discovered, others are sprouting. Last year, the fanatics of the movement achieved what they regard as a major accomplishment: statistics based on their announcements and on data from the territories reveal that they carried out more attacks this year than any other movement in the occupied territories.

Representatives of the organization abroad have proudly taken upon themselves the responsibility for the vast fires that destroyed the Carmel forests last month. These acts of arson are a routine part of their activities inside what they call "the occupied land." PLO officials, who contend that they no longer engage in attacks inside the "green line" borders of Israel, do not dare publicly censure the right fringe of the Palestinian movement.

The ghastly peak of the Islamic Jihad's activities occurred on 6 July this year, when a member of the movement, with a drawn knife, fell like a wild man on the driver of bus No. 405, sending the bus rolling down a cliff and causing the deaths of 16 civilians. Some months earlier, a soldier named Avi Sasportas was kidnapped; his body has just been found after prolonged search operations. In May, another soldier, Ilan Sa'adan, was kidnapped; his fate is not yet known. The PLO took pains to announce that its members did not carry out these kidnappings and the killing. PLO officials believe that the most reasonable conclusion is that the perpetrators are members of the Islamic Jihad.

Early in the morning of 3 May this year, two elderly lawyers, Qalman Vardi and Nisim Levi, were murdered on Jaffa Street in Jerusalem. The murderer brutally stabbed them repeatedly while they innocently walked past the central post office. Then he recited the lines he had studied and learned in advance from those who had sent him: "We want to put the revolution of the mosques in the headlines." One of his comrades in the movement managed to take advantage of a visit by relatives to prisoners of the intifadah at Ashqelon prison, entered the prison block, and stabbed 2 guards.

The secret of the movement's success is, in fact, its definition. It is based on blind fanaticism and the zealous devotion of its members who, in the best tradition of Islamic extremism, are ready to sacrifice their lives in suicide operations on the certain expectation that their reward will come somewhere in Allah's paradise. Their leaders declare again and again that their central objective is to bring about an escalation and intensification of the armed struggle against the Jews. The activists in the territories work like puppets in the hands of their leaders imbued with religious authority who, for their part, are said to receive instructions straight from the prophet Muhammad.

The strings of the murderous marionettes lead to Jordan, the intellectual and manpower center of the Islamic Jihad. The central personality, Jabir 'Ammar, aspires to reach the situation in which all the cells already existing in the territories occupied by Israel—according to observers' estimates, their number approaches 500—will be equipped with firearms.

From Jordan have come all the announcements and declarations of the movement in the wake of murderous attacks in Israel. Moreover, the Islamic Jihad boasts that it was the group that dispatched the Jordanian soldiers who went out to operate against IDF [Israel Defense Forces] soldiers after infiltrating through the fence that runs the length of the border between Jordan and Israel.

Security officials have not rejected the possibility that those Jordanian soldiers were Palestinian citizens of Jordan recruited by the command of the movement in Rabat 'Amon. Palestinian soldiers from Jordan's majority population of Palestinians recently have been called up by the Jordanian army for military service and assigned to guard duty on the quiet border with Israel. The usual practice is not to leave them to themselves, and they operate under the close supervision of Bedouin soldiers from Jordan's original population.

In the Islamic world, al-Jihad al-Islami has been operating for many years. Egypt is one of the most important breeding grounds for the spread of murderous religious fanatics, and the government there has been fighting them for years with extremely limited success. The movement gained world-wide publicity when its members murdered President Anwar al-Sadat. The sensational trial of those implicated in the killing was an opportunity to demonstrate before the television cameras the uncompromising determination of the murderous faithful.

The underground has formed cells in the Sinai peninsula, too. In October, 1987, the terrorist Hasan Yunis, 18, infiltrated from Egypt's Rafiah zone. He told Israeli investigators that he was recruited in the Canada Palestinian refugee camp by activists of al-Jihad al-Islami. He revealed that the movement already has an extensive foundation in Sinai.

Egypt's minister of the interior, General Zaki Badar, whom the Egyptian press calls the "iron fist," so far has managed to suppress the underground of al-Jihad al-Islami with harsh measures. But it quickly has become clear that the movement was not wiped out and is growing again. Its targets encompass the Arab world: Its intention is to bring down all the secular regimes and to raise a Sunni Islamic empire that will include Egypt, Palestine, Jordan, and Lebanon. Right now, 8,000 young members of the underground are held in Egyptian prisons. They were equipped with volumes of weapons, even shoulder-fired missiles. General Badar told MA'ARIV 4 months ago that "the al-Jihad al-Islami underground endangers all the democratic governments in the region, including Israel's." His words show that he

is convinced that an extremely dangerous network extending from Egypt to Jordan and Lebanon exists.

The Islamic Jihad movement is not the only fundamentalist Islamic movement at work in the Middle East. There and in the territories held by Israel, many and various Islamic religious currents have sprung up. Without a doubt, however, the Islamic Jihad is the most extreme and most violent. Its violence is directed in particular against 2 sectors: the "heretics" and the Jews.

What all the religious branches have in common is that they place the Islamic revolution at the top of their list of ideological priorities. Al-Jihad al-Islami is different from the other streams in that it already has announced the start of the holy war, "Jihad," against the Jews, the sooner the better, as a necessary step for the success of the Islamic revolution. It is now known that the movement once attempted to form ties with Iran after it saw in the Islamic revolution of Khomeyni a rare victory for Islam in the shameless period of secularism and permissiveness. But the Islamic revolution in Iran was Shi'a, while the leaders of al-Jihad al-Islami in the states of the Middle East are Sunni Muslims, whose religious principles are different from those of Shi'a Muslims. The Sunnis nonetheless continue to see in Iran an example it must copy to carry out a Sunni Islamic revolution.

The violent activity in the territories actually began many years ago, but the seeds of the movement sprouted just a year after the Khomeyni revolution. For the first time, foundations of the movement were discovered in Israeli villages of the Triangle. Groups of youths from those villages, who had made the pilgrimage to the holy places of Islam in Saudi Arabia, received instruction there on how to create the basis for al-Jihad al-Islami in the heart of Israel. These groups were convinced that it was possible to destroy Israel from within, starting with arson in the forests, crops, fields of fruit, public buildings, and so forth. The youths were given the addresses of contacts in the mosques of the Temple Mount in Jerusalem, but they were caught by security forces before they began their activity.

In a public announcement, the IDF has stated that al-Jihad al-Islami is characterized by a high level of discipline and organization; it operates primarily in small, secret cells, carrying on a tough, violent struggle against the local population as well and trying to force on it the ideology of extremist Islam. Until the murder of the head of the PLO's military arm, Halil al-Wazir, known as Abu-Jihad, the movement maintained close ties with the PLO because it depended on heavy funding to establish itself and make progress. That is the reason that many declarations at first linked the movement to Fatah.

These ties fell into line with Fatah's ideology and political trends in Palestinian history. Fatah was ready to exploit any opportunity to expand its activities and extend its influence among the Palestinians, especially

after the 2 great shocks it absorbed in 1982, the expulsion from Beirut following Operation Peace for Galilee and the internal split. Abu-Jihad saw in the existence of national and religious extremist Palestinian organizations in the territories the basis for escalating the armed struggle against Israel. It is well known that there have always been Islamic tendencies within Fatah, more so than in any other Palestinian terror organization. Although it used revolutionary terms, Fatah never supported the Marxist-Leninist solutions of the other Palestinian factions.

But with the advent of the intifadah, al-Jihad al-Islami turned 180 degrees, distancing itself from the PLO because of its secular nature and the organization's great concession, its readiness to recognize UN Resolutions 242 and 338, which meant recognition of the existence of the "Jewish entity."

During the same period, the organization issued an announcement to the Arab world, called "Letter from Jerusalem." The letter, which emphasized the about-turn the movement had made, stated: "The al-Jihad al-Islami movement in Palestine declares that the filthy peace announced by the Palestinian National Council in Algeria is null and void, prohibited by all injunctions in the Koran, because division of the homeland with the enemy and recognition of the legitimacy of his existence contravene God's commandments."

The letter further stated: "We are not accustomed to calling the state of the Jews by its name, Israel. The PLO, however, has given in and called it by its name. We, by contrast, today bless all the honorable voices within the Palestinian people that oppose any recognition of the legitimacy of the enemy and the division of the homeland. We also emphasize our firm position that yielding even an inch of the homeland is forbidden and that there can be no Palestinian approval of the state of the Jewish entity. We have sworn before Allah and al-Ummah that our Jihad will continue until the liberation of all our homeland, for the holy Jihad is the only path to overcoming the occupation and recovering Palestine." The letter concluded with these words: "Every plan for a settlement will fail, the blessed rebellion will grow stronger, and the Jihad will continue on to victory."

The Palestinian leaders of al-Jihad al-Islami, nearly all of whom have been expelled during the intifadah, are local shaykhs who have received advanced religious training in Cairo and were heavily influenced by their colleagues from the extremist Egyptian movement. Their central objective is defined in uncompromising terms: the liberation of all of Palestine from the Jews. Shaykh 'Abd-al-'Aziz 'Awdah, one of the most prominent leaders, who ruled in Gaza and was expelled last year, has emphasized more than once: "I am a Palestinian Muslim. I see in Palestine the most important homeland in the Muslim world and I hope that an Islamic state will arise there, today and forever. We are fighting for that." The shaykh insists that the Arab-Israeli dispute is purely religious.

Most of the Palestinian population, he believes, will not forever remain receptive to the modern idea of secular nationalism.

Thus, Islam has constituted in Palestinian history a power attracting broad support in the national movement. One of the fathers of the Palestinian national movement is the Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Husayni, who exploited Islam to cement and unify the Palestinians wherever they were. Like him, Shaykh 'Izz al-Din al-Qasem was a legendary figure in the pantheon of Palestinian leaders. Al-Qasem, who was a preacher in the Haifa mosque, spoke out in the 1930s on the need for the Islamic Jihad against the British and the Jews.

Incidentally, Hajj al-Husayni has a successor in the movement today. One of the leaders operating its men out of Jordan is Gazi al-Husayni, the grandson of the Mufti and son of the leader of the gangs of the 1948 war, 'Abd-al-Qadir al-Husayni. Gazi al-Husayni, who was expelled from Israel after the 6-Day War, today is one of the leaders of the Islamic Jihad abroad. The al-Husayni family, by the way, is not all of a piece when one speaks of the Palestinian movement. Gazi's famous brother is Faysal al-Husayni, who is identified with those holding Fatah's moderate line in the territories.

The intifadah has created high hopes among the members of al-Jihad al-Islami throughout the Arab world. They have stepped up their underground activities, by distributing proclamations that appear in the newspapers of the religious movements in Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon, and of course by their sermons in the mosques. But they also use threats and demands that the local population return to Islamic sources. At this stage, they do not rule out cooperation with leaders of the pro-Syrian Palestinian factions, such as "The Popular Front-General Command" of Ahmad Jibril, which permits them to broadcast from their transmitting station, "al-Quds," which has been operating for 22 months from southern Syria. In the context of Palestinian history, perhaps the most worrisome aspect of the existence of the extremist movement is the uncompromising zeal with which its masked men settle their tatar accounts, not only with the Jewish, Zionist state but also with those Palestinians whom they regard as "unfaithful" to the goal of annihilation of the state of Israel.

"Abu-Nidal," head of a murder organization not identified with extremist Islam, whose real name is Sal al-Bana, opened the pages of his publication, "FTI AS-TIN AL-THAWRAH," to the leaders of the movement. Not long ago, Shaykh Sayyid Husayn Barekah, who was expelled from Israel, was interviewed in the publication. The Shaykh told about attacks the members of the al-Jihad al-Islami movement had inflicted on Israel. Here are some of his remarks:

[AL-THAWRAH] Are you ready to permit workers to go to Israel?

[Barekah] We have issued a ruling of religious law that states, at a time when your brothers, mothers, and

children are carrying on the intifadah, your trip to work within the green line means that you are putting the burden of the fighting on the members of your family. Thus, you are directing the bullets of the enemy's soldiers against your mothers and children. We have said to them, either you will obey Allah or you will bend your knee to Shamir, Peres, Rabin, and Shomron. When Palestinian blood has flowed and the battle is at its peak, you are forbidden to go to work inside the green line.

[AL-THAWRAH] Are you responsible for the great fires that have broken out inside Israel?

[Barekah] Quite a few of our brothers have engaged and are engaging now in setting fires among crops and fields of fruit and in forests inside the green line. They, the Jews, have important agricultural products, such as avocados, intended for export. Vast tracts of avocados were set on fire last year, causing harm to their export abroad.

[AL-THAWRAH] Are you teaching that it is necessary to found a Palestinian state?

[Barekah] In our view, what is called a Palestinian state is a fraud and a profanation. When the Palestinian people see very soon that everything that is happening relating to the state is a mirage, they will understand there is no truth in any of the political tales of the Arab rulers and of the leaders of the PLO. We say that the day will yet come in which we will harshly and forthrightly settle accounts with everyone.

[AL-THAWRAH] Do you teach that collaborators must be brought back to the fold or killed?

[Barekah] Among the positive consequences the uprising has produced is that a number of the weak characters among the Palestinian people, who previously collaborated with the enemy and worked for him as agents, have announced their return to the faith. The collaborators announced their return in the mosques; as a result, the enemy intelligence service lost many of its sources of information. But those who returned and then fell back into their old ways, we have executed.

Recent investigations have made clear that, within the al-Jihad al-Islami movement, there are actually two factions that cooperate. One faction, working in Lebanon, was founded by Fatah in the 1970s and received its offices in the western branch of the PLO. This faction, which engages in terrorist actions in Israel on behalf of the PLO, is located in Rabat 'Amon. It was responsible for the attack on the Giv'ati soldiers at the Western Wall and other fatal attacks, known in Israel as "knife assaults," against Israeli civilians. The other faction is under the authority of the Mufti of Hebron, Shaykh As'ad al-Tamimi, who was expelled in 1970 and since then has become a flag bearer of the Iranian revolution. [passages illegible]

Yasir 'Arafat's Fatah does not believe the movement is of much importance, but it is known that 'Arafat is

looking for a way to bring the movement back under his wing. In his talk this month in Cairo with Israeli reporters, the head of the PLO was asked if he was prepared to condemn the announcement of al-Jihad al-Islami in which it took responsibility for the fires on Mt. Carmel. 'Arafat evaded the question. In a new book published in Egypt, "The Revolution of the Mosques in Palestine," Ahmad Sulayman writes: "What is developing today in the land of Palestine is a Jihad whose importance the hypocrites in the Arab world are trying to belittle. 'Arafat started out on the right foot when he adopted an Islamic starting point for the liberation of Palestine, but, to the misfortune of the great underground movement al-Jihad al-Islami, he quickly appeased the enemies of the flag of Islam, that is, the rulers of all the Arab states for whom the name al-Jihad instills fear and trembling."

Indeed, the Arab rulers have declared a war of annihilation against the wild spread of the movement, whose members have abandoned their great central breeding ground, the largest religious movement in the Arab world, the Muslim Brothers. This war is waged by various means, by decapitation in Saudi Arabia, by the destruction by bull dozers of whole neighborhoods over their residents in Syria, by mass detentions with unspeakable tortures in Egypt, and by hellish fire directed against the rioters in the streets and the mass demonstrations in Algiers a year ago. Only King Husayn of Jordan is attempting to buy them off with generous payments, but in the wake of the food riots in April under the slogan "Islam is the answer to all distress," he has recently begun to apply a policy of carrot and stick against the members of the movement.

Social Impact of Intifadah Denied

44230044G Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 24 Oct 89 p 13

[Article by Lilly Galili: "The Stones Didn't Touch Us"]

[Text] Strange as it may sound, for 2 years the intifadah has been surrounding Israeli society without leaving a real imprint on it. This fact contradicts the optical illusion created by massive media preoccupation with events in the territories, which creates a feeling that the intifadah is a collective experience with profound implications and with the same influence that it has on Palestinian society.

In contrast to dozens—perhaps hundreds—of social studies conducted by research institutes in East Jerusalem, Israeli researchers respond to the feelings of the Israeli public. The effects of the intifadah on Israeli society were so far examined indirectly and in few studies. The studies conducted support the conclusion that despite its intensity and scope, the intifadah has had only a marginal influence on Israeli society. The uprising is mostly perceived as something happening "to them," "over there," and has no real impact on feelings and basic perceptions among Israeli society. At the most, it is

upsetting us, as emerges from a study done by Prof Asher Ari'an, head of the National Security and Public Opinion Project of the Strategic Studies Center of Tel Aviv University.

The two stages of the study were conducted at two different periods: at the outbreak of the intifadah, and at the end of 1988. The same group of subjects was asked identical questions both times. The unequivocal conclusion was that the intifadah has contributed to lowering national morale and to personally upsetting about 40 percent of the subjects. Four percent claimed that the events actually improved their mood, while the rest said the events had no effect on their mood. According to this study, Israelis have acquired a more realistic political outlook in the wake of these events. This perception of reality has led them in opposite directions, which neutralize a greater impact than "mood." Ari'an is aware of the narrow scope of social studies in this area. In his view, the reason for that is a certain "routinization and normalization that have turned the uprising into part of our daily experience."

Prof Efraim Ya'ar, dean of the Social Sciences Faculty of Tel Aviv University, also offered an explanation for the impermeability of Israeli society to those events. From a psychological viewpoint, Ya'ar claimed, it is more comfortable to ignore what is happening by a process of "externalizing" that eliminates the need for doubt and soul-searching. In view of the intensity of the threat and the perception of the situation as impossible to solve, Israelis elect to suppress the problem altogether, especially since it does not really affect their personal lives.

Ya'ar recently conducted a study on Israelis' faith in public institutions. The study, which proceeded at two points in time in 1987 and 1989, reveals one conclusion: the intifadah, which broke out between those two periods, has only a marginal effect on Israelis' basic positions. The IDF [Israel Defense Forces] is still the most trusted institution, and faith in it even increased somewhat in spite of the intifadah. Simultaneously, trust in the police, the second institution in charge of security, also rose. The precarious security situation increased Israelis' attachment to and dependence on the defense forces.

At the other end of the spectrum are the press and the political parties, which "enjoy" the least trust. Here, too, there was no real change, merely additional erosion in the status of those two institutions, which in fact are the most patent symbols of democracy. The courts also enjoy a high level of trust.

The study reveals Israelis as having strong national-nationalistic identities and a certain measure of sophistication, which is reflected in their clear preference for bodies perceived as representing general national interests, as opposed to institutions that represent narrow, class interests (parties).

Like other societies whose security is threatened, Israeli public opinion tends to be rather cavalier about democracy. Particularly growing is the perception that certain

aspects of democracy endanger security and should be subordinated to security considerations. Dr Ari'an showed in his study that at times the dominion of law must be sacrificed on the altar of security. This conclusion also emerged from the studies of Professors Efraim Ya'ar and Yohanan Peres, according to which about half of the Israelis believe that "the State of Israel is too democratic." This perception spread during the first months of the intifadah and has stabilized since.

The same principle is involved in the erosion affecting the media, especially as regards conservative Israelis. Not surprisingly, public trust in the Rabbinate Institution is at a peak.

The picture that emerges is a complex one: Two years of the intifadah have left negligible social marks on individuals and their basic beliefs. The uprising is still perceived as an act of God, and as such it does not obligate us to any radical change. On the other hand, the increased acuteness of basic issues has caused greater internal polarization of the society, between people of liberal orientation (Ashkenazi, intellectual, and secular), and conservatives (Sephardi, religious, and less educated) according to the profile described by Professor Ya'ar. In particular, the studies revealed the threat inherent in the continuation of the present situation to the taxed Israeli democracy.

Crime Level Influenced by General Situation

44230044F Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 23 Oct 89 p 12

[Article by Psychologist Dr Ayala Malakh-Pines: "Violence Surges in Bad Times"]

[Text] What influence does the tense security and economic situation have on the level of crime and delinquency in Israel? This question was examined by Simha Landau and Danny Pepperman of the Criminological Institute of Hebrew University in Jerusalem, and the findings of their study were presented in CRIMINOLOGY.

The study dealt with two opposing hypotheses: One is that the level of violence drops at times of war or tense security. The assumption is that when a country is in a state of crisis and is challenged by outside enemies, inner solidarity and strength are fostered. Conflicts between national groups abate and even criminals feel a sense of greater belonging, and that is reflected in lower crime levels. According to the other hypothesis, at times of war and tense security the level of violence rises. The assumption there is that the violence and killing that are legitimate in war contribute to lowering inhibitions against violence in general and thus to raising the level of violence toward members of one's own society, also.

In order to examine the two opposing hypotheses, the researchers studied police monthly figures on violent crime and crimes against property between the years 1967-1982. The figures were analyzed and compared to

data concerning tense security (for example, the number of casualties in a terrorist attack) and the economic situation (for example, inflation and unemployment levels) during the same period.

The study findings testify to the fact that both tense security and economic pressures considerably raise the level of violent crime: Murder is influenced by both the number of Israeli casualties in terrorist attacks and by the level of inflation. Property crime, on the other hand, is mostly influenced by economic difficulties: Burglaries and theft are influenced by inflation and unemployment, but not by tense security.

At a conference recently held at the Israeli Institute for Military Studies on the influence of the intifadah on Israeli society, Professor Simha Landau presented a detailed analysis of crime and delinquency levels. The analysis highlighted the fact that in 1988, compared to 1987 data, there was a 50 to 200-percent increase in violent crimes, murder, and burglaries. The data concerned crime levels within the Green Line and did not include any intifadah actions. Although this increase cannot be directly linked to the intifadah, the coincidence in time points to a possible link between the two.

The influence of increased numbers of casualties on the rise in violent crime lasts between 1 to 5 months. This finding supports the adjustment-legitimacy hypothesis and contradicts the solidarity hypothesis. There is great theoretical significance to this finding, because it proves that the adjustment-legitimacy model fits not only times of war, but also periods of tense security.

The study findings demonstrate that, in time, violence created as a result of conflict with outside groups ("enemies") becomes directed toward inner groups. In other words, there is a gradual and protracted process of erosion of basic social norms against violence. When violence and crime become permissible against people, even if those people are enemies, the loosened norms end up affecting members of the society itself.

New Road To Skirt Gaza Camps, Villages

44230044D Tel Aviv HADASHOT
in Hebrew 22 Oct 89 p 2

[Text] Defense forces in the Gaza Strip will soon begin building a "Trans-Gaza road" which will connect between Qatif Bloc settlements and the Negev. The new road will permit relatively safe driving conditions, in that it will dispense with the need to drive past refugee camps and Arab villages.

Some 10,000 fruit trees were uprooted and 230 dunams of land were appropriated from 70 Arab families in order to make room for the road. Knesset Member Tawfiq Tubi sent a sharp message in this connection to Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin, in which he requested that work on the new road be halted and that damages be paid to the Arab families.

The spokesman of the Qatif Bloc Regional Council, Menahem Bet-Ha'Lahmi, yesterday said that the new road will be 4 km long and about 20 meters wide, and that it was featured in the 1972 traffic outline plan. "The outbreak of the intifadah made it necessary to have the road built, particularly for vacation and tourist travel purposes," Bet-Ha'Lahmi said.

In point of fact, the new road will replace the "road around Gaza," on which Israeli cars have been driving until now and which was considered to be relatively safe.

Last week, Knesset Member Tubi toured the area of the Qarara village and reported the uprooting of 10,000 almond, olive, and citrus trees. According to him, the families received no early warning about the road work and were thus not able to appeal to any judiciary institutions.

New Settlement in Etzion Bloc Established

TA12121714 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV
in Hebrew 12 Dec 89 p 10

[Text] Interior Minister Arye Der'i will today attend a cornerstone laying ceremony at the settlement of Ma'ale 'Amos in the Etzion bloc. Ma'ale 'Amos, which was established as a temporary settlement in 1981, is now a permanent settlement. It is the 16th settlement in the Etzion bloc area.

New Organization Established in Nabulus

TA19121741 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT
in Hebrew 19 Dec 89 p 4

[Text] A new organization called "The Black Panther Group for the Murder of Collaborators, Fatah" was established in Nabulus. The group yesterday disseminated leaflets saying that it was following in the footsteps of the "Black Panther" squad, and will continue to liquidate people who cooperate with the Israeli authorities, and will kill those who caused the uncovering of the "Black Panther" and the "Red Eagle" squads.

Religious Parties' Positions Examined

44230044B Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 22 Oct 89 p 9

[Article by Dan Margalit: "May It Never End"]

[Text] A few days ago, Interior Minister Arye Dar'i was asked whether it was clear to him that the Alignment ministers wished to see him heading the Labor and Welfare Ministry not because of their liking for SHAS [Torah Observing Sephardim], but in order to annoy the Likud. Dar'i answered his interviewer in good humor: Why don't you let me believe that they think I am good enough for that position?

The same thing is happening in the political arena. The orthodox and the religious are happy to be pursued by Shim'on Peres and profit from Shamir's and Arens' steps

to counterbalance that. However, the satisfaction they derive from the current crisis is merely individual and does not serve party purposes.

All the religious, whatever their color, are fed up with Shamir for having violated all his promises. Discussions within religious factions now center on how the next round of coalition negotiations will be conducted. As it turned out, a signed Hebrew agreement is not worth the paper on which it is written. Who will be able to believe whom at future negotiations?

Those involved in quiet exploring know that there is no answer to that. The orthodox and the religious claim that they cannot rely on any agreement or promise, written or oral. That fact undermines their willingness to open protracted and exhausting contacts.

Strange as it may seem, the religious have nothing to demand. The prime minister struck the issue of "Who is a Jew" from the national agenda, for which the media praised him without mentioning the deceit involved. The orthodox are furious and the settlers are raging about settlements that were never started and budgets that were never allocated, and the Habad Court will never forgive Shamir, but most religious activists are still concentrated within Likud. That is because SHAS supporters will not allow their leaders to act according to their judgment, unless a miracle happens and Rabbi Ovadia Yosef comes out with a religious verdict on the territories as he wanted to do upon his return from Egypt, but backed down. The majority of the NRP [National Religious Party], too, see themselves as the original Herut movement incorporated within Likud, and has thus no option out.

Israel's political history from the very beginning routinely assumed that the religious will always be the tipping weight between the two major blocs. A national unity party, which they officially want, does not particularly serve their special interests. They usually prefer a narrow, stable government. However, the 1989 picture is different. In actual fact they cannot now be the tipping weight, because there is no one to restore the "Who is a Jew" issue, to increase their already swollen budgets in a narrow government, or to extend their evasion from military service. They, too, just like the major blocs, are unwilling to rest their government on the good will of secular Refa'el Eytan on the right, or on the tacit agreement of Shulamit Aloni on the left.

In the present conditions, it is comfortable for them to remain an unrealized threat; let the others need them, let them activate the necessary constraints to guard them against joining the competition, as long as a narrow government doesn't come into being. And indeed, such a government cannot be formed, despite all the talk. More than vilifying Shamir, the Alignment factions threaten Peres not to dare resume his night talks with various rabbis and religious leaders. The finance minister cannot make any firm promises to Dar'i because the Labor Central Committee will not allow him to keep his promises.

Nor are new elections attractive to the orthodox and the religious. The Knesset lists are comprised of inner, brittle, and temporary coalitions. Almost every Knesset member is a camp. In Agudath Israel, Avraham Vardiger is a devoted hawk who, inspired by the Lubavitch Rabbi, is angry with Shamir but misses the Alignment of yore; Menahem Porush cannot forgive Shamir; SHAS knows no inner peace, Yitzhaq Peretz is for the time being pushed to the side, but powerful Dar'i may find himself without a power base if the government is dismantled, and during the interim period between the coalition to elections he would not even have a seat in the Knesset.

So they want to go on. They are continually seeking a compromise between the major blocs. Zevulun Hammer was serious when he suggested that any Palestinian could be in the delegation to the Cairo talks, provided he declared that he was against terrorism and the Palestinian charter's intention to eliminate Israel. Shamir did not like the proposal and did not put it to a vote, and the NRP will not say anything about it as long as the government is not in danger and can live without it. The religious and the orthodox are in a waiting position, watching the contest outside the field, and wishing that it may never end.

Changes Expected In RAKAH Leadership

90OL0122D Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR
in Hebrew 10 Oct 89 p 6

[Article by Qasim Zayd]

[Text] The debate within RAKAH [New Communist List] has sharpened recently, and it is almost paralyzing the party's activity. Our correspondent has been informed that a wave of dismissals and resignations of key party members is expected soon amid sharp differences of opinion in rival camps in the party.

The straw that broke the camel's back was the renewed publication of the weekly AL-'ARABI by members of the camp of writer Amil Habibi, who opposes the line of the veteran leadership.

AL-ITTIHAD, RAKAH's Arabic mouthpiece, recently waged a strong attack against Habibi's group. The information staff of RAKAH nullified an agreement with the owners of AL-'ARABI to publish Histadrut election announcements.

Knesset Member Tawfiq Zayd, who had remained neutral in the conflict between the veteran leadership and Habibi's group, recently aligned himself with the veteran leadership.

Knesset Member Charlie Biton, stated in an interview to the weekly AL-'AJAMI that the possibility of him leaving HADASH [Democratic Front for Peace and Equality] should not be discounted.

Statistics Indicate Economic Stabilization

900L0122F Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT
in Hebrew 12 Oct 89 p 7

[Article by Gad Le'or and 'Edna Eis]

[Text] Israel's January-September trade deficit totals \$1.8 billion, an impressive reduction of 16 percent compared to the same period last year.

Net exports in January-September 1989, totalling \$7.5 billion, recorded an impressive increase of 8.5 percent compared to the same period last year.

Data of the Central Statistics Bureau published yesterday further indicate that net imports to Israel since 1 January 1989 totalled \$9.3 billion, 3 percent higher compared to the same period in 1988.

In addition, in September, Israel's trade deficit totalled \$158 million: \$1.42 billion in imports minus \$884 million in exports.

From processing the data, it further emerges that the monthly average trade deficit in August and September, \$153 million, was similar to that of June and July of this year. This stability of the trade deficit during the last 4 months follows a 38-percent decline in the 4 months previous to them.

Industry and Commerce Ministry Director General Yoram Blizovsky stated yesterday that industrial exports rose in September by 38 percent compared to September 1988. Industrial exports have risen since January at a rate of 9.9 percent compared to the same period last year.

Blizovsky indicated that the data point to a continuing trend toward an increase in all export branches. Hope was expressed in the ministry regarding the possibility of attaining a real 5-percent increase in industrial exports this year if the trend continues.

According to data from January-September 1989, a real growth in industrial exports (excluding diamonds) of 10.5 percent is expected compared to an increase of less than 4 percent in 1988," stated Hazi Guttman, the head of the economic and foreign trade branch in the Association of Industrialists, in responding to the data of the Central Statistics Bureau.

Official Denies Crisis in Higher Education

44230044A Tel Aviv HA ARETZ
in Hebrew 23 Oct 89 p 4

[Text] "The claim which university presidents have been spreading in the past few years and that the Education Ministry has also recently picked up, that the higher education system in the country is in a shambles and is collapsing because of budget cuts, is unfounded," Prof Ya'akov Ziv, chairman of the Planning and Allocations Committee of the Higher Education Council, said yesterday.

Ziv stressed that although improvements are required regarding scientific equipment, libraries, research funds, and funds to recruit young staff to replace some 30 percent of the older staff who will retire in the 1990's, such improvements are already being made. For the past 2 and 1/2 years the Finance Ministry has been allocating additional budget funds to the universities within the framework of a multiyear recovery program. According to that program, within 6 years the budget for higher education will increase by 24 percent. Government financing of the budget increased by 11 percent from 1988 to 1989, and will further increase by about 6 percent by the year 1992. "This rate of improvement is too slow for my taste, but it is taking place and I hope it will continue," Ziv added.

The chairman of the Planning and Allocations Committee once again rejected the claim that the debts of universities, particularly their accumulating deficits, totaled \$360 million. He said that according to reports by university CPAs (reports that only the Planning and Allocation Committee sees in their entirety), by the end of the 1989 school year the overall deficit of those institutions was about \$200 million. Out of that sum, several tens of millions were recorded in bookkeeping ledgers as differential funds for covering sabbatical expenditures, for example. Many of the staff do not take advantage of those funds because they don't go on sabbaticals. Consequently, university deficits in what is described as the "regular budget" total about \$120 million. In addition, universities have approximately \$30 million in their development budget. Ziv stated that, all together, the various deficits add up to \$160 to \$170 million.

Ziv emphasized that there is an additional, albeit controversial, way of ascertaining the real extent of the deficits—according to the interest that the universities paid out in 1989 to banks, independent funds, and suppliers. "The interest comes to about \$15 million. If we compare that sum to the annual budget of all the universities, which is about \$600 million (the budget is made up of \$415 million from the Planning and Allocations Committee and donations), it means that the interest comes to only 2.5 percent of the higher education budget. Consequently, despite the seriousness of accumulating deficits, the claim that interest eats up a good chunk of the universities' budget is an exaggeration."

At the same time, Ziv pointed out that, despite the real increase in the budget for higher education, the present budget in fact dropped to its real value of 10 years ago, while the number of students at that time was 20 percent lower. Currently there are 64,000 students, not counting students in academies and pedagogical institutes.

Immigration Statistics for 1989 Given

44000135 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 8 Dec 89 p 2

[Text] According to the Ministry of Absorption spokeswoman 20,405 new immigrants arrived in Israel in 1989, which is the largest number of immigrants to arrive in a single year during the last decade. Immigration data show an increase of 67 percent compared to the first 11

months of 1988. The largest group, comprising 9,295 immigrants, was from the Soviet Union. There was also a significant increase in the number of immigrants from African countries—1,669 since the beginning of the year, 142 of them in November.

New Power Plant in Hadera

44230046B Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 30 Oct 89 p 6

[Text] Yesterday, the government approved a recommendation by the National Planning and Building Commission to erect a new power plant, with an overall output of 1,100 mw, in Hadera, in the vicinity of the existing plant, Me'or David. At least \$1 billion will be invested in the project. The cornerstone will be laid in November in the presence of the president and the minister of energy and infrastructure.

At the Ministry of Energy and Infrastructure it is claimed that the power plant will be completed within 5 years and that its construction will provide some 2,500 jobs. Energy and Infrastructure Minister Moshe Shahal pointed out with satisfaction that the Planning and Building Commission acted in fairness when it approved the power plant.

Replying to a question by Minister 'Ezer Weizmann, Moshe Shahal said that a few months ago Power Company and Employment Agency officials met to discuss employment of new workers at the site of the new plant, with a view to reducing unemployment in the area. Already in the coming year, approximately 500 workers will be hired for the project, some of whom will attend special professional courses given by the Power Company; 200 people have already enrolled in the first course.

New Bill Expected To Reduce Pollution

44230044C Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 22 Oct 89 p 4

[Text] Last week, Environmental Protection Minister Roni Milo decided to wield the prerogatives vested in him by the Kanovitz Law (antidamage law) and signed regulations instructing the Power Company and refineries to drastically cut back the polluting emissions of their plants in Haifa.

According to the bill, the new regulations, which will replace the ones signed according to the special "individual orders" proposed against the two enterprises in 1984, will come into effect within 90 days.

The topic will probably be brought up today at the cabinet meeting by Energy Minister Moshe Shahal, who opposes the new regulations because of their economic and political implications (oil supply contracts).

According to Milo's new regulations, the Power Company must reduce by two-thirds the sulphuric acid emissions from the stacks of the power plant in Haifa, and cut down particle emissions by 50 percent. Under the new

regulations, the Power Company is advised to achieve this by burning low-sulphur fuel of up to 1 percent at all its plants in Haifa, throughout the year. So far the company has been using fuel with an average yearly sulphur content of 2.7 percent.

The regulations also feature new limitations for special meteorological conditions, under which the Power Company must use fuel with 1/2 percent sulphur contents, as opposed to the current 1 percent in such conditions.

Concerning refineries, the amended individual regulations stipulate that sulphuric acid emissions from all their installations must not exceed 1.1 tons an hour as an annual average, and not exceed 1.3 tons an hour. The old individual order set no limitation on overall emissions from refineries, stipulating only that the average sulphur contents of the fuel used by the plant should not exceed 3.2 percent. Currently, refineries emit an average of 2 tons of sulphuric acid an hour. In exceptional meteorological conditions they are now also required to burn 0.5 percent sulphur fuel. Plants are also required to install gauges on all their major stacks to constantly measure sulphuric acid emissions, so that the monitoring authority of the Environmental Protection Ministry can verify and supervise the situation on an ongoing basis. Refineries are also required to prepare a new plan for dealing with the problem of the smell they emit.

According to environmentalists' estimates, the Power Company can implement the new regulations if it switches to burning low sulphur fuel throughout the year, while refineries can choose between continual use of low sulphur fuel and installing filters [solkanim] on all their major stacks. Environmentalists hope that implementation of the new orders will for the first time permit Haifa, which is the most highly polluted area in the country, to not exceed the new standards even in exceptional meteorological conditions, as is the case in Western countries.

Arab Housing Problems Reportedly Spreading

44230044I Tel Aviv AL-HAMISHMAR
in Hebrew 25 Oct 89 p 7

[Article by Avner Regev: "Housing Solutions Outside Villages"]

[Text] Recently, the issue of Arabs living in Jewish cities has come to the forefront of the fabric of relations between Jews and Arabs in the State of Israel. This problem became quite acute when Carmi'el Mayor Adi 'Eldar announced that Arabs had no place in his town. The issue had already invaded the headlines when it became known that many apartments were sold to Arabs in Nazerat 'Illit.

Until now, joint Arab-Jewish neighborhoods in mixed cities such as Haifa, Yafa, Ramla, and Lod did not give rise to conflict. The Arabs remained in their houses after the establishment of the state, but there was no mutual hatred, unless it concerned social issues. There was no sense of illegitimacy in Arabs living where the end of the

independence war found them. Problems arose in one mixed city, Acco, and they were discussed at a meeting at the mayor's office. Acco Arabs live in the Old City, where many houses are crumbling and have to be pulled down. The residents rejected an attempt to relocate them to the El Makr village on the outskirts of Acco, which they viewed as an attempt to get them out of Acco and replace them with Jews.

Acco, however, is neither Carmi'el nor Nazrat 'Illit, where the problem is becoming increasingly acute. Those towns were established to fulfill the ideology of "Jewish Settlement of the Galilee." The purpose was to preclude Arab domination of the Galilee by founding large Jewish urban centers at the side of Arab settlements, with a view to asserting our presence and ensuring solid Jewish population. Because of that ideology, the institutions involved in the establishment of those centers opposed the idea of Arabs coming to live in them, and used various means of preventing them from doing so. The Mizpe settlements that were established in the Galilee to break the chain of Arab settlements and their hold on state lands, fitted into that general ideology. The drive to establish a Jewish population in the Galilee forced Arabs to seek housing alternatives outside their villages.

Arab intellectuals, graduates of Israeli universities or returning from studies abroad, have trouble settling down in the villages in which they grew up. Land cannot be obtained to build on, blueprints are not approved, and where they were approved, building permits were not issued. In order to avoid confrontation with the authorities and with neighbors, many found housing in neighboring Jewish localities. This is what impelled Arabs to purchase apartments in Nazrat 'Illit, Carmi'el, and Nahariyya in densely populated Jewish areas and in buildings occupied by Jewish families. These groups of educated, professional Arabs do not cause any special problems; on the contrary, they raise the level of the neighborhood.

Reaction such as that expressed by the Carmi'el mayor are probably unavoidable. Israeli Arabs currently make up 17.5 percent of the entire population. According to forecasts by the Central Office of Statistics, in 10 years, i.e., by the year 2000, they will make up 22 percent. Housing and employment solutions will have to be devised. If the authorities don't provide planned solutions, Israeli Arabs will do that for themselves in various ways. Establishing residence in Jewish cities is one example of their capacity to adjust when required to find solutions independently.

Statements such as those made by the mayors of Carmi'el and Nazrat 'Illit serve to rally the Arab population around nationalistic slogans and issues and around nationalistic goals. Arab residents of Jewish and mixed cities did not protest those statements. On the other hand, we heard reactions from the Board of Arab Council Chairmen and other public figures. These are inflammatory issues, and it is reasonable to assume that Arab leaders will capitalize on them in the near future.

Attempts to seek a compromise formula to joint Arab-Jewish housing are becoming increasingly difficult. We would do well to prepare ourselves for a situation in which talk of integration in the style of the 1950's and 1960's will completely disappear, to be replaced by talk of Arab-style integration.

The struggle between Jews and Arabs is causing conflict within the Arab sector itself. A few days ago, 'AL-HAMISHMAR carried an article that warned against the new consolidation of forces between RAKAH [New Communist List] and its associates against the Islamic Movement. A few days later, the leader of the Islamic Movement, Shaykh 'Abdallah Nimr Darwish, unleashed an unprecedented attack on HADASH. In an interview for an Arab weekly, Darwish said that RAKAH suffers from public anemia and that it has allied itself with Mi'ari and Darawishah against the Islamic Movement.

In reaction to that, RAKAH's newspaper claimed that "The only enemy is the authorities that oppress us, steal our land, and deprive us of our rights." Arabs may well rally around such statements, patch up their internal disagreements, and turn against the Jewish population, especially against the background of statements such as the Jewish mayors' about the impossibility of living together in the same cities.

In reaction to a lecture delivered before officers a few days ago, voices were heard saying that in the current situation, the Israeli Arab population must be treated the same as the population in the territories. It has also been said that we may see a return to a military administration in the Galilee and the Triangle in the wake of national and nationalistic activities by Israeli Arabs. Such views have filtered down to the general public, whose position is in the last analysis expressed by mayors and other elected officials.

The social fabric of the State of Israel is facing a serious crisis. This time the crisis focuses on Jewish-Arab relations, while issues such as relations between secular and religious or Ashkenazi and Sephardi are pushed aside. As a result, demands can be expected for basic changes in overall relations between the two populations and between Arabs and the authorities. We would do well to stay alert and be prepared for such an eventuality.

Arab Christians Form 'Union of Churches'

TA13121736 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 13 Dec 89 p 2

[Text] Christians in Haifa and the Galilee have established an organization called "the Union of Churches" because of their fears resulting from an increase in the strength of the Islamic movement. In Nazareth, the "Christian Social League," which is not affiliated with any political party, has been established in order to educate Christians in Israel to be good citizens and to develop Christian awareness. The objective of the notables behind the new Council of Churches is to establish an Israeli Christian lobby to protect the interests of

Christians. The communists oppose the initiative. Christian notables associated with the Labor Party or Likud are asking that Israel institute national service for Israeli Arabs, for which Christians would volunteer, but the matter has still not been discussed by those authorized to handle it.

Commentator Rules Out Mideast War

44230044E Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 23 Oct 89 p 9

[Article by A. Schweitzer: "War Is Not the Alternative to Occupation"]

[Text] One can agree or disagree with the findings of the global study contributed by Deputy Foreign Minister Netanyahu to HA'ARETZ readers ("Israel in the Detente Era," 20 June). But not many will disagree with his opinion that peace will not be established in our area on the basis of agreements, but as an outcome of the balance of power. This view is so widespread and so generally accepted, that the author did not even have to quote Henry Kissinger in support of his statement.

Power—our own or borrowed from friends—has been sustaining us until now and will continue to sustain us for many years to come, whether it be overt or merely hinted at.

This is not the place to analyze the elements of power and our total or partial command of such elements. Whatever these elements may be, they may need to be extensively implemented, according to Netanyahu, in order to ensure, among other things, international maritime and air transportation and supply links, preclude renewed proliferation of Middle East terrorism, consolidate moderate (Arab?) governments, and above all, "preclude the use of dangerous weapons" by adventurous governments apt to jeopardize world peace, all that, in practical cooperation with the United States. With surprising reticence on the part of a Herut member, Netanyahu refrained from expressing an opinion on the possibility of the use of force on behalf of special Israeli interests.

The same cannot be said about Hayim Tzadok: In an article published in Friday's DAVAR, he brought up "deterioration toward war" as an alternative—perhaps the only alternative—to a peace agreement on Israel's eastern border. Indeed, whether it may be a question of an initiated Israeli use of force—which is the natural conclusion from Netanyahu's list of possible joint ventures with the United States—or of defensive war, to which Tzadok is apparently referring, once the Arabs attempt to free the Palestinians by force, war is still the inescapable solution. However, contemporary war is not exactly a shoot-out in the wild west: Neither securing supply lines (Netanyahu), nor freeing Palestinians (Tzadok) can be viewed as interests justifying all-out war.

However, if we take a closer look at the two typical forms of war against Israel, staged on one or several of its borders, we perceive that starting and conducting such a

war will not meet the purposes of the initiators. As far as one type of war is concerned—guerrilla war by irregular forces—there is no need to speculate: The experience of dozens of years has shown that Israel is only marginally vulnerable to this type of warfare. In other words, if Israel does not lose its nerve and keeps up its defenses (despite the drawbacks of warfare in the vicinity of basically static positions), this type of war will not chase it out of the land of Israel and will not prevent it from lending support to the United States (as predicated by Netanyahu).

At the other end of the spectrum is the scenario of general war declared on Israel by an Arab coalition. This is an unlikely scenario, because of the total disproportion between risk and gain. A coalition war will not let up in intensity and will not stop at conquering a certain area in the West Bank or Gaza, but will, in case of initial success, push on to a final settling of accounts with the Zionist entity. Even the most obtuse Arab leader will hesitate to arouse Israel's reaction to a total attack, in view of the fact that Israel's destructive potential is widely known. Considering this balance between risk and gain, it is difficult to imagine that any state will go to war to free an enslaved people.

Thus, if we rule out the extremes, what is left is a sort of gray area in the middle—a single Arab state conducting a limited war both in objective and method. This may be a static war of attrition, or a mobile attack; in both cases, in view of its consciously limited objectives, it cannot justify the gain that the attacker may contribute to the Palestinian cause. In short, war against Israel can be profitable to Egypt (or Syria, or Iraq), if the ensuing political or other gain exceeds the practical cost or risk to itself. It is hard to see any concrete example of what gain could justify in the eyes of the Egyptian (or Syrian, or Iraqi) leadership opening fire for the sake of the Palestinians or jointly with them. (This is even more true if America is being attacked, according to Netanyahu's model, and Israel serves as its local ally).

The reader must have perceived the absence of any spirit of peace or world detente in the above considerations, which in themselves lead to the conclusion that there is little likelihood of a war breaking out between us and one or several Arab states over the Palestinians or over any of the other issues on Netanyahu's list. Actually, as far as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is concerned, it is not war that is threatening Israel's peace or chances, but the present status quo or the one that preceded the intifadah. In point of fact, the definition that best describes Israel's main political objective is separation between the two nations, and that objective does not require the use of force, or perhaps only marginally.

What we said above does not contradict the view that power (and preparedness) is what is responsible for preserving peace, rather than written agreements. Until reason becomes the factor governing the thinking of all the national leaderships in the area—and in this connection, to set Netanyahu's mind at peace, dictatorships can be no less rational in their foreign policy than democratic

governments—including Israel, the rule which says that he who wants peace must prepare for war, will remain in effect. At least on this important issue there is no radical controversy in Israel, and we should be thankful for that.

JORDAN

Disturbances in Refugee Camps Reported

TA11121913 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 11 Dec 89 p 2

[Text] According to military sources in Israel, the outbreak of disturbances among Palestinian youths in the large refugee camp near Amman contravened PLO and Fatah directives. These sources point out that since the beginning of the intifadah [uprising], the Palestinian leadership headed by Yasir 'Arafat has been careful to prevent the intifadah from spilling over into the East Bank, and has prevented disturbances directed against King Husayn. According to a military source who deals with the issue, "refugee camp residents are the real time bomb ticking in Jordan, although this is a time bomb in terms of a historical process, and not a question of the near future. There is no question that the awakening in the territories has affected them, and aroused nationalist sentiment. King Husayn's decision to sever links with the West Bank forced them to choose unequivocally between their Jordanian and their Palestinian identity."

OMAN

New Tax Law Imposed on Industry, Commerce

90OL0128A Muscat 'UMAN in Arabic 21 Oct 89 p 6

[Article: "The Law for Tax Commercial and Industrial Profits Helps Diversify the Sultanate's Sources of Income"]

[Text] 'UMAN interviewed Ya'qub Bin-Muhammad Bin-Faqir who discussed the law mandating taxes on profits of industrial and commercial establishments. Ya'qub Bin-Muhammad Faqir is a chartered accounting expert and practices under his name.

Ya'qub began by lauding the wisdom and modernity of the recent Royal Decree No 77/89 issued by His Majesty, the exalted sultan Qabus Bin-Sa'id, in order to increase and diversify the sultanate's sources of income.

He said that the law applies only to industrial and commercial establishments with annual profits exceeding 30,000 Omani riyals. Most small industrial and commercial establishments continue to be exempt from all taxes. The exemption applies to commercial and industrial establishments whose profits do not exceed 7.5 percent. This is the highest tax-free margin the world.

Ya'qub pointed out that the tax law will also benefit the Omani economy as a whole by mandating that all commercial and industrial establishments keep books and file accurate accounts with the Ministry of Finance

and Economy. He explained that numerous commercial and industrial projects do not maintain accurate records of their dealings and are therefore unaware of their true operational income or financial position. The new tax law mandates that all commercial and industrial establishments in the sultanate must as of now maintain proper records. This will make their owners better informed of their operational income and financial position and consequently help them improve performance by making better-informed decisions.

The law has charged accounting firms with grave responsibility, since all records filed with the Ministry of Finance and Economy must be audited by registered chartered accountants.

Ya'qub emphasized that accountants must observe international standards and guidelines and must also make sure that books too are kept in accordance with international accounting procedures.

He also stressed the necessity for supporting world-class Omani accounting companies, at least by allowing only Omani accountants to handle and audit the books of public sector establishments and companies in which the sultanate's government is a substantial shareholder.

Resolutions Dealing With Irrigation Suggested

90OL0128B Muscat 'UMAN in Arabic 20 Oct 89 p 1

[Article: "International Scientific Symposium on the Development of Omani Agriculture Concludes Session, Recommends the Introduction of Modern Technology in Farming and Irrigation, Utilization of Saline Water Resources"]

[Text] The international scientific symposium on means of developing Omani agriculture concluded before noon yesterday after making recommendations to develop scientific research, introduce modern technology (especially in irrigation systems and farming techniques), utilize available resources of salt and high-salinity water and identify congruous plants, and use treated water for agriculture.

The symposium, held at Sultan Qabus University, recommended technical and economic feasibility studies to increase farm, animal, and fishing productivity; safeguard, conserve, increase, and develop natural resources and conduct relevant surveys; and support producers, motivate them to improve product quality, train them and guide them, and acquaint them with modern production methods and techniques. The symposium also recommended making factors of production available; developing food processing to absorb the surplus, reduce waste, and utilize by-products; develop storage, preservation, and other techniques helpful to marketing farm goods; direct investment to serve development in the sectors of agriculture and fisheries; and equip the national work force to carry the burden for the development of farms and fisheries.

The international scientific symposium on the development of Omani agriculture also recommended at its conclusion that investments be augmented in order to raise farm and fish production, improve the efficiency of the apparatus for gathering farm statistics, and develop data and national plans for land reclamation and cultivation as well as water resource development.

The symposium further recommended increasing support for farm research agencies, bolstering extension services by adding more agricultural agents, and seeking solutions to palm tree and date industry problems by thoroughly surveying date palms in the sultanate, establishing an experimental station specialized in agrarian weaving, utilizing modern technology in raw date processing and ripe date storage, mechanizing date palm servicing, and expanding the date-packaging and wrapping industry.

The symposium's recommendations underscored the importance of building dams for underground water feeding and of imposing restrictions on pumping volume.

The symposium lauded the efforts of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries in raising fishermen's contribution to the gross domestic product by building and maintaining infrastructure, developing fish research centers, subsidizing the fishermen's incentive fund, and increasing the contribution of the Omani private sector to the development of fish resources.

His Excellency Shaykh Muhammad Bin-'Abdallah Bin-Zahir al-Hana'i, minister of agriculture and fisheries, addressed the final session of the symposium to thank the participants, express his appreciation of their efforts, and commend their active participation in the working sessions.

His Excellency emphasized that the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries will make good use of the findings presented at the symposium which discussed farm issues of the utmost importance. He asserted that the ministry will give due consideration to all recommendations and proposals presented at the symposium.

QATAR

State's Security Apparatus Described

90OL0110A Doha AL-'ARAB in Arabic 17 Oct 89 p 2

[Interview with Salim 'Ajab Hadi al-'Ajab by 'Atif Sulayman: "We Expect Greater Citizen Cooperation With Various Security Agencies"; first paragraph is AL-'ARAB introduction; date and place not specified]

[Text] How important are communications in today's world? When was the Police Communications Division [PCD] established and how is it linked to the ministries and other government departments? What is the jurisdiction of the ministry's operations room and what role does it play in receiving phone and radio messages?

What are the future plans for raising the performance efficiency of the operations room in particular and the PCD in general at the Ministry of the Interior? These and other questions were put to Major Salim 'Ajab Hadi al-'Ajab, deputy director of the PCD, who began this interview by saying, "The importance of communications stands out as a basic process in our modern life and a vital procedure in today's world. Moreover, it is something that is crucial and essential to public security divisions and departments at the police command.

"The Ministry of the Interior has an advanced and sophisticated system of communications that mirrors the most important features of our age known as the age of science and communications technology.

"The division has been expanded through the construction of a workshop, a warehouse and a control room at the police command.

"With the advent of 1980 when the operations room became fully-equipped and a multichannel communications network, equipped with a modern electronics system, was put into operation, it became possible to transmit information and provide nationwide communications with east."

About the division's function, he said, "The division is composed of:

"The Administration. It is in charge of all administrative functions related to the PCD, from preparing future communications projects to devising necessary training programs, writing monthly and annual reports, and training Qatari workers in various communications functions, both in the country or out of the country in cooperation with friendly and sister nations.

"Technical Affairs. It is in charge of the installation and operations of radio stations and equipment in all interior ministry police divisions and departments, such as manual and signal equipment, car equipment, etc., and of overseeing regular maintenance to ensure continued efficiency.

"Operations. In view of its importance as the link between all police divisions and departments of the Interior Ministry, on the one hand, and all citizens and residents, on the other hand, this section will be discussed in detail later."

About the division's jurisdictions, Maj Salim added, "The communications division has the following functions: to chart a general vision and plan for the future expansion of communications agencies so as to keep pace with technological developments in the various fields of communications; to monitor projects and appraise performance therein with a view to providing the most efficient communications services; to furnish computers to the interior ministry's divisions and departments, devise special computer programs and institute a computer maintenance plan.

"The ministry intends to upgrade the computer system to make it more universal and wide-ranging, using state-of-the-art methods to offer a full data service to all the ministry's security divisions and departments. This project is still under study and, in view of its high capacity to store, process, and retrieve data for all sectors, senior officials at the Interior Ministry are affording it great attention.

"Furthermore, due to its capacity to transmit information at exceptional speed via sophisticated equipment such as computer-recorder sets, facsimile machines, telephones, telex, etc., the communications division is closely linked to all the ministries and government departments in the technical and security fields in general and via the operations room in particular."

Operations Room Functions

[AL-'ARAB] What is the function of the operations room?

[Al-'Ajab] To receive all telephone and radio messages and reports coming in around the clock for transmission to senior officials, to handle all major communications functions and to transmit orders and instructions to various security agencies at the ministry. To respond to citizen appeals for help in cases of medical emergency, fires, and various other disasters by dispatching patrols to the proper scene. To monitor daily incidents of all kinds and to follow up their progress with the competent parties and, thereupon, apprise ministry officials of the situation. To act as the direct link between all officers and officials when necessary. To keep an around-the-clock log of incidents, complaints, and messages for future reference.

[AL-'ARAB] What role does the operations room play in processing messages?

[Al-'Ajab] The operations room plays an active role in this area, one that has already been demonstrated in the visual media and the daily press. Citizens and residents have been cooperating with us by making observations and offering assistance to the interior ministry on the premise that "every citizen is a security officer." We are ready to offer them the help they need and I affirm the ministry's intention to offer them round-the-clock assistance on telephone number 999-330000.

[AL-'ARAB] What role does the operations officer play?

[Al-'Ajab] The operations officer's jurisdiction is drawn from the powers of the interior ministry's senior officials.

The operations officer has the right to take effective action to contain an incident until the competent side is informed. There are a number of security measures he can adopt to achieve this end.

[AL-'ARAB] Is there coordination between the ministry's operations department and other government agencies?

[Al-'Ajab] Making the best use of the manpower and the material resources available at the ministries and the official and semi-official state institutions and uniting all powers in the service of the nation is an urgent national requirement advocated in government resolutions and actually put into action on more than one occasion.

Coordination between the interior ministry and those other sides has been ongoing and lasting in all fields. What we particularly care about in the operations room is the support and assistance these sides provide in carrying out security services related to the country's guests and domestic help for official functions and national celebrations.

[AL-'ARAB] What future plans do you have to raise the work efficiency of the operations room in particular and the PCD in general at the interior ministry?

[Al-'Ajab] The operations room has proven its ability to carry out its responsibilities to contribute to the maintenance of law and order so that the nation may live in peace under the protection of Good Almighty and the leadership of his highness the ruler of the country, his highness the crown prince and the minister of defense, behind whose wise and blessed leadership we are all united. His excellency, the minister of the interior, his excellency the chief of police and all other interior ministry officials have spared no effort in helping the PCD to be as effective and as universal as possible to keep up with the constant changes of time.

[AL-'ARAB] Do you have one last word you would like to express before we conclude this interview?

[Al-'Ajab] I call upon all citizens and residents to heighten their cooperations with the ministry's various security agencies to secure peace and security for themselves and their property. I would like to reaffirm that security officers are very proud of the fact that they are the ones who keep a watchful eye on all those who live on our good land.

Industrial Coordination With GCC Discussed

90OL0127A Doha AL-RAYAH in Arabic 8 Oct 89 p 3

[Interview with Director of Industrial Affairs at Ministry of Industry and Public Works by al-'Azab al-Tayyib: "There Are No Problems With Industrial Coordination With GCC States; We Seek Even More Cooperation and Integration Among Industries in Qatar"]

[Excerpts] Engineer Majid 'Abdallah al-Maliki, director of industrial affairs with the Ministry of Industry and Public Works, touched in his first interview on the various trends of industrial development in Qatar, and especially on support for the private industrial sector.

In this segment, Eng al-Maliki discusses, among other things, the potential for national industrial coordination in Qatar and within the framework of the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC].

[AL-RAYAH] Eng Majid: One question relating to the lack of coordination among existing industries. Is it a future objective to institute a degree of coordination among existing industries in order to solidify industrial integration among them?

[Al-Maliki] Cooperation and coordination already exist among the various industries in Qatar. Fact is, every industrial concern has its own board of directors and managers responsible for its internal affairs free from interference by any other party. Industrial concerns also have foreign partners of various nationalities. Coordination and cooperation among industrial companies are mandated by several factors, including the fact that they are all located in the same industrial zone of Umsay'id and share the same port. It can be said that there is administrative or technical cooperation among these companies and that this will grow in the future, God willing, especially since most of their managers are highly qualified Qatari youths.

[AL-RAYAH] That is on the national level. How about industrial coordination among members of the Gulf Cooperation Council? Is there a trend to augment and expand such cooperation?

[Al-Maliki] Before the GCC, each country had an industrial policy that was different in orientation, administration, and marketing. The GCC, however, organized the Committee for Industrial Coordination which is a special committee responsible for industrial coordination among members of the council. The committee has expended a great deal of effort to provide better opportunities for coordination. It has organized several technical subcommittees to facilitate the process of coordinating among Gulf countries. An important subcommittee is the basic industries subcommittee responsible for planning for basic industries in the fields of administration and marketing as well as for group purchases of raw materials on world markets.

Most of industrial cooperation subcommittees held recent meetings to discuss various issues dealing with industrial coordination and cooperation. Their recommendations will be submitted for approval to the next session of GCC ministers of industry, which in turn would submit them to the upcoming summit of GCC leaders.

I don't believe there are any problems there. All the parties are empathetic and truly believe in the value and importance of coordination in order to accomplish a high degree of industrial integration and to prevent duplication that can only have a negative effect on the Gulf economy as a whole.

Studies prove that coordination can only result in huge economic benefits for that economy. I'll give you a specific example. Iron and steel companies in GCC countries, by agreeing to purchase their raw materials as a group, will save a lot more money than if they went about their purchases separately. Similar positive results will be achieved when they also agree to market their

products collectively, thereby improving their negotiating posture in the vicious world competition for consumption markets.

[AL-RAYAH] How about coordination among the private sectors in GCC states?

[Al-Maliki] The GCC states are currently undergoing comprehensive surveys to determine the size, scope, and activity of existing industries and their ability to supply the needs of the region. The objective of the survey is to deny permits to industries for which there is no pressing need in all countries of the region. Another objective is to avoid focusing on certain industries to the exclusion of others. For instance, should a Qatari investor request a permit to build a certain factory, it would be possible within 2 or 3 days to find out how many similar factories exist in the region, what kind of demand for this industry exists in GCC states, and whether there is a shortage or an oversupply. If that industry proved to be already providing an adequate supply, the investor would be asked to look into another industry for which there is more demand. This policy is not limited to Qatar but has the consensus of all the GCC states in their efforts to coordinate among themselves.

I would like in this regard to refer you to Law No. 11 of 1989 which governs the coordination of and support for industrial projects in GCC states. Article 2 of the law stipulates that before it recommends granting a permit, the committee for industrial development must consider the project's technical, financial, and economic feasibility studies and whether it is harmonious with the principles and objectives of the unified GCC strategy for industrial development. Article 3 of the same law stipulates that the Ministry of Industry and Public Works provide the GCC secretariat with ample information on permits issued to implement new industrial projects and expand existing ones. This is to include data on productive and operational capacity as well as other details, in accordance with the model prepared for that purpose by the technical subcommittee of the GCC committee for industrial cooperation. The ministry must also regularly and periodically supply [the GCC secretariat with] the dates when licensed projects go into production. [passage omitted]

[AL-RAYAH] What is the role of your department's recently created division of industrial oversight? Will it supervise and ensure high quality of industrial output?

[Al-Maliki] The industrial oversight division has existed for sometime and a young Qatari man was nominated to head it. The division, however, has operating through personal initiative in as much as available resources would allow. The division will now be developed to occupy its proper place in the course of Qatari industrialization. It will provide production follow-up and company oversight within the competence of the industrial affairs department to oversee industrial companies as to output quality, compliance with mandated policies, and ensuring that technical specifications meet GCC and

international standards. The division will also have responsibility for coordinating with the permanent committee on environmental protection in Qatar to promulgate sound regulations to protect the environment against pollution.

[[AL-RAYAH]] Eng Majid al-Maliki is one of Qatar's industrial experts on an issue that still remains the focus of a debate in which AL-RAYAH took part with four discussions last July: the issue of the International Monetary Fund's current orientation towards privatizing the public sector. It was appropriate therefore that I ask him about the extent to which Qatar is responsive to that trend.

[Al-Maliki] I personally believe that privatization is a good idea and would relieve the state of sustaining all industries. The question is whether the private sector is capable of absorbing industries of all kinds. I believe that the state must participate in industrial projects to a certain degree in order to guarantee its right of oversight. On the other hand, let us assume that such projects were subjected to some shock or crisis. Would the private sector be able to bear the resulting losses? Of course not. This is why the state must be a partner.

SUDAN

Eritrean Refugees Add to Economic Burdens

900A0095A London AL-MAJALLAH
in Arabic 31 Oct 89 pp 32-33

[Article by Muhammad al-Shaykh Husayn: "Latest Field Study in Sudan: Eritrean Refugees Will Not Return Within 5 Years"]

[Text] With the influx of more refugees from east, west, and south of Sudan across the vast easily-penetrated borders, the refugee question in Sudan is growing in complexity. This question has reached alarming proportions for several reasons, including a breakdown in services, difficult living conditions in Sudan, and previous Sudanese governments using the refugee issue to vie for international assistance and sympathy.

Following is a review of the latest study on the conditions of Eritrean refugees in southern Sudan. The significance of this study is that it shatters many assumptions about the refugee problem in Sudan.

The study in question is the product of a scientific cooperation agreement between the Khartoum University Developmental Studies and Research Center and the Amsterdam Free University Developmental Services Center and was directed on the Sudanese side by Dr Khalif 'Affan Ahmad 'Umar and Dr Salah al-Din al-Shadhili, and, on the Dutch side, by Professor Linemann. It deals with the subject of refugees who have settled haphazardly in Sudan, refugees other than those who have been welcomed and cared for by the government. They do not have legal status, account for 70

percent of the total number of refugees, and do not live in residential towns. This study sheds light on the impact these refugees have on life in the areas in which they live and on the demand for services, health, education, housing, and natural resources.

The study did not overlook the impact the refugees have on local communities. It is worth mentioning that because researchers base their information on field studies and facts in this kind of research may be inadvertently distorted.

The research team had prior experience in the area where the study was conducted and in the city of Kassala, the capital of the eastern Sudan. The first 3 months were spent on a preliminary survey to gain firsthand knowledge of the situation and to determine what course the research should take. This survey culminated in a meeting held in Kassala and attended by the concerned officials and political party representatives.

Impact on Refugees

Due to a number of factors, including the economic problem in Sudan and the drought that afflicted the southern region, factors that basically aggravated the situation in the area, it was difficult to determine the full impact these refugees have had on the area. This fact laid the foundation for the study, making it incumbent upon the research team to study the manifestations and repercussions of the economic crisis on the southern region and, thereupon, to outline the other topics dealing with education, health, natural resources, and the labor and housing market.

The research team was faced with the methodology problem of whether to study individuals or families and it was decided to make the family the focus of the study.

The preliminary survey helped the team to get acquainted with the refugees and compelled the regional government to deal seriously with the team.

Other factors that made the researchers' job easier included the fact that the team was comprised of Sudanese, Dutch, and Eritrean nationals. The Dutch presence gave the refugees the feeling that the team was serious and the Eritrean presence boosted the communication process and enhanced confidence and trust. The team faced the problem that the Eritreans were afraid to identify themselves.

Study Results

The study made it clear that talk about the impact of refugees is generally vague, hence the need to specify who and what is affected by them. In the housing field, they have had a positive impact on homeowners, due to the fact that they have caused rents to go up and they are easy to evict, and a negative impact on the ordinary citizen who has been hurt by higher rents. In irrigated farming, they have had a positive impact on canal owners and higher production, in view of the fact that

they represent a source of cheap labor, and a negative impact on the environment because they cut down trees to produce wood and to add to the farm land. If they persist at this rate, they will raise the chances of drought and desertation in the area.

The refugees have had a clear impact on health, but the failure and breakdown of health services cannot be attributed to their presence because long lines are a significant feature at clinics and health centers. However, they have made positive contributions to health services through the pharmaceutical products they receive from health organizations. This is a positive impact of benefit to the citizenry.

With respect to security, the study make it clear that there is no evidence that the Eritreans as a nation are more prone than others to criminal behavior.

It is common knowledge in all communities that, because of their feeling of insecurity, immigrants are more wary and cautious. There is a tendency to blow out of proportion a refugee's mistakes. News of simple assaults by one refugee against another quickly spread through towns and cities, but at the police department the common remark was that "the Eritreans are peaceful."

The study also pointed out that although the 1974 labor law guarantees refugees the right to work, it does not allow the Eritreans to obtain a work permit. It also revealed that prostitution is one of the negative effects of their cause.

Police records show that the crime rate among the Eritreans is not very high compared to the Sudanese. A special Arabic-speaking group of Eritreans from the Bani 'Amir tribe attend Sudanese schools.

Standard of Education

Kassala has a number of Eritrean schools that offer Eritrean courses in the evening. The educational policy at the regional level lacks clarity. The research team noted that the Eritreans face some difficulty in enrolling their children in school. On the other hand, school principals are free to accept or reject applicants. While the director general of the Regional Ministry of Education affirms the Eritreans' right to get an education, the research team found several indications at the regional level confirming that instructions have been issued to keep the Eritreans out of the schools. The team believes that the one thing impeding Eritreans getting an education is the demand for a birth certificate, not to mention the fact that the Eritreans are proud of their identity and want to return to their country and the Sudanese are reluctant to accept a non-Sudanese culture in their midst.

The study concluded that, under the current circumstances, the Eritrean refugee problem is not expected to be settled any time soon. The multitude of Eritrean fronts makes it difficult to adopt a unified stand vis-a-vis

this issue, aside from the fact that it reinforces Addis Ababa's position. The study explained that the Eritrean presence in the camps is an impediment to a military solution because a refugee is an apolitical and unarmed individual, aside from the fact that the solution at hand is a political one. The research team does not expect the Eritreans to return to their country within the next 5 years. Consequently, the Sudanese government must incorporate this fact into its policy by granting legal status to refugees outside the residential towns according to the following terms:

- Draw up rules and regulations for registration to facilitate the information collection process related to various refugee matters. This is the government's chief concern. The research team noted that the Sudanese government's security concern is unrelated to information.
- Draw up rules and regulations banning refugees from settling in specific areas. The study advocated full rights for the refugees in education, health, and other services. This requires the Sudanese government to set up rehabilitation projects in refugee areas.

It is not necessary, as the study noted, to have lasting aid, because the refugees do reach the self-sufficiency stage and foreign aid must be directed toward training in self-financing. The study also noted that the research team cited the international community's belief that Sudan is exploiting the refugee issue, which may cause cuts in foreign aid. The team, however, believes that this is a matter of trust that can be dealt with. The study recommended the placement of refugees in residential towns.

TUNISIA

Lack of Innovation on Part of RCD Criticized

90OA0169A Tunis LE MAGHREB in French

3 Nov 89 pp 6-9

[Article by Abdelaziz Mezoughi: "Did 7 November Bring Forth a New Political Class?"]

[Text] What is new is essentially an ambitious program but also and above all motivated men, "interested" in its successful application. Everyone agrees that the program of 7 November is more than generous, but there is some disagreement as to the selection of the men appointed to implement it. What we have is not a slow and continuous political process bringing forth a new political class prepared to take over after 30 years of Bourguibism, but a handful of men of goodwill necessarily issued from the regime itself, who were forced to come to the rescue and to break the deadlock which, it was felt, prevented any positive evolution of the regime. Compared with the situation that prevailed at the time of independence, when taking over from the previous regime was harder than now, we may consider that although there was less choice—elites were much smaller then—the political and labor struggles of the past 30 years and more have

"selected" a new political class that adapted itself rapidly and surprisingly well to the exercise of power. The political configuration that prevailed on the eve of 7 November conditioned to a large extent the process of renewal of the political class. Between two major poles (PSD [Destourian Socialist Party]-MTI [Islamic Tendency Movement]) which, in addition, are exclusive of each other, there was a mixed ill-structured "third party" including former Destourians (MDS [Movement of Socialist Democrats], PUP [Popular Unity Party], MUP [Popular Unity Movement], etc.) and independent individuals who managed to remain outside the "establishment" and sometimes opposed to it, or again individuals and leftist groups who, through different stages and at different times, formed the radical opposition to the former regime.

The strategic decision to rely mostly on Destourians to provide impetus and implement a policy of reforms has somehow forced the new regime to select people from among a small group that does not necessarily represent the "unconditional beliefs of 7 November."

Apart from a few isolated cases—H. Ben Slama, Dali Jazi—the new regime did not manage to attract political personalities from movements issued from the internal debates and struggles of the Destour and who, under difficult conditions, opposed the Bourguiba regime with various degrees of determination. Moreover, the (inferior) conditions offered to these movements caused a sort of tension that further complicated the task of all those who, with or without ulterior motives, might be tempted to knock at the door of the RCD [Democratic Constitutional Rally]. The case of the present minister of health remains, after all, an isolated case considering that Dr Hamouda Ben Slama did not belong to any party when he joined the RCD.

Lacking any real opening toward the political class and relying mostly on the reservoir of former Destourians, the new regime will have little room to maneuver in the recruiting of its political personnel.

What About the Destourian Reservoir?

First-generation Destourians, those who were active before independence and have experience are worn out, either politically or physically, and sometimes both ways. In spite of a few vague attempts, they cannot be expected to play a part as reformers. To these Destourian old-timers we should add all those who joined the PSD or reached positions of political responsibility in it when the party was securely in power, and when what was needed to rise in the hierarchy was scheming, skillful moves, and political savvy rather than commitment. Technocratic "militants" of this type, most of them coming from the administration and centers of power, raised in the cult of discipline, patronage and the reason of State, may be more "competent" than their elders, but they prefer, and by far, the delights of positions that present no risks to the excitement, and sometimes the drama, of struggle and political commitment.

These are the two types of men who fill the spheres of power. And it is curious to observe that some leading political personalities of the former regime accepted, without any obvious reason, to leave the stage for the wings rather than return to the status of mere citizens. This is the case of former prime minister Rachid Sfar and two of his former colleagues, Yacoubi El Ouachi and Abderrazak El Kefi. This gives an idea of the love for official positions which permeates the political class which emerged and was trained during the last years of the Bourguiba regime. One by one, most of the top leaders left the government, but they sought refuge in other public bodies, for instance the Chamber of Deputies—Slaheddine Bali, Beji Caid Essebsi, etc.—and we get the impression that the new regime did not find the right angle to deal with the problem of recycling the entire former political class with dignity. The invitations to official events that are regularly sent to the barons of the former regime (Behi Ladgham, Hedi Nour, Jelloul Fares) may reflect the new regime's desire to go ahead without cutting itself symbolically from its roots, for fear of being drawn into a spiral of renewal and the unknown. Another noticeable phenomena is the reliance on certain personalities, men of very high calibre certainly, but not necessarily men with a future. For instance, Mustapha Filali, who comes up every time the word Maghreb is uttered, or Hassib Ben Ammar whose "field" is human rights, not to mention Taieb Slim whose abilities are not in question but who does not give the regime a "Year 2000" look.

We should also mention the grassroots levels, where politics are a daily occurrence—governors, high-administrative delegates, regional directors—and where the personnel has hardly changed at all in spite of some geographic and professional mobility. Observers get the impression that the last 2 years—years 1 and 2 of the new regime—were marked by some experimentation in the selection of men and that this in turn may promote a do-nothing, wait-and-see attitude as well as silent hidden struggles to occupy new positions or strengthen old ones at the expense of efficiency and active and committed work.

If we look at the bodies that count (government, RCD political bureau and central committee, Chamber of Deputies, the media scene, the world of labor and employers unions) we are struck by the fact they are nearly identical to the Destourian types.

At government level, we get the impression that the newcomers, whether opponents coming from political movements or independents, did not manage (except for Med Charfi) to acquire a stature that would somehow enable them to appear as authentic representatives of one or several fractions of the opposition. From Ahmed Smaoui—the victim of repression in the 1960's—to Moncer Rouissi, who was actively engaged on the fringes of the perspectivist left, to Dali Jazi and Hamouda Ben Slama, not to mention Saadeddine Zmerli, the image of all the new ministers remains blurred. Still, their speeches and their decisions on all major problems are

not much different from those of any Destourian minister of the pre-November type. They do not seem to have managed to create in public opinion, not even just among the elites, the psychological impact that would have enabled large fractions to rally the 7-November flag without expressed or mental reservations. Moreover, considering the demands of politics and the need for support and political legitimacy, they somehow tend to overdo it. Some give the impression that they have forgotten to prove themselves capable of managing sensitive sectors better than their predecessors and of handling the affairs of their respective departments in a different spirit. The cab drivers' strike in the case of Smaoui, or the tragicomic story of the national soccer team coach, and the opposition to change of a sector in such a sorry state as the health sector as in the case of the man who was introduced by a local columnist as "former minister of foreign affairs of the opposition" tend to prove that "it is easier to criticize than to do something" and that real credibility depends on results even if premises are correct. [as published]

To this reasoning, we may, of course, object that none of these "reformers" was given a free hand and that "pockets of resistance"—a concept that, in truth, is all too convenient—personified at the highest government level, it seems, by the former prime minister, have prevented these young talents from being totally free to give their full measure. This argument, although valid to a certain extent, is not fully convincing considering the widespread lack of progress in many fields and the impression, which may be misleading, that the major ills which discredited the former regime—excessive numbers and inefficiency of the administration, waste, authoritarian and far from optimum management of public enterprises, etc.—still persist.

Perhaps the most significant example of this sort of contagion is that of the present minister of culture and information. A known and respected politician, in spite of a few mistakes, he came to the government with the aura of a man of culture and politically a liberal. To sum it up, after Ben Smail-Boulares's report on the problems of information, he was awaited like the messiah by all observers. But we must say that now nearly all agree to criticize his timorousness and his extreme caution. Even his most ardent supporters and admirers are rather disappointed.

That leaves Mohamed Charfi, one of the very first militants who, like many tens of young men of his generation, paid his dues in the struggle against the rise of authoritarianism, even though, in the eyes of the hardliners of his generation, this period of his life is marred by his plea for clemency, incomprehensible as well as useless. After the excesses of his hotheaded youth, he turned to the democratic struggle, less exalting perhaps but a lot more effective. After joining the government, he was immediately recognized as one of theirs by broad fringes of democratic public opinion, in spite of his somewhat faltering approach that caused him, too, to leave his natural environment and recruit his staff from

among the so-called enlightened fringes of Islamism. Instinctively, some of the intellectuals and some of the obscure soldiers engaged in the daily struggle for freedom and human rights spontaneously recognized themselves in him. He did not join the RCD so that, now that he has become the Islamists' favorite target, the RCD grants him only reluctant support, but he is perhaps the only member of the current government whose political career will not necessarily end should he leave the ministry. Next to the newcomers on the power scene, the Destourians are not playing just minor parts. Men like Sadok Chaabane and Ahmed Khaled, to mention only two, express themselves and take clear-cut positions on the political chessboard without having recourse to the usual stereotyped formal language. The "technocrats" in the government, not well-known among the public or even among some politicized fringes, are working with a discretion that borders on self-effacement, and no one can guess what their main political orientations are (Belaid, Rabah, Boujbel, Firaat, etc.).

At the RCD central committee, few remarkable personalities really stand out among the innumerable academic technocrats or former opponents with a hierarchical conception of partisan work. These are the traditional stars (Azzouz Rebai) and new personalities whose ascent is not unrelated to the "pulling out of the rug" (Sheikh El Mestaoui), who take pride of place, or women of exceptional calibre like Mrs Fethia Baccouche.

The same is true of elected representatives: with few exceptions, no new figure really stands out and we find former ministers—Caid Essebsi, Salaheddine Baly—and a few new personalities who are still in the learning stages of this hard job. So that the star, at least for the media, is Sheikh Abderrahmane Khelif, another incarnation of the "pulling out of the rug" level.

Note that in legislative byelections and in the general election no adequate attempt was made to encourage the emergence of new personalities. Rather, we get the impression that—especially in the byelections of 1988—there was an attempt to discourage all those who, like Moncef Ezzahi in Gafsa, wanted to bring new inspiration to the election campaign. Worse, none of those who rallied the RCD after 7 November is a member of the assembly. But the decisionmaking apparatus does not consist solely of the government and constitutional institutions; it includes also, and above all, the entire higher administration (chief executive officers, general directors, governors, delegates). There again, extreme caution prevails on both sides. In spite of an infinitesimal injection of newcomers into the system, stability prevails despite the internal permutations that occur within this "nomenclature." This trend is still more marked in the information sector. Managers tend to remain, but they are permuted as required by vacancies and failures. No real newcomer has been "injected" into that sector. Some say that this explains the persistence of defects that already existed in the system set up by the former regime.

Apart from men like Moncer Rouissi and, to a lesser extent, Med Jeri—former high official at the Ministry of Finance—we cannot say that one personality stands out above the lot. The impression is that the system is still in gestation, that it has not yet found adequate means to evaluate men and renew teams. Is this a necessary stage in what is supposed to be a "quiet" process of change, or does it reflect a deepseated malaise and a lack of competence (which cannot be blamed on the government alone although it bears most of the responsibility for it)?

New people have really emerged only in mass organizations: the UGTT [Tunisian General Federation of Labor] and, to a lesser extent, the UTICA [Tunisian

Union for Industry, Trade and Handicrafts], with the arrival of Hedi Jilani who, after all, is a new man.

Despite its stagnation and the attempts made by both sides to take it over, the UGTT has seen new men emerge at all levels. Just in the executive committee, men like Med Trabelsi, Chandoul, Tahar Chaieb, and Abdelmajid Sahraoui represent another generation of militants, different from union men like Habib Achour, even though most of them have worked for some time with the former UGTT leader.

Then, did 7 November really bring forth a new political class? The answer has to be no, even though it may be somewhat early and somewhat presumptuous to answer such a broad question.

INDIA

Reportage on 'Hindu' Coverage of Bofors Case

Associate Editor Ram's Statement

46001112 Madras THE HINDU
in English 13 Oct 89 p 9

[Article by N. Ram: "N. Ram's Statement on Bofors Expose"]

[Text] New Delhi, Oct. 12—The following is a press statement by N. Ram, Associate Editor of THE HINDU, on the Bofors scandal and a new turn in THE HINDU's role in the expose.

I have invited, on a specific invitation basis, media representatives because I wish to deal with the Bofors scandal and a very unusual situation for independent and ethical journalism which has arisen right now. It is a situation affecting the newspaper of which I am Associate Editor, which means the No. 2 person in the editorial structure. It is a situation concerning the unacceptable attitude of the Editor, Mr. G. Kasturi, to our persistent, detailed and ongoing expose of the Bofors scandal and the Government of India's role in it.

The Editor of THE HINDU, the No. 1 person in the editorial hierarchy, has "decided"—arbitrarily, capriciously and in a manner highly derogatory of the traditions, norms and values of independent, ethical journalism—to discontinue the expose of the Bofors scandal in the columns of THE HINDU. This he has done at a critical stage in the development of our detailed and many sided investigation which began in April 1987 and which, from April 1988, has seen the extensive publication of documents (in facsimile, so that readers can make up their own mind) on the scandal. Every one of these documents, without exception, referred to the competent authorities in Sweden has been authenticated. They have been accepted by all fair-minded people who have read the expose as major evidence on the scandal. Hundreds of thousands of our readers, and millions of people in various parts of India, are looking forward to reading the next instalment of the continuing story—especially considering the fact that when we began our new round of publication of documents and analysis, we ended the first and very detailed instalment (published in the issue of October 9, 1989) with the promise: "To be continued."

A detailed second instalment—which comprises many pages of original and vitally important documents to be reproduced in facsimile plus the analysis and the conclusions—was got ready for publication in the issue of THE HINDU dated October 11, 1989. The subject, and the character and significance of the new documentation, were discussed in depth with the Editor of THE HINDU, Mr. Kasturi, and he seemed to go along with the idea of publication. There was never, at any stage, any question relating to the authenticity of the material.

Just before the publication of the expose focusing on the secret part of the Swedish National Audit Bureau [SNAB]'s Report, on the major implications and links with other aspects of l'affaire Bofors, Mr. Kasturi insisted to me that no more material should be published in the columns of THE HINDU and that he, as Editor, and no one else, could decide on this matter. At one point, he took the position that "the whole thing must be published in one go"; that he would need to read "every word" of what might "eventually" appear, in future stories or instalments, before he could consent to having "any word" of the new round of expose published in THE HINDU. Anyone who knows anything about the character of journalism knows the preposterous character and implications of this "demand".

In turn, I insisted that our investigation and expose, which has been widely recognised and supported for its independence, open-mindedness, professionalism and balance, must continue without fear or favour. After blocking publication, Mr. Kasturi changed his mind at the very last minute and consented to the publication of the major expose of the secret part of the SNAB Report in the issue of THE HINDU dated October 9, 1989.

During all this, Mr. Kasturi has been advocating, in our internal editorial discussions, the view that on the basis of what has been published in THE HINDU, the Government of Mr. Rajiv Gandhi should have quit a long time ago if it had any sense of honour. He repeatedly expressed the view internally that because of the Bofors scandal alone, and its proven role in it, the "corrupt" Government had no right to continue in office. However, tragically, he failed to demonstrate the courage of his "convictions" in the field of journalism.

On the positive side, in THE HINDU's very detailed expose of June 1988, the Editor of THE HINDU took a detailed interest in the layout of the documents and the material and made his own professional contribution to the presentation and highlighting of the material.

But, essentially after this, every time the question of publishing something major and original on the Bofors scandal arose, he countered the idea of publication with the question, "What is really new about this? Isn't what we have already published enough to make clear to everyone who is involved?" He also repeatedly stated that while he personally was convinced of the guilt of the Government in the Bofors affair, he was afraid that "the institution is in great danger." This was his perspective on THE HINDU which was founded in 1878 and has seen many trials and challenges in its history. (I repeatedly pointed out to the Editor the failure to understand the significance of history which underlay his statement). Mr. Kasturi also expressed serious concern over the impact of the fall-out from the Bofors expose on the interests of the "family" behind the newspaper.

Without wishing to go into excessive detail, I would like to underline the point that Mr. Kasturi, Editor of THE HINDU, has been a severe obstacle in the path of

conducting this important journalistic investigation, and especially the business of publishing documents and articles in detail, on Bofors.

The situation deteriorated in 1980 and became quite intolerable in September-October 1989. A quite dishonourable and unethical break—not backed up by any acceptable reason that can possibly meet the glare of a public or professional discussion—occurred after the publication of our major new article, spread over three pages of *THE HINDU* on October 9, 1989. Ironically, when various newspapers round the country (including *THE TIMES OF INDIA*) and in Sweden and other places round the world highlighted our newspaper's new contribution and acknowledged and discussed its major significance in editorials and news articles, the Editor of *THE HINDU* "decided" capriciously—without consulting me as the co-author of the story, with direct editorial responsibility for it—to stop further publication, despite our promise to our readers, to our professional colleagues and to the nation.

In my view, the Editor's Note published on page one of *THE HINDU* of October 11, 1989 is a conspicuous insult to the traditions of independent, intellectually and socially serious, and ethical journalism. The note states mysteriously: "Enough has been written, supported by extensive documentation, in *THE HINDU* to establish the fact of the cover-up and the non-serious pursuit of the investigation by the official agencies and give the lie to the Government's latest assertions." This is a posture suggesting, ambiguity and equivocation; it is not worthy of the better intellectual and professional values associated with either the institution or the field of journalism in India, historically speaking. Many lay readers and our professional colleagues have got in touch with us, expressing their puzzlement over what was happening to the investigation and what the Editor's Note on page one (linked to a relatively unimportant story on Bofors) meant.

After this unilateral step was announced to the public without so much as the courtesy of consultation with me, I decided to take what is—for a professional journalist—an extraordinary step. I decided to step out of the four walls of *THE HINDU* as an institution and into the public arena and explain the situation to the readers of various newspapers and to the people of this country. I decided to speak to my colleagues in the profession and ask for the hospitality of their columns to throw light on this vital national and ethical issue. I wonder whether this expose of what has happened within one major journalistic institution would be kept away from the readers of *THE HINDU* through editorial censorship!

The detailed and serious expose of the Bofors scandal—which involves national honour and the issue of the integrity of the Government—will continue and I am determined to participate seriously in it as Associate Editor of *THE HINDU*. The documents, all authenticated, have a major significance for the people's understanding of what happened. The issues are much larger

than the possible "embarrassment" that could be caused to a "family" or the image of one media institution, however significant and worthwhile its historical role in the field of journalism. The larger issue here is whether the people have a right to know on a vital and major national and ethical issue and whether journalism must essentially fix its professional norms and values around this right. I am taking essentially an ethical stand on the intellectual and professional issues at stake. Therefore, I must speak out.

I have decided as a practical step to counter the internal sabotage and censorship, to make available simultaneously to several selected newspapers—approached essentially for their well-known professional influence on major regions of the country and on a broad professional basis—the detailed second instalment, backed with extensive original documentation, that was got ready for publication in *THE HINDU* of October 11, 1989. The answer to Mr. Kasturi's question, "What is new?", can be left to readers to judge in India and Sweden.

For one thing, as I have pointed out to Mr. Kasturi repeatedly in our internal discussions, if it were not new, neither he nor anyone else was likely to feel threatened or take much notice; but since it was new and important, it should be published right away even if he or someone else felt threatened. Indeed the non-heroic, arbitrary and unethical decision taken by the top level of decision-making in *THE HINDU* implies that the material could be "dangerously" original and new. Therefore, we must publish and, if for certain completely unacceptable reasons, the columns of *THE HINDU* are not open to the material and the documents, I—as Associate Editor of this newspaper—have no choice but to take the extraordinary step of offering this material to other influential newspapers on a broad, representative basis and to seek the hospitality of their columns.

I essentially request them to publish this material either in full, exactly as it has been written, or in a faithful summary. That is up to them.

I am the co-author of the various documented articles *THE HINDU* has published on the Bofors scandal and was due to publish until this internal sabotage—clearly in response to pressures from New Delhi—occurred, denying the readers of *THE HINDU* the vital information. What the Defamation Bill, 1988 could not achieve in relation to the expose of the Bofors scandal has been achieved through internal censorship.

In this connection, I would like to pay a special tribute to the principal investigator in this continuing story, Ms. Chitra Subramaniam. She is the person who, more than any other, deserves the credit for the expose. In fact, her role in the whole investigation, which started in 1987, has been magnificent. When the massive cover-up occurred and the course of honour and justice was obstructed by the Government of India and the official investigative agencies, Chitra Subramaniam, virtually single-handed, gained possession of a mass of original

documents from Sweden which have demolished the cover-up. This young woman has shown outstanding professional, intellectual and ethical integrity and traits that, in my professional judgment, qualify her for a major national and international recognition in the field of high-quality journalism.

In this connection, I would like to explain one simple point. Chitra Subramaniam and I finalised and wrote out the details of new articles and the second instalment was readied for publication in the columns of THE HINDU. That is where it should have been published in the first place on Oct 11. Now, on account of circumstances beyond my control, it cannot appear in THE HINDU, at least not for now. The second instalment, written for THE HINDU and put in my hands by my co-author for publication in THE HINDU, is being made available to other newspapers under very special circumstances.

The whole episode raised disturbing professional and ethical issues for Indian journalism, the structure of decision-making and the conflicts of interests within it. Perhaps it might even be a subject worthy of detailed discussion in certain intellectual and professional forums. But the more important task today is to make the information available to the people of India as early as possible. Their right to know more on l'affaire Bofors must be respected and responded to ethically and intelligently.

I am confident that readers round the country will respond very positively and that the whole practice of internal censorship and behind-the-scene manipulation of information and news within newspaper structures will be exposed and perhaps ended swiftly.

Thank you for responding to my invitation and for your detailed interest in this matter.

Kasturi's Reply

46001112B Madras THE HINDU
in English 13 Oct 89 p 9

[Text] The Editor of THE HINDU, Mr. G. Kasturi, in a press statement, said:

It is unfortunate, to say the least, that Mr. N. Ram has made a statement of the kind newspapers are being asked to carry. Most parts of it do not call for any comment other than that they reflect gross indiscipline, lack of decency and elementary manners on the part of the individual.

Certain other parts of the statement do call for an answer.

A reference has been made in the statement that there has "clearly" been pressure from the Government on me to take the kind of decision I am supposed to have taken. It may be stated categorically that there has been nothing of the kind from either the Prime Minister or any Minister or any official.

Secondly, no decision was taken to discontinue the expose of the Bofors scandal in the columns of THE HINDU. What was decided was not to publish the "second instalment" that has been referred to because in my estimation there was nothing in it that was vitally indicative of who might have been the recipients of the Bofors payoff and of something that can be traced to people of this country, high or low. Nor did it take the issue forward in any meaningful way.

The decision was not the product of any capriciousness on my part, for almost all members of the family, of which I happen to be the senior member, were of the view that the "second instalment" did not merit serious enough attention to warrant publication. In the opinion of most of the members to the family, repeated publication of such material without any real advance posed the danger of turning serious newspapers into scandal sheets.

IRAN

IRI, Turkey Reach Extradition Agreement on Fugitives

90010051B Tehran KEYHAN in Persian
21 Nov 89 p 18

[Interview with commander of the Islamic revolutionary committee of Western Azarbaijan by reporters; date and place not specified]

[Text] Urumieh—KEYHAN correspondent: According to the protocol signed between Iran and Turkey, from now on, all fugitive criminals and international smugglers will be pursued, and upon arrest will be sent to the judicial authorities of the two countries.

The commander of the Islamic revolutionary committee of Western Azarbaijan explained the results of the 10-day phase of the Val'adiyat plan in that province in an interview with reporters. In response to a question by our correspondent concerning how international smugglers are pursued, he said: According to the protocol signed between Iran and Turkey, in regard to the extradition of fugitive criminals, through obtaining an arrest warrant from the judicial authorities and with the cooperation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, we are trying to arrest 38 narcotics smugglers who are fugitives active in Turkey and have them extradited to Iran. He added: The officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran have also cooperated in a similar way to implement this protocol.

He continued: With the round-the-clock efforts of the guards and infiltration into the narcotics distribution ring in Miandoab, in a sting operation, about 32 kg of opium were uncovered and 7 members of this ring who were also active in Karaj and Kohnuj were arrested. In the interrogation, these individuals confessed to the distribution of 500 kg of narcotics.

The commander of the Islamic revolutionary committee of Western Azarbaijan added: Also, through the infiltration of the guards of the Islamic revolutionary committee of Western Azarbaijan and the follow-up from Zahedan, an international ring which also had roots in Kohnuj and Kerman, was entrapped at Salmas Pass during the mission of this organization. He said that seven persons were arrested in this connection and added: Efforts to arrest two others of this ring continue.

He said that about 12 kg of narcotics was confiscated from this ring.

Iran Stressing Normalization With GCC

90OL0102A Doha AL-ARAB in Arabic 1 Oct 89 p 1, 8

[Article: "Iran Wants Expanded Diplomatic Relations With Gulf States"]

[Text] The night before last, Iran stated that it wishes to expand its diplomatic relations with Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC] states, on the basis of mutual respect for the interests and legitimate rights of each nation.

In his speech before the UN General Assembly, Iranian Foreign Minister Dr 'Ali Akbar Velayati said that Iran also wants to provide a strong foundation to achieve permanent peace and security, without the presence of foreign forces in the Gulf area.

He added that common religious, cultural, and economic bases among the area nations provide the necessary incentives to achieve solidarity and strengthen themselves without the presence or intervention of foreign powers.

Moreover, Dr Velayati stressed that establishing peace and security in the Gulf area should be done by the Gulf states, free from foreign intervention.

Dr Velayati pointed out that the Security Council did not take any steps last year to implement Resolution 598, pertaining to the Iraq-Iran war.

Shortly before his departure from New York, Dr Velayati met with UN Secretary General De Cuellar. Radio Tehran reported that De Cuellar stated during that meeting that his special envoy to the Iraqi-Iranian peace negotiations, Jan Eliasson, would go next month to the Gulf area to prepare for a new round of negotiations.

The Iranian Foreign Minister asked the Security Council to continue its efforts to apply Resolution 598 in earnest, emphasizing that the state of nonpeace, nonwar could continue for a long time. Dr Velayati pointed out that this condition might lead to the return of tension to the area.

Dr Velayati also requested that Jan Eliasson be provided with the authority to implement Resolution 598. Dr Velayati did, however, welcome the special envoy's impending visit.

The Iranian Foreign Minister made it clear to the General Assembly that Iran "was prepared to apply Security Council Resolution 598 without delay or prior conditions."

He said that Iran was ready to release all prisoners in accordance with the plan suggested by UN Secretary General De Cuellar. Tehran is holding about 70,000 Iraqi prisoners, while Baghdad has some 35,000 Iranian prisoners. It should be noted, however, that neither side has informed the International Red Cross of the exact number of prisoners being held.

With regard to chemical weapons, Dr Velayati stressed that his country was prepared to take part in any international effort leading to their total embargo.

Despite Dr Velayati's expression of satisfaction with the improvement in international relations, he noted that his country was a direct victim of the United States, which has frozen Iranian assets, attacked its oil platforms, and shot down its civilian aircraft.

Radio Tehran indicated that Dr Velayati met the night before last with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, and discussed with him relations between their two countries.

With regard to the Afghan issue, Dr Velayati stressed in his speech, as reported by Radio Tehran, the need to restore completely the rights of the Afghans and to liberate all occupied territory.

The Iranian Foreign Minister reiterated his country's position vis-a-vis the Afghan issue, calling for Afghan self-determination and the establishment of an independent government.

Importance of Fighting Foreign Influences Stressed

Resisting Societal Vice

90OI0067A Tehran RESALAT in Persian 22 Nov 89 p 1

[Text] News Division—In a meeting held yesterday at 'Allameh Tabataba'i University in the presence of the students of the College of Social Sciences, Dr Hashemi, the director general of the office of propagation of virtue and prohibition of vice committee of the Islamic revolution, spoke about social vices and the violation of custom in the society and responded to the questions of the audience.

Reading part of the speech by Ayatollah Khamene'i to the women's congress in 1366 [21 March 1987-20 March 1988], he asked the academicians to study ways to spread the culture of propagating virtue and prohibiting vice in the society.

He invited the academicians to cooperate with the Islamic Revolutionary Committee to fight social vices and said: While the domineering countries make use of

the most advanced technology to spread the culture of immorality, we have no scientific plan to fight vice.

He emphasized the scientific study into reasons and motives and said: We must have different methods to deal with vices such as improper veiling and, after conducting research in this area, deal with the causes appropriately.

He added: We do not want to force women back to the veil with bayonets, as Reza Khan did in forcing them to unveil. We believe that we shall not get any results by force, but we need to penetrate the hearts of the people.

Dr Hashemi considers travel as one of the factors in the spread of vice in the society. He also said: The heroic nation of Iran, especially the honorable families of our martyrs, will never allow the spread of punk culture and improper veiling in the Islamic society.

Opposing Cultural Conspiracies

90O10067B Tehran RESALAT in Persian
22 Nov 89 p 4

[Text] The scholars of Islamic countries must discuss and exchange views on resolving the problems of Muslims and freeing them from the domination of the power of injustice governments. They must use their chests as shields to protect the interests of Muslims, thus preventing the invasion of the immoral cultures of the East and the West, which have caused the annihilation of the generation and of the nation, and remind the people of these countries of the ill effects and loss of identity which comes along with the glitter of the East and the West.

Message of Imam Khomeyni to the hajj pilgrims, Mordad 1366 [23 July-22 August 1987]

Historical experience, logical deduction, and the foundation of beliefs all emphasize that with the victory of the independence-seeking and anti-oppression revolution, the domineering powers are not prepared to accept the new conditions and will not give up their inclination for superiority. Rather, in keeping with their impure nature, they conspire to return to the unequal conditions of the past.

The materialistic world view dominating the oppressors makes them test such conspiracies so as to bring about results as soon as possible. Hence, the oppressors give priority to military, economic, and political conspiracies, and if they do not succeed, they set their hopes on cultural conspiracies. Although they appear superficially to be of a milder nature, if the revolutionary forces are negligent, because of the depth and importance of culture, the oppressor will succeed on the economic, political, and military fronts as well.

Hence, under the conditions of victory and self-rule, the revolutionary forces should not only pay careful attention to the cultural conspiracies of oppression from within, but also constantly increase their attacks against the false values governing the world.

In the same connection, and in light of the regular reminders of our late leader Imam Khomeyni and our beloved leader Ayatollah Khamene'i, in order to confront the cultural conspiracies of the colonialists, the cultural sector considers it its duty to make use of the directives of the two revered leaders to air the views of the experts and the people concerning cultural matters in reports and articles.

In this issue, we call to your attention the first point of this collection concerning the cultural conspiracies of the oppressors.

Hojjat ol-Islam Seyyed Jamaloddin Dinparvar (director of the Nahjolbalagheh foundation) says in this regard:

One of the most heinous faces of colonialism is cultural colonialism. It must be said before political and economic colonialism, it is cultural colonialism that paves the way for their entry. Hence, the most important investment by colonialists is in the area of cultural colonialism. Their most subtle trick is to drain a nation of its authentic cultural legacy, because when a nation feels that it has no substance and foundation, when it can no longer see its roots and history, and when it is unaware that it is seeking something to lean on, unwittingly, it follows power and is absorbed by it.

The nations of the East, especially the Islamic East, which have been a target of attack by global oppression for centuries and whose cultural heritage has been invaded by the enemy, who has made an effort to take charge of and influence the education of generations of Muslims, must be aware and alert in order to preserve their authentic Islamic identity and subsequently regain their human honor and glory. For further explanation of the issue, we shall briefly review the cultural conspiracies of colonialism.

1. Spreading corruption and prostitution; establishing centers of corruption and its spread among the young generation and students; propagation of unveiling or improper veiling; attending to appearances while glossing over intellectual and moral filth with glitter and makeup; hiding animalistic instincts and the filthiest and most shameful medieval sexual gratifications in the name of deceptive Western behavior.

2. False intellectual and mystical propaganda; misuse of the poetry and the lyric poems [ghazals] of famous poets, with twisted interpretations of such concepts as love and kindness, unfortunately, rather than being used in such poetry to promote lofty human and spiritual ideas, being degraded by the enemy to the level of utter baseness.

3. Supplying and offering inappropriate clothes designed and made by the international organization of corruption and colonialism, which in addition to being a source of profit and tremendous economic gain for them, turn the person wearing such clothes into their agent, whose mind and thoughts they control, like a puppet, turning him in any direction they wish and making of

him a tool for spreading their filthy ideas. In fact, the person who wears offensive Western clothes and sexy styles declares implicitly that he or she is a mercenary of colonialism.

4. Secret, dishonorable, and mercenary activities in schools and cultural organizations, through the distribution of photographs, tapes, and pamphlets, and invitations to parties of debauchery.

5. Staining sacred religious figures and draining the hearts of the people, particularly the young generations, of love for the Prophet and his family and other pious men, because as long as the love of these pious figures exists in the heart, Satan and such thoughts have no room. Hence, they try first of all to drive out these sacred people and ideas from the hearts and minds in order for the people to accept their idols, because the heart cannot contain two loves in the same way. If anyone desires to fill his heart with the love of God and the Imams, he must first drive out the demons and idols, since: The solitude of the heart is not a place for others/ When the demon leaves, the angel enters.

6. Propaganda against mosques and religious meetings and keeping everyone, especially the young generation, from such constructive centers.

7. Administration of and control over some religious meetings and religious groups through the hands of improper persons or agents of the oppressors, even with dozens of intermediaries.

He continued, enumerating the ways to fight such conspiracies:

1. Calling the attention of the people and the younger generation to the conspiracies through reasoning and documented evidence.

2. Satiating and satisfying minds with healthy, interesting food for the intellect.

3. Proper, interesting, and constant propagation from radio, television, and the press.

4. On the part of the government, seriously dealing with the main perpetrators and primary agents of such conspiracies.

Mr Fakhroddin 'Askar-Owlati (representative of the religious guardians and head of the Imam Khomeini emergency committee) said with regard to the cultural conspiracies of the oppressors:

As an introductory remark, it can be said that whenever the world dominators are disappointed in terms of military, political, or economic colonialism, or whenever they face an obstacle or are unable to impose such methods or do not consider the conditions right for the imposition of such domination, they resort to culture as a means for their conspiracies.

In the early stages, they try to destroy the religious beliefs of the society in question in order to religiously bankrupt it so that they can inject what they have in mind as they see fit. If they fail in the area of religion, they try to show that the authentic national traditions which contain human independence and freedom are negative and harmful and try to replace them with their own forged traditions. If this is not possible, they begin to raise issues of race and ethnic differences, implying that the race of the domination seekers is superior. If again they fail, they begin a new trick, engaging in pointing out the low level of knowledge and vision in the society and maintaining that such characteristics are unacceptable, in order to somehow create psychological complexes in that society. While humiliating the society, the domination seekers present themselves as possessors of lofty knowledge, vision, and human capabilities in order to make the society submit to them. They begin the conspiracy through a show of cultural aid and then a show of economic support and then political support. Ultimately, a military defense treaty is signed. In fact, without any military involvement, the dominators have fully attained domination and colonialization through cultural conspiracies and colonialism.

As evidence, Mr 'Askar-Owlati said: It would be appropriate to review the political, divine will of the Imam, rest his soul.

"Alienation against the colonized, Westernized, and Easternized countries which cause our countries to consider themselves, their culture, and power to be naught and consider the West and the East, the two powerful poles, as the superior race and their culture higher, thus regarding those two powers as the Mecca of the world, and presenting dependence on one of the two poles as an inevitable mandate."

In another section, the Imam states:

"With determination, hard work, and perseverance, stand up to eliminate dependencies and know that the Aryan and Arab races are by no means inferior to the European, American, and Soviet races. If an individual empties himself of despair and expects nothing of anyone but himself, in the long run he will have the power to do anything and build anything."

Professor Jallaleddin Farsi expresses the following views concerning the cultural conspiracies:

Cultural conspiracy usually means the secret plan and actions which the enemies of the revolution or global oppression have devised and implemented. The goal of this conspiracy is to reduce the beliefs and morality of the people and the officials of the country or, in other words, to destroy the revolution.

Considering the greater importance of domestic dangers, he says:

Before an external cause can be blamed for the phenomenon of the decline of beliefs and morality of the people,

or the destruction of the revolution in our monotheistic society, we must realize the internal one. The main threat to the monotheistic society comes from within and not outside. For this reason, the Prophet feared in his people more than the threat of the infidels the corruption and decadence within, which occurs in the actions of government officials.

The cultural conspiracies of foreigners can only escalate the situation. If the actions and policies of the government are unable to ensure such primary needs as bread, water, housing, clothing, culture, literacy, and health, and if the people suffer intolerable, crushing deprivation, numerous types of moral corruption and the decline of beliefs will occur. Hence, raising the issue of cultural conspiracy must not make us forget the main issue, which is, if a monotheistic revolution is going to be destroyed, it will be destroyed by domestic agents and not by foreign enemies. Cultural conspiracy takes place in one of two ways.

1. Directly, by expediting the course of destruction which has started internally.

2. Indirectly, by escalating poverty, deprivation, and economic disorder, so that the government and the people are unable to reach a higher level of moral and ideological belief and instead remain at the early stages of providing public services for the people.

Excess Liquid Gas To Be Exported

90C10051A Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 21 Nov 89 p 2

[Interview with Oil Minister Aqazadeh by reporters; in Ahvaz; date not specified]

[Text] Ahvaz—KEYHAN correspondent:

Excess liquid gas will be exported from the Iran-Japan petrochemical complex, the first phase of which will begin operations next year, with a capacity of one million tons.

Aqazadeh, the minister of petroleum, announced the above statement and added: At the present time, work on the water, electricity, and steam units of this complex is underway by the experts of the reconstruction groups of the country, the first unit of which will start operations in Khordad [22 May-21 June] next year.

He pointed out: The raw materials for the complex will be provided from the Ahvaz natural and liquid gas 800 factory.

The minister of petroleum, who had travelled to Ahvaz to take part in the opening ceremonies of the Marun liquid gas refinery and the natural gas and gas 800 factories of Ahvaz, spoke to reporters on these matters.

According to our correspondent, the second unit of the gas and liquid gas 700 and 800 factories of Khuzestan will become operational by the end of this year. These factories include 5 units and 11 pieces of pressurizing

equipment in Ahvaz and Marun and will produce 25,000 barrels of liquid gas and about 56 cubic feet of natural gas per day.

According to the same report, the Marun liquid gas refinery was established during a pause in the operations of the Bandar Mahshahr liquid gas refinery, next to the natural gas and liquid gas 500 factory, 95 km southeast of Ahvaz. This refinery has a capacity of 40,000 barrels of crude liquid gas per day, and its products consist of 19,000 barrels of domestic liquid gas and 15,600 barrels of natural unrefined gasoline per day.

The implementation cost of this project was about \$15 million dollars and 2.2 billion rials [as published]. The materials used by the refinery are procured from the natural gas and liquid gas factories of the Marun and Ahvaz regions.

Domestic liquid gas is delivered from the Martyr Shahraki loading station in Bandar Mahshahr to the Iranian national liquid gas company. Upon mixing the natural unrefined gasoline and crude oil in Marun 2, domestic liquid gas is transferred to the loading station.

Thousands of Telephone Numbers Assigned in Tehran

90C10051C Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 21 Nov 89 p 18

[Text] Qom—KEYHAN correspondent: By the end of this year, 30,000 new telephone numbers will be assigned in the cities of Tehran Province.

Mohammad Reza Sabur, the director general of communications for Tehran Province, who had traveled to Qom to visit the villages of that city, announced the above statement and added: Through the investment of 30 billion rials in Tehran Province by the communications company, a vast increase compared to past years, 30,000 new telephone numbers will be assigned to applicants in the cities of Karaj, Qom, Shahriar, Bomhan, Ruzhan, and Shahr-e Qods, and the villages. Most of the telephone numbers, that is, 15,000, will be for Karaj and the villages surrounding that city.

He also said: By the end of this year, in addition to this project, significant resources including communications offices and long-distance telephone systems will begin operation in the province, which will create significant qualitative and quantitative changes in long-distance telephone communications for customers.

He also said: By the end of this year, in addition to this project, significant resources such as communications offices and long-distance telephone systems will begin operations in the province, which in terms of quality and quantity will create significant changes in long-distance telephone communications for the customer.

In the next 10 years, a 20,000-unit telephone center will be built in Tehran Province, which will be fully operational by 1381 [21 March 2002-20 March 2003].

Heavy Industries Ministry on Distribution Suggestions

90010051D Tehran KEYHAN in Persian
21 Nov 89 p 18

[Text] Economic service:

On the basis of a plan that takes into consideration the criticism and solutions regarding the reduction in red tape required in purchasing goods, the Ministry of Heavy Industries asked Dr Habibi, the president's first deputy, in implementing this plan to resolve the problems of production, requesting that the industry be able to play its role in providing for domestic needs and in the area of industrial exports.

According to a report by KEYHAN's economic correspondent, this proposed plan was sent to the president's first deputy by the Ministry of Heavy Industries late last month.

The complete text of the proposed plan is as follows:

A. Elimination of procurement and distribution centers and establishment of purchasing councils in the industrial ministries.

All responsibility for purchasing should be that of the executive organizations responsible for production, and the necessary control should be implemented through the establishment of purchasing councils in the industrial ministries, formed of a number of trustworthy, competent individuals familiar with the problems of production. The procurement and distribution centers of the Ministry of Commerce shall act as data banks in connection with the industrial ministries and provide the industrial units with information concerning the international sellers of goods and the prices of the day.

Once the purchases have been approved by the "purchasing council," the registration of the order will take place in one center, and if a purchase is considered by the center to be suspicious, it may send a report to the minister of commerce for investigation.

The Present Method Is Counterproductive

The present method is illogical, uneconomical, and counterproductive. The major reasons are as follows:

1. Every organization with responsibility must be given the necessary authority to carry out that responsibility. If the responsibility for production belongs to the industrial ministries, the responsibility for purchasing goods and raw materials, which are the primary basis of production, cannot be taken away from these ministries.

2. The present method, in which the production apparatus carries out purchasing negotiations while another organization altogether controls and approves pricing, has resulted in sellers never declaring their actual prices up front, always leaving room for discounts at a later stage. Hence, those purchases that are approved by the centers in the first stage are suspect.

Under this method, purchase negotiations are artificial, because the seller knows that the negotiator is not authorized to buy.

3. Essentially, with regard to most goods (except for those produced on the basis of particular standards of quality), the issue of price depends on the quality of the goods. Hence, price comparison without taking into consideration the quality of the goods is illogical. Often less expensive purchases may not result in a savings. The problem of determining quality requires specialization, which the centers lack because they are not involved in production.

4. Since the centers are only responsible for the control of prices and not production, if there is a problem in production and, for example, an item needs to be purchased immediately and transported, the centers often refuse to accept the price of the seller because it is too high, resulting in the stoppage of part of the production or a large amount of goods and production machinery being stored due to the shortage of that particular item, even though there is an urgent need for that item on the market.

5. Many production factories, because of joint technical cooperation agreements or the transfer of technical knowledge, are obliged to purchase the raw materials and spare parts they need from particular companies. However, since the directors of the production companies lack the authority to purchase and the centers may change the prices or at least delay the proformas for months, no seller is prepared to fill the orders until the funds have been released, and this problem has lengthened the purchasing stage by several months.

6. The price of goods and raw materials on the world market changes daily, weekly, or monthly. When a seller announces the price of his goods, the price proposed to Iran exceeds that for other countries, because in Iran it takes from 9 to 12 months for a purchase to be finalized and the funds to be released, and the seller always quotes a higher price in anticipation of such a delay.

7. Given the present method, goods can never be purchased through bidding.

8. Some purchases are made in conjunction with the transfer of technical knowledge and industrial cooperation. Unfortunately, the procurement and distribution centers do not have the necessary expertise to evaluate such purchases. Hence, such purchases, which are generally speaking the most valuable part of the industry, are faced with more problems.

9. Nearly all the ministries which carry out large-scale implemental work in the country and use a major portion of the developmental foreign currency are exempt from the control of the procurement and distribution centers and also the control of industrial ministries (in regard to domestic production control), while the industrial ministries, which are the domestic producers, are subject to all sorts of rules and regulations.

This means that we have established all the necessary facilities without any controls for those who import foreign goods, but for those who want to produce domestically, we have created a host of problems.

The present method must be reversed, or domestic producers should also enjoy the facilities of the importers.

10. The experience of the past 10 years in the country has shown that, since the revolution, we devised certain regulations which have prevented the executive organizations from doing their jobs, but whenever it is felt that an executive organization, because of the problems created in the society, must do its job, we exempt it from these regulations.

Examples are the Ministries of Petroleum, Defense, and so on, and most recently, the Ministry of Energy, in the case of which, when we had 6 to 8 hours of blackout in the country, we began to think about unbinding its hands and feet, and we saw that it was effective.

Unfortunately, the problems of industry are not readily apparent to the common onlooker. Comparing the problems of industry with the problems of electricity is like comparing cancer with the common cold. The symptoms of a cold are readily apparent, but cancer can only be detected by an expert before it reaches the terminal stage. The problems of industry are the cancer of the national economy. If we accept this belief, the treatment is clear. If we do not, all this shouting will get us nowhere.

Elimination of Domestic Production Permits

B. Elimination of the need to obtain production permits for industrial ministries: We believe that the domestic manufacture of goods should not prevent the import of similar goods from other countries. Hence, the requirement to obtain a domestic production permit, one which indicates that an item is not manufactured domestically, must be eliminated, provided, of course, that firstly appropriate trade taxes on the entry of all imported goods are established in order to promote quality and reduce the prices of domestic products while supporting them. Secondly, all executive organizations of the country should be required to pay taxes.

Our reasons for this belief are as follows:

1. The government is unable to prevent the entry of smuggled foreign goods. The most obvious proof is that at the present time despite the general shortages of goods in the country, all sorts of goods, even those which are not permitted entry, are found on the open market.

Hence, all foreign goods that people need enter the country. However, instead of the government making an appropriate profit, the smugglers do.

2. The organizations that have been exempted from acquiring domestic production permits, and which, incidentally, have at their disposal most of the foreign

currency in the country, import foreign goods at low prices (7 tomans on the dollar) without paying trade taxes, while the domestic producer, who cannot compete with foreign sellers and 7 tomans on the dollar, closes down, yet we continue to talk about supporting domestic producers.

3. When foreign goods are not available at all on the market, the domestic producer has no competition. Hence, he has no incentive to improve the quality and reduce the price of his product.

Elimination of Ministry of Roads Permit

C. Elimination of the transport permit from the Ministry of Roads: At the present, for most purchases, applicants must receive transport permits from the Ministry of Roads for every item.

We believe that, based on the statistics of previous years and the amount of imports of every ministry and its transportation policies, the Ministry of Roads and Transport must determine and announce at the beginning of every year every ministry's share in the entry of goods from various points of entry.

In addition, every ministry, on the basis of their share, should handle its own transportation and in each case inform the Ministry of Roads and Transport. In the event of special problems, the Ministry of Roads can modify the share during the course of the year, whenever it finds it necessary to do so.

Attention to Releasing Documented Funds

D. Simplifying the steps to releasing documented funds:

At the present, in order to release documented funds, documents are exchanged several times between the Central Bank and the bank handling the funds and its branches.

We believe that given all the computer resources in the Central Bank and the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance, the Central Bank can easily establish a computerized system between itself and all the involved banks to have available the statistics concerning its foreign currency receipts and payments inside and outside the country at any given moment. With the establishment of such a system, the work of releasing documented funds can be done in the involved banks without repeated exchanges with the Central Bank and wasting 1 or 2 months time.

The method of operation will be such that the Central Bank, at the beginning of each year, on the basis of the five-year plan and within the framework of the budget ratified and the decisions of the foreign currency allocation committee, will determine the foreign currency share of every ministry and announce it to the appropriate banks.

If in the course of the year, due to failure to collect the projected revenues in the budget, or for whatever reason, any change occurs in the foreign currency shares, on the 15th of every month, the modified share for the next month will be announced to the appropriate banks, and the executive organizations, issuing foreign currency checks, will engage in releasing documented funds.

Any form of control as well as easy classification of data by the computer system is possible, based on balancing the receipts and payments.

Prevention of Personal Relations

The implementation of this method has the following advantages:

1. The existing bureaucracy will be sufficiently reduced and purchasing will be expedited by about 1 and ½ months to 2 months.
2. The likelihood of influence in personal relations in the area of foreign purchases and domestic products will be prevented.
3. Possible misuses, delays, and unscrupulous expediting in the release of funds will be prevented.

PAKISTAN

Seraiki Leaders Demand Division of Punjab

46000042B Karachi DAWN in English 14 Oct 89 p 3

[Text] Multan, Oct 13: Pakistan Seraiki Party (PSP) is waging a struggle for balancing of power among the federating units and for ending economic injustice and exploitation in the country.

This was stated by Mr Taj Mohammad Khan Langah, PSP central president, while addressing a gathering here on Friday.

Afzaal Masud, PSP Vice President; Seth Ubaid-ur-Rehman, Chairman of literary commission; Dost Mohammad Bhechar, Mazdoor Kissan Party; Tahir Masud, Pakistan Workers Party; Qari Ubaid-ur-Rehman and Ejaz Husain Shah also addressed the gathering.

The speakers demanded division of the Punjab into two or three units to end the sense of deprivation among other provinces.

Mr Langah made it clear: "We are not fanning regionalism or linguistic hatred in the area.

He said that all those who were settled in the Seraiki belt, whether they spoke Urdu, Punjabi, Pushto, Baloch, Haryanvi, Pathohari or Seraiki, were all Seraikis.

A resolution passed at the meeting demanded the entire Seraiki belt, comprising Multan, Bahawalpur and D.G. Khan divisions and Bhakkar, Mianwali, Jhang and Dera Ismail Khan, districts be declared as duty free cotton zone and textile industry be set up in this zone.

Status of Northern Areas Discussed

46000042C Karachi DAWN in English 18 Oct 89 p 5

[Article by Shehla Kazmi]

[Text] Reports regarding the Status of Northern Areas do not encompass all the facts about the matter in question. They are mostly focussing upon an agreement between the Government of Pakistan, Azad Kashmir and Jammu & Kashmir Muslim Conference in 1949 relating to the distribution of work in Kashmir.

The Northern Areas in Pakistan include the districts of Gilgit, Baltistan, Diamer and Chitral. Excluding Chitral, they are administered by the Federal Government through Political Agents. Gilgit Agency and Baltistan are organized as separate units because of the difficult mountainous terrain that divides them and also because of the lack of communication between them. Gilgit town is the headquarters of Gilgit Agency while Skardu is the administrative unit of Baltistan. Although local body institutions are functioning in the Northern Areas, their representation in national political life is still inadequate.

The introductory part of the Constitution of Pakistan says that the territory of Pakistan also includes "such States and territories as are or may be included in Pakistan, whether by accession or otherwise". Hence, the Northern Areas, specially Gilgit and Baltistan, which acceded to Pakistan on 1 November 1947 and 14 August 1948 respectively, are constitutionally integrated parts of Pakistan.

The constitutional and legal status of the Northern Areas has been discussed for a long time. According to press reports, Sardar Abdul Qayyum Khan, President of Azad Kashmir, in his open letter to the president of Pakistan, has tried to give an impression that the Northern Areas, specially Gilgit and Baltistan, have been a part of Jammu and Kashmir State and should be represented in the Azad Kashmir Assembly in order to democratize the region.

Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto has appointed a high level committee to determine the constitutional status of Gilgit and Baltistan. The Committee is also entrusted with the power to analyze all aspects leading to the grant of political rights to the people of the Northern Areas and to present a report to the Prime Minister accordingly.

This short article aims at representing general opinion on the constitutional and legal status of the Northern Areas with reference to the Partition Plan (1947) and the developments since partition.

The partition of India was an epoch-making event in as much as it divided the subcontinent on the basis of the two-nation theory, leading to the establishment of two independent States of Hindu India and Muslim Pakistan. But there remained another bloc in India comprising 565 States which recognized British paramountcy. The allegiance of these States was used as one of the arguments for the legitimacy of the British Crown while some of them, specially parts of Kashmir (Gilgit

and its adjoining areas), were used as a buffer zone against the communist threat from the northwest.

The British paramountcy was so vague that it created difficulties in the way of many constitutional developments of India. The ambiguous relationship between the Princely States and the Crown was one of the major weaknesses which prevented the implementation of the Federation Scheme of the 1935 Act. Similarly difficulties arose at the time of partition on the question of the termination of the paramountcy. To whom would the Indian States go, and how would their rulers use the freedom of choices? Would they be practically able to revert to their former pre-British status with the passing away of the British paramountcy?

The Partition Plan did not answer these questions. The instrument of accession, embodied in the 3rd June Partition Plan of 1947 gives a choice to the States to either join one of the two dominions or to remain independent. But no *modus operandi* was explained in the Plan to implement the freedom of choice. Since Pakistan and India emerged on the basis of the two-nation theory, it was illogical to leave a large population inhabiting the States to the sweet will of their rulers, [the] majority of whom were accustomed to look towards the British Crown for the safety and protection of their power instead of their people. These were the lacunae of the Partition Plan through which, emerged the Kashmir issue. In the absence of any clear policy about the Indian States, the Indian National Congress used all possible tricks and forces to compel a great majority of the States to accede to India allowing about 14 to join Pakistan.

Through the malicious tactics of Hari Singh, the Maharaja of Kashmir, India got the accession of the Jammu and Kashmir State against the wishes of its people, 77 percent of whom were Muslims at the time of partition. Mountbatten, the Crown Representative in India, accepting the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India, wrote to the Maharaja on 27 October 1947 that the State's accession to India was subject to reference to the people after law and order was restored in Kashmir. The UN Security Council's resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 regarding the Kashmir issue also provided for a plebiscite in Kashmir. These resolutions omitted the provision of remaining independent. The regions now comprising Azad Kashmir liberated their areas on 24 October 1947 two days before the accession of Kashmir to India.

Keeping in view the above facts the accession of Gilgit and Baltistan to Pakistan was legal and there should be no dispute on the question of their constitutional status.

Although the Gilgit Agency, with a Muslim majority of 100 percent, was part of Jammu and Kashmir State in the past, the Dogra regime never had real authority over it. The 1846 Treaty of Lahore, enabled Gulab Singh to purchase the province of Kashmir from the British and it came to be known as a Sikh province despite a history of Muslim rule, spread over five centuries. There were a

number of petty Muslim Kingdoms there and most of them to some degree, had come into the orbit of the Sikh dominion during the reign of Ranjit Singh, and Gulab Singh clearly regarded himself as the inheritor of Sikh rights and interests in this quarter. He tried to bring all Hill States under Dogra rule, but was only partially successful. By 1890, it was the British agent at Gilgit who wielded the real authority there and the Dogras were never able to establish their power as they had in the vale of Kashmir.

The British Government was vitally interested in the region and had used it as a buffer zone against Russian expansion from the North. In 1935 the British Government got Gilgit and its neighborhood leased from the Maharaja of Kashmir for a 60-year period and from that moment the region passed right out of the orbit of the Kashmir and Jammu State Government. On the eve of partition in 1947, however, the British surrendered their lease with the result that in theory sovereignty reverted to Kashmir. But the people in Gilgit never gave the opportunity to allow this sovereignty to become effective in any way. The Maharaja of Kashmir appointed a Governor, Ghansara Singh, to safeguard his interests in the region. This was not acceptable to the people of Gilgit. The Gilgit Scouts, aided by the local Muslims, fought bravely against the Kashmir Army and liberated their territory. Mr. Brown, who officered the area at the time of partition, then called a conference which was attended by the Gilgit Scouts, Kashmir Infantry and civilian representatives. They unanimously decided to accede to Pakistan and declared war against the Indo-Dogra axis and set up a provincial government with a former Subedar Shah Rais Khan.

On 16 November 1947, Pakistan's flag was ceremoniously raised on the tower of the Scout Lines amid great rejoicing. The Pakistan Government in response to urgent appeals from the freedom fighters, sent Sardar Mohammed Alam as the Political Agent to administer the area. A similar situation emerged in the District of Baltistan where the Dogra forces had to surrender. The Government of Pakistan appointed the First Additional Political Agent on 14 August 1948 to look after the area.

The situation in the Northern Areas is much improved now as compared to the days of the Dogra regime. The means of communication have improved with the construction of Karakoram Highway.

The administrative set up of the Northern Areas seems to be a civil division of Pakistan. Till 1983 it was headed by a Resident Commissioner who acted as the head of the administration. But in that year, the then President of Pakistan appointed a Secretaries Committee headed by the Cabinet Secretary to review the administrative set-up of the Northern Areas. The Committee recommended that the post of the Resident Commissioner be redesignated as Administrator Northern Areas who would act as the Chief Executive of Northern Areas. The Committee also recommended other administrative changes which were implemented by the Ministry of

Kashmir Affairs and Northern Affairs in parts. All development programmes are now carried out under the overall supervision of the Administrator. The projects are mostly prepared by the concerned departments or Northern Affairs PWD [Public Works Department]. The departmental working party headed by the Administrator, having members from the Planning & Finance Divisions, and also public representatives can approve projects up to the tune of Rs 20 million, whereas the Northern Affairs Council, having 16 elected members, can approve projects costing up to Rs 60 million. Projects costing more than Rs 60 million are to be approved by NEC [National Economic Council].

This establishes that the bureaucracy administers the whole area, except Chitral, which is represented in the Assembly. Public participation, however, is restricted throughout the Northern Areas. We find some sort of public representation and democratic institutions though at the local level. There are 105 union councils, three district councils, and three municipal committees at Gilgit, Skardu and Chilas.

Although local institutions were introduced in 1979, there was some sort of local system existing in different districts of the Northern Areas long before that. In Gilgit, the District Jagirdary system was functioning while in Diamer district the area was being governed under the Jirga system within the framework of the Frontier Crime Regulations (FCR). The powers in civil and criminal cases were vested in the Political Agent and his field officers.

The area also saw certain local and rural development programmes implemented as in other parts of Pakistan, after 1958. They include the Village Aid Programme, the Basic Democracy System, the Rural Works Programme, the People's Works Programme and the integrated Rural Development Programme. All these programmes were carried out by the political and administrative units of the northern Areas. In 1979 the local government institutions in the area were given the responsibility of planning, education and monitoring of rural development. The community Basic Services Programme was launched in 1982. The Government has also initiated Integrated Area Development projects in collaboration with the UNICEF [United Nations Children's Fund] and Aga Khan Foundation. The community Basic Services programme has been implemented in three phases in 150 villages in the three districts of the Northern Areas from 1982 to 1987.

Even though the Northern Areas have received comparatively less attention, they have always been treated as separate administrative units under the Federal Government of Pakistan. It is high time to introduce political institutions there and to allow the residents to participate in the decision-making process at the national and provincial levels.

The Northern Areas are already legally and constitutionally integrated into Pakistan and all claims to the contrary are misleading. There is no reason to annex the

areas to Azad Kashmir. On the contrary, besides introducing political and other developments in the region it would be in order to upgrade the present constitutional status of the Northern Areas as the fifth province of the Federation of Pakistan, sharing all legal and political rights that the other provinces are enjoying. Isn't it an irony of fate that the Gilgit and Baltistan people, who had themselves acceded to Pakistan are still kept away from Pakistan's legislature? Although the Govt. of Pakistan had accepted their allegiance, dependent upon the settlement of the future of Jammu and Kashmir State, the areas constitutionally form part of Pakistan, more so because the people of Gilgit and Baltistan have already exercised their will to accede to Pakistan by rejecting the Maharaja's accession to India during 1947-48.

It is a pity that the news reports appearing in a section of our press regarding the status of Northern Areas do not encompass all the facts about the matter in question. They are mostly focusing upon an agreement between the Governments of Pakistan, Azad Kashmir and Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference in 1949 relating to the distribution of work in Kashmir. This agreement actually empowered the Government of Pakistan to control and direct various fields of activities in Azad Kashmir including Gilgit, under the Political Agent without taking into account the fact that Gilgit had already acceded to Pakistan before the enforcement of this agreement.

Technology Transfer: Article Questions Standard Views

46000042D Karachi DAWN (Business Supplement)
in English 3 Nov 89 p V

[Article by M.B. Naqvi]

[Text] Some eminent engineers believe that technology per se cannot be transferred; it has to be developed locally keeping in view each country's circumstances, economic, demographical and physical factors.

Frequent complaints are made as PM [Prime Minister] Benazir Bhutto spoke last week in Kuala Lumpur at the Commonwealth Summit, about the developed countries not transferring true technology to Third World countries, particularly Pakistan. It is asserted they are interested mainly in selling, at most, complete plants or large machinery, preferably on turn-key contract basis, when they do not always insist on exporting consumer goods and durables. This is a reflection of the calls that Third World delegates make at most international moots. In many respects, the objections are either naive or misconceived.

Indeed, where Pakistan is concerned, these pleadings for technology transfers are somewhat strange—unless it is assumed that true industrialization of this country is a responsibility of the more developed countries. Let us be clear on essential prerequisites: this question really

becomes relevant to a country that undertakes a well-thought out and integrated plan of industrialization of the economy with a view to achieving both self-reliance and self-sustained growth.

Stark Reality

The stark reality is Pakistan never made such a decision; its governments, priding in their pragmatism, always opted for soft options and a 'more practical' approach. This meant that they chose a few ad hoc industrial units, mostly on a turn-key basis. No doubt, under Mr Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, some basic industries were set up. But even they were chosen for their ad hoc security relevance and most of them were not always fully utilized. In the main, there was a clear rejection of an India-like basic industrial base and all ideas of an integrated, self-sustained industrialization were located under known foreign advice.

For a country like Pakistan that has no clear preference for the State-determined and State-enforced order or priorities in economic development, indeed which appears to believe in the magic of market place, the question is basically irrelevant. If Pakistani officials under all sorts of governments, except during the first PPP [Pakistan People's Party] Government, wish to deregulate, give private enterprise maximum scope and freedom of choice and provide incentives to it to perform its desired (free) role, the complaint about technology transfers becomes redundant; the entrepreneur will do what is cheaper, profitable and more efficient. That should be OK by the government if they mean what their policy statements say and there is a remarkable continuity and consistency in the pronouncements and policy decisions by the economic part of our senior bureaucracy's fondness for private enterprise and its dislike of socialistic public sector [sentence as published].

Nevertheless, despite the policy framework that favors unhindered economic construction on free market principles—and also as a result of echoes being heard all the time from other Third World countries, complaints against MNC [multinational corporation]s taking host countries for a ride while selling production equipment have multiplied. Pakistanis, in government and outside, have become conscious of the wide gaps in industrialization and of their mills and factories being mostly odd accretion of obsolete or obsolescent or inappropriate machinery. The limitations and inadequacies of our industrial policies stand out and we constantly bump against our dependence on others for whatever technology is handed to us. This awareness of being left out from the real game is forcing many Pakistanis to rail against the cupidity of large sellers of modern technology.

Pakistanis would do well to distinguish between how Socialist countries behave and how private corporations of the West conduct their business. When we set up steel mills in Karachi, the Soviets had no hesitation in giving us whatever technology they were using; it did not worry them. On the contrary, a large private company in the West spends a tremendous amount of money on R and D to achieve relative efficiency, usually increasing the

capital costs and reducing the costly labor component per unit of production. This is a vital matter for private companies. This gives them competitive advantage against all other producers of the same technology. Any developer of plant blueprint or product would want to preserve that new technology, in order to (a) recover its R and D costs and (b) make as much profit per unit of product as would recompense total capital employed as optimally as possible. That is how private enterprise work. A bird cannot be made to behave like a mammal.

Now this applies to all kinds of technologies developed by private corporations, no matter where. Even "hard" technologies (plants and factories' equipment for manufacturing industries) are not really easy to be transferred. Still they can be. In most cases the technology developer would wish itself to invest in a "host" country through an affiliate or subsidiary of its own (with negotiable local share of equity and personnel) to keep its technology 'secure'. 'Soft' technologies are said to be relatively less expensive per unit, though remuneration of donor countries' personnel of service industries cost much more to Third World importers than the experts dealing with 'hard' technologies.

Let us not ignore the primary concern of all private developers of a technology (of any kind); it is to make profits for the chunk of capital locked up in its development before it becomes obsolete—and it does become so very quickly these days losing its competitive advantage in favor of a later competitor. It will be idle to expect a tame transfer of the essential new technology before its full commercial exploitation—just for the altruistic purpose of satisfying nationalistic urges of the Third World. This applies to all technologies in private sector.

Primary Concern

Indeed, there are eminent engineers who have doubts about the very concept of technology transfer; technology per se cannot be transferred; it has to be developed by those who want to industrialize and develop their economies by themselves. Each country's circumstances, economic, demographical and physical, determine the nature of its designs. Any newly developing country would certainly need initial help in starting the process. But it must know what it wants and what the prerequisites are. This initial help can take many forms, including buying whole mills and factories or whatever. Historically, Japan and China had begun by pirating foreign technologies, copying them and later adapting, modifying and even improving them. They could do so because they had fulfilled the required prerequisites (social infrastructure primarily, though not in isolation from physical facilities) in approximately adequate manner. This was mainly by creating a large enough pool of educated, trained and skilled manpower.

Prerequisites

Education and reasonably well-nourished and healthy labor force are not the only prerequisite, however. As we

noted, the managers of the economy would have to keep their economic objectives clearly in sharp focus with a proper order of priorities. Then, growth of physical infrastructure has to march in step with social facilities' growth. The top management's readiness to pay the full price of true development not only the allround (sector-wise) development of the economy but generating self-reliance and self-sustaining impulses for development within each department of growth: for example, spread of scientific and technology education would require not only the widest possible base of general education, it will also need institutions of higher science and technology that aim at excellence and original work. Within the industrial sector, the notion that a country can have a more advanced services sector than its manufacturing one is unsound. Not only country can be an America. And so forth.

To sum up, Pakistanis would do better by attending to what comes first: clarifying the state's role in the economy. It is an engine of change and improvement or a mere holder of the ring wherein private initiative achieves what it may. In the latter case, we have no business criticizing how private enterprise behaves: the latter knows best; after all its money is at stake. But if we do wish the State to become the engine of growth and its director, we must fix the direction of the economy not to mention the goals that have to be achieved.

Steel Expansion Program Launched

46000043A Islamabad THE MUSLIM
in English 12 Nov 89 p 8

[Article by M.S. Raj]

[Text] Karachi, 11 November—The Senior Federal Minister Begum Nusrat Bhutto while stressing the need to expand and develop the iron and steel industry in Pakistan announced that the People's governments plans to set up three more steel mills in the country. Begum Bhutto who launched the Pakistan Steel's billet caster on Saturday, said that the new steel mills are planned to be set up at Nokkundi in Balochistan, Dera Ismail Khan and Sargodha in the Punjab province.

She said that studies to build these steel mills were already underway and these mills were promised by us in our party's manifesto.

She said that the Soviet Union had also offered a 100 million U.S. dollars loan for the expansion of the Pakistan Steel.

She said that the commissioning of the billet caster was in fact the launching of the expansion programme of Pakistan Steel.

The billet caster which has been set up with the assistance of an Austrian firm in a short span of 16 months at a cost of Rs 400 million would increase the existing production capacity of billets from 2,60,000 tons a year to 6,60,000 tons a year meeting 45 per cent of the country's billet requirements.

The Senior Federal Minister said that launching of the expansion programme would bring in prosperity and ensure overall development in the country.

She said that a new era had begun and appreciated the efforts of the Pakistan Steel for setting up the billet caster and said that it is a matter of pride for the management and workers and satisfaction for the government.

She assured all possible assistance from the government for the expansion programme of the Pakistan steel and said that the development of the iron and steel industry would help improve the living standards and it is the need of the time.

Begum Bhutto whose speech was more than once interrupted by slogans of Jeay Bhutto and Bhutto Zinda Hai, had to personally intervene at one time to direct the workers to avoid coming to the stage which was specially built inside the huge new billet caster premises.

On the occasion she also stressed the need to increase the production of the Pakistan steel and said that we should further make this mammoth project profit-oriented.

The Senior Federal Minister also announced a bonus for all the workers of the mill and assured that their case regarding pension scheme which is already under consideration, would be expedited.

Begum Bhutto also directed the Pakistan Steel management to provide free technical education to 500 workers and asked them to give priority to these employed on daily wages. She said those who successfully complete their training should be absorbed in the mill.

On the occasion she also upgraded the Allama Iqbal College to degree level and announced the separation of Allama Iqbal School from the College.

Earlier when the Senior Federal Minister reached the Steel Mill's premises by a helicopter, she was greeted by hundreds of school children.

The Minister of State for Production, Raja Shahid Zafar in his welcome address said that Pakistan Steel has been directed to carry out technical survey and investigation for setting up a mini steel mill at Quetta and Kalabagh based on indigenous iron ores found at Nokkundi in Balochistan and Chichali/Kalabagh in the Punjab. He said that with the commissioning of the billet caster Pakistan steel had actually entered the expansion stage and it is now set for increasing its production capacity to 1.5 million tons by 1991.

He informed that in the second phase it is planned to increase the capacity to three million tons by 1966.

Others who spoke on the occasion included Secretary Ministry of Production, M. Masihuddin and Chairman Pakistan Steel, Maj. Gen. Shujat Ali Bokharee. The launching ceremony of the billet caster on which millions were spent was totally mismanaged. On one hand the security personnel misbehaved with the guests including

journalists while on the other the workers had a free hand who continuously disturbed the smooth proceedings.

A senior diplomat who was present along with scores of other diplomats and officials remarked that he had never seen such type of mismanagement in his entire life.

Workers on the occasion also raised slogans against Tajdar Siddiqi, President CBA [Central Bureau of Audit?] Union and one of the Board of Directors of Pakistan steel who was present on the stage.

Press Views on Sindh Situation Reported

46000042A Karachi DAWN in English 13 Oct 89 p 2

[Article by Anwer Pirzado]

[Text] The debate in the National Assembly and the Senate on the desecration of Pakistan's flag at Sukkur Airport, the threat given to the Sindhi Press by the MQM [Muhajir Qaumi Movement] chief, the influx of foreign nationals in the country as indicated by the Prime Minister, the grant-in-aid delayed for the rain victims of July last and the famine-like conditions prevailing in Achhro Thar of Sindh were some of the main issues discussed by the Sindhi dailies under review (from Oct 1 and onwards).

On the issue of the desecration of the national flag during Sindh tour of Mr G.M. Syed, the Sindhi dailies while condemning the action suggested to the Government not to take hasty steps which could lead to further deterioration of the law and order situation.

The dailies narrated all similar incidents occurred in the country in the past and underlined the need to safeguard the present phase of democracy in the country.

The daily HILAL PAKISTAN, Karachi, a mouthpiece of Sindh PPP [Pakistan People's Party], in its editorial Oct 7 said: "The desecration of the national flag is a deplorable and condemnable act, but to regard all Sindhis as traitors and anti-State elements as a result of an act committed by some, is nothing but injustice.

Yet another editorial note in the same daily expresses anxiety over continuous incidents of firing in Hyderabad after the riots of Sept 17 last and advised the administration to take stern steps for eradication of violence in this city.

The daily SINDH NEWS, Hyderabad, in its Oct 7 issue, writes in its editorial: "Such incidents have been taking place in the country for a long time in which various political groups have been hoisting their own flag after removing the national flag from various buildings. In Hyderabad and Karachi too, such incidents took place. However, it is a highly deplorable fact that some sections of people have unleashed an unprecedented propaganda against the PPP Government. We condemn the Sukkur incident and advise the rivals of democracy to stop conspiracies against the present government by making Sukkur incident as a basis of their campaign."

The daily AWAMI AWAZ, Karachi, says in its editorial: "It looks as if the workers of the Jeay Sindh Tehrik lack sense of discipline. This act is such which could only be condemned. However, in spite of clear denial from the leaders of the Jeay Sindh Tehrik regarding their involvement in the Sukkur incident, certain elements are busy in exerting undue pressure on the Government which is not fair."

The daily AFTAB, Hyderabad, in its lengthy editorial writes: "We must honor the national flag. However, those boys who removed the national flag should be made to realize their mistake, and be pardoned, if they realize. However, if the Government decide to arrest the nationalist leaders, we would also consider it is an extremist act, the daily said.

The daily IBRAT in its editorial said: How this could occur? What was its real story? Whose hand was involved in it. It all must thoroughly be investigated.

The daily MEHRAN of Hyderabad says: "First of all we should explore the causes of unrest in Sindh. We should study as to why the people of Sindh are getting hostile to Pakistan?... Since the daily MEHRAN is the organ of the party which made Pakistan, i.e., the Pakistani Muslim League, the prevailing conditions of Sindh form the cause of great concern for us."

All Sindhi newspapers protested over the warning given by the MQM chief to the Sindhi Press recently. In this connection a joint editorial was floated in five Sindhi dailies on Oct 8. The joint editorial said in part, "the chief of MQM Mr. Altaf Hussain said while addressing a Press conference in Karachi that, "Urdu dailies are being burnt down in Sindh and their sale hindered. I hereby warn that if in the future any Urdu newspaper is burnt down, it should be understood fully well as to where from the Sindhi newspapers are being published and what could not be done to them.

It is the misfortune of the press in Pakistan that various political and linguistic organizations wanted to influence the newspapers by attacking and threatening them.

"... We shall call upon APNS [All Pakistan Newspapers Society] and CPNE [Council of Pakistan Newspaper Editors] to devise a strategy so that the honor and prestige of the Press could be maintained. We shall also call upon those who speak against the Press to review their attitude towards the Press and should bring about a positive change in their approach.

The daily IBRAT and SINDH NEWS in their Oct 9 issues, welcomed the address by the Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto about obstructing the influx of 2600 foreign nationals in Pakistan every day. Both newspapers expressed concern over the mounting pressure of ever-increasing population of foreigners over the national economy and suggested for some practical steps to eradicate the menace.

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

17 Jan. 1990